Putting The Cart Before The Horse

With the approach of the Cairo Summit to discuss the Palestinian issue and the reconstruction of Gaza, Arab leaders find themselves facing three main scenarios to make decisive decisions that determine the future of Gaza and the fate of the Palestinians the day after the cessation of the war. The dilemma is no longer limited to reconstruction only but also includes the political and administrative arrangements that ensure the stability of the sector and prevent the recurrence of the devastating conflict.

From the American side, it seems that the Trump administration is adopting a more stringent approach, as it recently stated the necessity of displacing Palestinians from Gaza as a “solution” to ensure regional security, which reflects its traditional position biased towards Israel and complicates any Arab efforts to find an independent solution for the sector.

 This American position raises great concerns in Arab and international circles, given the disastrous consequences it carries for the Palestinians and the entire region, especially in light of the widespread international rejection of forced displacement policies.

The first scenario involves adopting a comprehensive regional solution led by Arabs, aiming to place Gaza under temporary Arab administration, which may include Egypt and perhaps some Gulf states, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. In this scenario, a transitional body would be established to administer the Strip, which would undertake reconstruction operations, organize basic services, and reorganize the security situation in a way that prevents the recurrence of the conflict. 

This body could also work to pave the way for comprehensive Palestinian elections to be held later, so that Gaza would be part of a unified Palestinian entity. 

This temporary administration would work to restructure institutions within the Strip, ensure the regular provision of health and education services, and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged by the war. It would also undertake the tasks of securing the crossings and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, while imposing strict control to prevent the infiltration of any elements that might contribute to destabilization. 

It is expected that the contributing Arab states would have different roles, as Egypt could handle security aspects, while the Gulf states would contribute to financing and reconstruction. This option requires Arab and international consensus, as well as internal Palestinian acceptance, which may be difficult in light of the differences between the factions. 

Israel may not view this scenario favorably, as it strengthens the Arab role in Gaza and limits its influence there. In addition, the success of this scenario depends on the Arabs’ ability to impose a unified vision and work to reduce external interventions that may hinder this solution. Ultimately, this scenario remains a realistic option, but it is fraught with challenges that require active diplomacy and strong political will.

As for the second scenario, it is to support the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority and grant it full control over Gaza after reaching internal understandings with the various factions, including Hamas. In this framework, the security services are integrated into a unified framework under the supervision of the Authority, and the administrative institutions are unified, with an Arab and international commitment to provide financial and logistical support to ensure the success of this transition.

One of the main pillars of this scenario is rebuilding trust between the various Palestinian factions, which requires intensive efforts from regional and international mediators, especially Egypt and the United Nations. This proposal also requires providing guarantees that the faction leaders will not be targeted or excluded from the political scene, which necessitates establishing a joint governance mechanism for a transitional period.

This scenario depends primarily on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to impose its effective control over the Strip, which is doubtful, especially in light of the deep differences between the West Bank and Gaza, and the lack of trust between the Palestinian parties. 

In addition, Hamas’s acceptance of this proposal may be conditional on effective participation in governance, which may not be acceptable to Israel or some regional powers. Moreover, this solution faces obstacles related to the extent of the international community’s ability to commit to funding reconstruction, and to ensuring that Israel does not obstruct any efforts aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority’s control over the Strip.

The third scenario, which may be the most complex, is to impose an international solution under the auspices of the United Nations, whereby international peacekeeping forces are deployed to oversee the administration of Gaza for a transitional period, during which the Strip is rebuilt, and the political conditions are prepared to find a comprehensive Palestinian settlement. 

In this scenario, the infrastructure is rehabilitated, security guarantees are provided to prevent the outbreak of new confrontations, while the way is opened for an internal Palestinian dialogue under international auspices to reach an agreement on the future of governance in Gaza. 

This scenario also includes international supervision of the rehabilitation of civilian institutions in Gaza, ensuring the distribution of aid, and preventing the use of resources in any military activities that may lead to a renewal of the conflict. 

It could also contribute to reactivating the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis through an international mechanism that ensures the implementation of any understandings reached. 

However, this option faces several obstacles, most notably the rejection by some Palestinian forces of any direct international intervention in Palestinian affairs, and Israel may refuse to deploy international forces near its borders, preferring to keep Gaza under siege or in a state of instability that keeps it weak and unable to pose a security threat. 

Moreover, any international intervention will require consensus among the major powers, which may be difficult to achieve in light of global political tensions. Each of these scenarios carries its own challenges, and the optimal choice remains linked to the extent of the Arabs’ ability to unify their positions and make bold decisions that go beyond narrow political calculations. 

The main challenge lies in reaching a solution that spares Gaza further destruction, establishes a new phase of stability and development, and ensures that the Palestinian issue is not exploited in regional conflicts. The question remains: Will the Cairo Summit be able to overcome Arab differences and present a unified vision to save Gaza and its future?

Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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Seismic Shift Across The Atlantic

By Dr Khairi Janbek

Even before Trump’s coming of age, which is a long way away, or  more accurately so, coming to power, one often wondered about the status of the European Union (EU) in the world of changing circumstances and the existential meaning of its presence on the world power map among the increasing differences among its member states.

Although and frankly, differences always existed within the Union, the Russian invasion of Ukraine made those differences more acute, sharper and penchant materializing between those Europeans fearing being next on the Russian menu, those who want an assertive position against Moscow, those reluctant either way, and those who are out rightly pro-Russia.

Evidently, having unity among the 27 European countries which are not necessarily different in their political structures, yet having necessarily different strategic interests end up with infighting, recriminations and threats.

As well what makes things near-impossible, is that the EU does not have a mechanism to expel a fellow-member from the Union, so one is always beleiving that there is hope that an obtrusive member of the Union would walk out voluntarily in the manner made by the British Brexit.

Now it is more complicated. Not only the EU is having to deal with a possible Russian threat, but also a looming trade war with the US that is compounded with the distinct possibility that America may be withdrawing its protection umbrella from Europe.

Of course, this legitimately raises the question about the future of NATO; a question which was raised before especially after the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This ultimately means a new form of a military alliance will be required for the EU.

Ideally, one would have thought a smaller EU entity, leaner and meaner, with incorporation of Britain in it, would the best option, while the rest of Europe, from its center to its eastern side, hitched by accords with Russia and the USA.

This would be far better instead of the current large European crippled Levathian with Britain running like a headless chicken proposing to be the bridge between the USA and EU, a link both sides of the Atlantic believe it’s too far a gap for any meaningful effect.

Having said all that, there is a window of opportunity now with the new government in Germany, showing more courageous initiatives in wanting to see a reset of the Atlantic relationship, which falls well with President Macron of France, the other core member of the EU which has the idea of creating a single European army to protect the EU and its interests.

When it comes to transnational trade, the absurdity of the war of tariffs will hurt all including the American economy, though European companies whose main market is in the USA will go and invest in America, but those US companies whose main market is Europe, will invest in the EU.

Essentially, the seismic shift in relations across the Atlantic is set to commence with most probably less profits but more fairness.

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in ParisFrance

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Who is Going to Rebuild Gaza?

No official announcement was made following the Riyadh Summit, which was considered fraternal, friendly, and consultative rather than formal. The summit, held a few days ago, was attended by the Gulf states, along with Jordan and Egypt, in anticipation of the Cairo Summit scheduled for March 4. The Cairo Summit is expected to approve and announce a new Arab plan for rebuilding Gaza as an alternative to Trump’s plan. However, more importantly, the Arab plan presents a comprehensive political approach linking the Gaza issue to the establishment of a Palestinian state and a peaceful resolution in the region. This approach counters Israel’s new policies, which are based on political hegemony—not only in Palestine by eliminating the two-state solution but also by expanding Israel’s security boundaries to include parts of Syria and Lebanon and inciting the U.S. into a confrontation with Iran.

The Egyptian-Arab approach is still in its final stages of preparation. It takes into account a combination of financial, technical, political, and security aspects concerning Gaza. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa has proposed modifications to the plan originally put forward by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union, which estimated the cost of rebuilding Gaza at over $50 billion in a rapid and preliminary needs and damage assessment report (IRDNA). Instead, Mustafa proposed a more realistic and feasible plan costing no more than $20 billion, to be implemented in three phases. The Egyptians have incorporated this into their reconstruction plan, which includes dividing Gaza into three safe zones, using temporary housing (caravans) and tents, and developing a technical vision for redesigning the sector’s infrastructure through specialized Egyptian companies.

The Arab approach links the reconstruction plan to several key elements. The first is the technical, logistical, and financial aspect of rebuilding. The second is reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) to counter Israeli claims of its incompetence, with reform measures covering political and security aspects. The third element concerns the administration of Gaza in the post-occupation phase. A significant development has occurred with the Palestinians agreeing on a temporary administrative committee responsible for technocratic affairs. Hamas has accepted this arrangement, and President Mahmoud Abbas has reluctantly agreed to it, as it implicitly means that the PA will not return to Gaza.

The most challenging aspect of the Arab plan lies in the security arrangements during the reconstruction phase. Arab states refuse to deploy security forces or enter Gaza without a clear vision for ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. As Arab diplomats emphasize, what is needed is not just a roadmap for resolving the Palestinian issue, but rather an agreement on final-status issues and recognition of a Palestinian state—followed by a roadmap for implementation, not the other way around.

The most contentious issue in the Arab approach is Hamas’s weapons. Israel, along with the United States, will not accept Hamas retaining its weapons in Gaza. Israel has made it clear that it links the second phase of the process to this condition, and the U.S. has accepted this demand. On the other hand, the Arab side ties the issue of disarming non-state actors to the establishment of a Palestinian state that would have the exclusive right to possess weapons. The key question remains: Who would disarm Hamas? The only legitimate entity that could do so is a recognized Palestinian state, which remains the missing piece in U.S. policies that align with Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision.

The Arabs hope that this approach will establish a new framework for relations with the United States and offer alternative strategic options. They even believe it could persuade President Donald Trump to secure several achievements—perhaps even earning him a Nobel Peace Prize in the end.

This is undoubtedly a highly optimistic approach, but it represents a new Arab attempt to present a united position and alternative strategic options. However, the biggest challenge this vision overlooks lies in the details. As the saying goes, “the devil is in the details.” What kind of Palestinian state is actually possible under the current circumstances? What was previously proposed by Trump himself? Is there a single Palestinian—any Palestinian—who could accept a state comprising only 30% of the West Bank, without East Jerusalem, and without control over borders? How could Hamas and its supporters—or even the majority of Palestinian refugees—be convinced of such a proposal, even if there were Israeli and American acceptance of the new Arab approach?

Mohammad Abu Rumman is a columnist in The Jordan Times.

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