Putting The Cart Before The Horse

With the approach of the Cairo Summit to discuss the Palestinian issue and the reconstruction of Gaza, Arab leaders find themselves facing three main scenarios to make decisive decisions that determine the future of Gaza and the fate of the Palestinians the day after the cessation of the war. The dilemma is no longer limited to reconstruction only but also includes the political and administrative arrangements that ensure the stability of the sector and prevent the recurrence of the devastating conflict.

From the American side, it seems that the Trump administration is adopting a more stringent approach, as it recently stated the necessity of displacing Palestinians from Gaza as a “solution” to ensure regional security, which reflects its traditional position biased towards Israel and complicates any Arab efforts to find an independent solution for the sector.

 This American position raises great concerns in Arab and international circles, given the disastrous consequences it carries for the Palestinians and the entire region, especially in light of the widespread international rejection of forced displacement policies.

The first scenario involves adopting a comprehensive regional solution led by Arabs, aiming to place Gaza under temporary Arab administration, which may include Egypt and perhaps some Gulf states, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. In this scenario, a transitional body would be established to administer the Strip, which would undertake reconstruction operations, organize basic services, and reorganize the security situation in a way that prevents the recurrence of the conflict. 

This body could also work to pave the way for comprehensive Palestinian elections to be held later, so that Gaza would be part of a unified Palestinian entity. 

This temporary administration would work to restructure institutions within the Strip, ensure the regular provision of health and education services, and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged by the war. It would also undertake the tasks of securing the crossings and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, while imposing strict control to prevent the infiltration of any elements that might contribute to destabilization. 

It is expected that the contributing Arab states would have different roles, as Egypt could handle security aspects, while the Gulf states would contribute to financing and reconstruction. This option requires Arab and international consensus, as well as internal Palestinian acceptance, which may be difficult in light of the differences between the factions. 

Israel may not view this scenario favorably, as it strengthens the Arab role in Gaza and limits its influence there. In addition, the success of this scenario depends on the Arabs’ ability to impose a unified vision and work to reduce external interventions that may hinder this solution. Ultimately, this scenario remains a realistic option, but it is fraught with challenges that require active diplomacy and strong political will.

As for the second scenario, it is to support the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority and grant it full control over Gaza after reaching internal understandings with the various factions, including Hamas. In this framework, the security services are integrated into a unified framework under the supervision of the Authority, and the administrative institutions are unified, with an Arab and international commitment to provide financial and logistical support to ensure the success of this transition.

One of the main pillars of this scenario is rebuilding trust between the various Palestinian factions, which requires intensive efforts from regional and international mediators, especially Egypt and the United Nations. This proposal also requires providing guarantees that the faction leaders will not be targeted or excluded from the political scene, which necessitates establishing a joint governance mechanism for a transitional period.

This scenario depends primarily on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to impose its effective control over the Strip, which is doubtful, especially in light of the deep differences between the West Bank and Gaza, and the lack of trust between the Palestinian parties. 

In addition, Hamas’s acceptance of this proposal may be conditional on effective participation in governance, which may not be acceptable to Israel or some regional powers. Moreover, this solution faces obstacles related to the extent of the international community’s ability to commit to funding reconstruction, and to ensuring that Israel does not obstruct any efforts aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority’s control over the Strip.

The third scenario, which may be the most complex, is to impose an international solution under the auspices of the United Nations, whereby international peacekeeping forces are deployed to oversee the administration of Gaza for a transitional period, during which the Strip is rebuilt, and the political conditions are prepared to find a comprehensive Palestinian settlement. 

In this scenario, the infrastructure is rehabilitated, security guarantees are provided to prevent the outbreak of new confrontations, while the way is opened for an internal Palestinian dialogue under international auspices to reach an agreement on the future of governance in Gaza. 

This scenario also includes international supervision of the rehabilitation of civilian institutions in Gaza, ensuring the distribution of aid, and preventing the use of resources in any military activities that may lead to a renewal of the conflict. 

It could also contribute to reactivating the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis through an international mechanism that ensures the implementation of any understandings reached. 

However, this option faces several obstacles, most notably the rejection by some Palestinian forces of any direct international intervention in Palestinian affairs, and Israel may refuse to deploy international forces near its borders, preferring to keep Gaza under siege or in a state of instability that keeps it weak and unable to pose a security threat. 

Moreover, any international intervention will require consensus among the major powers, which may be difficult to achieve in light of global political tensions. Each of these scenarios carries its own challenges, and the optimal choice remains linked to the extent of the Arabs’ ability to unify their positions and make bold decisions that go beyond narrow political calculations. 

The main challenge lies in reaching a solution that spares Gaza further destruction, establishes a new phase of stability and development, and ensures that the Palestinian issue is not exploited in regional conflicts. The question remains: Will the Cairo Summit be able to overcome Arab differences and present a unified vision to save Gaza and its future?

Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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The Gaza Death Trap

While everyone waits for the full-blast war on Gaza which Israel promises to continue, Tel Aviv must know this will not be an easy matter not least of all by the Benjamin Netanyahu government whose ministers are split over allowing the army to resume its “fighting” position in Gaza.

Not everyone holds the view of extremist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. He wants to resume, or continue, a large scale offensive on Gaza and reoccupy the enclave forever! For these opposing ministers as well as a large number of army soldiers and officers are not in favor of going back to fighting in Gaza because (a) of the bloody situation and danger soldiers were subjected to since 7 October, 2023, and because they want the rest of the remaining hostages – 59 and about 24 still thought to be alive – to be returned.

They fear – and reflecting major sections of society who have been demonstrating daily in Tel Aviv and other major Israeli cities under the of banner “bring them home,” – that increasing the wheels of war on Gaza would be signing the death warrants of the remaining hostages, originally marked at 250 and over 40 of them killed by indiscriminate Israeli bombing of the different areas of enclave over the past 17 months or so of fighting.

In the eyes of Smotrich, and he doesn’t mince his words, the return of the hostages is now secondary and what is crucial is to destroy Hamas and end its presence in the Gaza Strip.

But this is not happening. Since the resumption of the Israeli war on Gaza on 19 March, 2025 the resistance led by the Islamic organization and the other Palestinian factions have also resumed their fighting. While it is true, Hamas was slow in getting back to the war, preferring to give the ceasefire and peace talks a chance, and which led many to say the resistance are finished, this was far further from the truth.

Fighting again

Exactly one month later after 19 March, the Palestinian resistance led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, re-started their fight against the Israeli army and the targeting of its soldiers; the Zionist army had maintained an active presence in the different areas of the Gaza Strip since the ceasefire took effect on 19 January, 2025 when the newly-elected US president was installed in the White House.

After much waiting and the gradual realization that Israel was no longer interested in the ceasefire nor in ongoing talks in Doha and Cairo, Hamas and Islamic Jihad reignited their war tactics on the Gaza battlefield. They realized Netanyahu, as prime minister of an extreme right-wing government, was no longer interested in maintaining a ceasefire.

Analysts maintained that Netanyahu was encouraged by Trump’s conflicting and dangerous stance on Gaza on top of which was the dramatic and subsequently abhorred idea of expelling the 2.1 million population of Gaza to build the Strip as the newly-plushed Middle East Riviera.

Although he quickly backed down due to Palestinian, Arab and even world pressure, Netanyahu interpreted this hugely-wrongful idea as greenlight to continue to hammer Gaza from the air and reimpose the starvation policy of its population.

Although the people got the backend of the Israeli willful mad firepower while shutting down the curtain on aid entering the 364-kilometer enclave, Hamas and the other Palestinian groups begun to regroup and re-started its military operations against the Israeli army in Biet Hanoon in the northern Gaza Strip to Gaza City in the center, Shujaiyia to the west, Khan Younis lower down and Refah, further south on the border with Egypt.

Like before, since 7 October, 2023, the resistance has now embarked on the increasing use of ambushes and booby-trap operations of luring Israeli soldiers and targeting Israeli tanks, armored vehicles and bulldozers while firing at them through locally-made, cheap but effective and deadly missiles that resulted in many of these soldiers being killed and badly-injured – numbers in the thousands – while many of the tanks and bulldozers either blown up and/or put out of action.

Towards the end of April onwards, this strategy was reactivated at full length and on different days sniping Israeli soldiers and targeting armoury would rise in multiple and different operations through the Gaza Strip. What is today of major worry to the Israeli army is that these geographical areas which were supposed to be “cleaned up” from Palestinian operatives are becoming active once again which means that for the Israeli army its back to square one.

The Israeli army had literally destroyed many of the major cities, towns, neighborhoods, villages of Gaza not once but many times. They entered places like Khan Younis, Jabalia, Shujaiyia, Nuseirat, Rafah and many more multiple times and declared them free from Palestinian resistance groups but these fighters just continue to emerge as seen recently and to the chagrin and frustration of the Israeli army.

Such frustration has led Israeli politicians like Netanyhu, and arch anti-Palestinian politicians like Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of National Security and hated by some Israelis for his extreme rightwing views to call for the re-occupation of Gaza, something that Netanyahu is actively contemplating. The prevailing view that once the army gets into Gaza once again, and on a mass scale, they can never leave! There are many in the army who have long rejected such an idea because they know of the “bloody situation” their soldiers would face.

However, the Israeli government and its army continues to operate under a set of illusions it is refusing to budge away from simply because Hamas and the Palestinian resistance presence is still operating in Gaza and in a robust mode to fight and kill Israeli soldiers and destroy their tanks and military hardware.

This is in addition to the fact the Israel and its army is getting nowhere near to freeing the rest of the hostages and who are likely to die if Israel embarks on a bigger war on Gaza and which Netanyahu and his extremist government are determined to do despite the warnings of the Israeli army which admits the rest of the hostages could die in any bigger military offensive.

Trump in region

Throughout this war there was always one external factor that played a permanent role in fuelling the Israeli genocide of Gaza and that was the United States through its provision of military support to Tel Aviv first under the Joe Biden administration and now under Trump.

If he could be persuaded to stop the supply of weapons to Israel, Netanyahu will finally stop the war on Gaza. Trump is on record, especially when he was running for the White House he would stop the war in Ukraine and Gaza. But will he? First of all, the Israeli lobby is entrenched in the US government.

However, there is one important factor that can pressure the Trump administration and that is the Arab countries. Trump is soon visiting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. If enough pressure can be applied from these quarters then surely the US president can move on the Gaza issue and halt any plans that Netanyahu is concocting for the enclave.

The Trump visit is being made in mid-May and its already played as a “bilateral” tour between the United States and these states whilest focusing on investment. And this is where their influence can be made with investment, economics and politics moving on one pedestal.

So the ball at the present time is in the hands of the Arab Gulf countries!

This comment is written by Dr Marwan Asmar, chief editor of the crossfirearabia.com website. 

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Trump’s War in The Red Sea

Dr Khairi Janbek

The US foreign policy in the Red Sea today is characterized by a robust military response to Houthi threats, aiming to protect critical maritime trade routes and assert influence in a geopolitical strategic area. While these military operations garnered international support, the ongoing conflict underscores the complexities and challenges of Middle East interventions.

The US military’s increased involvement in the Red Sea, including the deployment of two aircraft carriers, signals a commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation and countering the Iranians in the region. However, the present ongoing escalation also risks entangling the US in a prolonged conflict.

This is reminiscent of past Middle East engagements which the Americans should be well-aware of, and may put additional strain on the US military resources amid other pressing global priorities if faces.

That said, the present military strikes on Yemen are not just about the Houthis. They are also widely seen as demonstration of US strength towards the group’s main backer: Iran.

The Washington administration is currently locked in a series of negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and Trump has not ruled out military action if those talks fail, yet, it is possible still, that the US, and judging by recent history, the Americans may change their mind and everything is put on hold yet again.

But we need to wait and see! The US has already moved its patriot and THAAD missiles from Asia to the Middle East, and only in the first month of the preparedness campaign, $200 million of ammunition has been used and this is making military officials greatly concerned about the impact on stocks the US Navy might use in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

At the same time, there are various Yemeni groups opposed to the Houthis with regional backing, and dare one say with some international backing, reportedly considering taking advantage of the situation to launch a ground campaign to oust the Houthis once and for all, but Washington is yet to make a decision on whether to back such operations or not.

Most analysts and officials say that, American troops participating in any ground operations in Yemen is highly unlikely, moreover, even more limited support for ground operations would still be another case of the US backing armed groups in a messy middle Eastern war; exactly the sort of situation Trump blasted previous administrations for falling into.

Dr Janbek is a Jordanian analyst based in Paris, France.

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