Israeli Bulldozer Runs Over Bleeding Child

Lebanese Media in The Age of Political Conspiracies

• marwan
• July 13, 2026

By Sama Abu Sharar

Lebanese media outlets have traditionally played a pivotal role in shaping public opinion on the current issues of the day. This includes their promotion of the Syrian tutelage in the 1990s, their tacit acceptance of Hezbollah’s influence during the 2016 presidential settlement, and their consistent coverage of the framework agreement recently signed in Washington.

Local TV channels align with the agendas of their respective political parties. Each era has its agenda with the current one clearly aimed at whitewashing the image of Israel in the eyes of the Lebanese public, and reinforcing the notion that peace with Israel is possible, and normalization is not impossible.

Lebanese television stations are controlled by influential figures linked to political parties or families known for their impact on local politics. Al-Manar is affiliated with Hezbollah, while NBN is owned by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and seen as the official mouthpiece of the Amal Movement. Pierre Daher, who broke away from the Lebanese Forces following a dispute that reached the courts, owns half of LBCI.

This is while MTV, headed by Michel Murr, is owned by his family and is known for promoting the Lebanese Forces’ rhetoric. Al-Jadeed, owned by Tahsin Khayat, fluctuates its editorial policy depending on its funding sources, and OTV is affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement. Given the clear affiliations and loyalties of the Lebanese audience, these television channels appear more like a mirror image reflecting the sectarian and political mosaic of the country, spanning the spectrum from the far right to the far left and everything in between.

Political Money in Lebanese Media

A study by the Maharat Foundation in collaboration with the Legal Agenda and the European Media and Journalism Research Centre (MJRC) indicates that the vast majority of print, broadcast, and online media outlets in Lebanon are affiliated with political parties, sectarian groups, or influential political entities. These outlets reflect political agendas rather than editorial independence, transformed into tools in the hands of powerful decision-makers, whether individuals, parties, or even regional states. The study describes journalism in Lebanon as a weapon in the ongoing political conflicts.

Media coverage of the recent Israeli war on Lebanon reveals that most television stations chose to prioritize their political agendas over the Israeli crimes targeting Lebanese civilians and this demonstrates their political alignment over the issues professionalism and interests of the people.

Research by the Legal Agenda reveals shortcomings in the media coverage of the 2024 Israeli war on Lebanon. This coverage has sometimes misled public opinion, justified violations, weakened documentation, and obscured the victims. A review of the media coverage of 10 war crimes committed by Israel showed that the three most-watched television channels (Al-Jadeed, LBC, and MTV) omitted crucial legal questions. The extent of Israel’s adherence to the principles of international humanitarian law and its disregard for necessary measures to protect civilians. These were ignored. Furthermore, their coverage lacked legal analysis of the Israeli attacks, despite their serious violations amounting to war crimes.

Lebanese journalist Jumana Baalbaki affirms that some media outlets “deepened the division, justified the aggression, and indulged in dangerous sectarian rhetoric, thus deviating from the priority of maintaining peace and accuracy.” The accuracy that Baalbaki refers to is not limited to publishing the correct news; it also refers to the neglect of events and realities such as people’s stories, their deaths, displacement, and their suffering. “The victims became mere numbers, without names or faces, and consequently, their stories not part of the narrative that could have exerted pressure to stop the war, as happened in Gaza, where its people shared their suffering through TikTok.”

In his study, “The Lebanese Press and Its Role in Times of Peace and War,” Dr. Nassim Khoury argues that the Lebanese media has historically played a constructive role on one hand and a destructive one on the other. It contributed to strengthening nationalist and independence sentiments, while on the other hand, at various periods in Lebanon’s history, it served as a tool for political polarization, sectarian conflict, and foreign influence.

According to Khoury, the relatively broad press freedom in Lebanon allowed for the flourishing of diverse opinions, but it also enabled newspapers to align themselves with political parties, sectarian groups, and foreign governments instead of serving the public interest. Although the study focused on Lebanese newspapers, most of which no longer exist, its conclusions can be applied to the majority of visual, audio, and electronic media.

He argues that the media formed part of the conflict during the Lebanese Civil War, whether through its work as an arm of the various political factions and militias or through fueling fear, hatred, and division.

Mobilizing the Street

Some might think the various Lebanese media outlets learned from their experience with political alignments, but not so. Political money, promoting specific agendas, continues to influence most of them, and more openly than in previous eras.

Lebanese journalist Hussein Ayoub confirms the role played by most Lebanese media outlets has not changed. He points to the worsening situation with the deepening internal divisions over Lebanon’s identity and regional positioning. Are these media outlets “an ally of America and Israel, or an ally of Iran? Are they an ally of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, or an ally of Europe? Is it even permissible for a country like Lebanon to be neutral?” Ayoub asks.

The environment in which the media operates takes us back to the early stages of the formation of the Lebanese state, according to Ayoub: “When you live in a country called Lebanon, whose pillars, since it’s founding a 100 years ago, have been sectarian and reinforced by foreign tutelage,” political, partisan, cultural, and media institutions represent “an extension of the sectarian system.” They are distributed according to sectarian considerations, making them a tool for measuring the sectarian audience that follows this channel or boycotts that one, based on criteria of polarization and alienation.

It is clear to observers today that the loudest voices are those of media outlets promoting peace—if their presence is compared to the voices rejecting any kind of relationship with Israel. And abundant political funding not only ensures the media’s adherence to the peace agenda but has also demonstrated its ability to disseminate this orientation.

As Lebanese media outlets compete to promote the Israeli narrative to their local audiences, MTV hosted members of the South Lebanon Army residing in Israel on one of its programs to glorify the Jewish state and create the impression of Israelis’ love for the Lebanese, revealing a performance that aligns with a predetermined agenda. LBCI television defied the Israeli boycott law by hosting Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, a correspondent for Israel’s Channel 12 and Axios.

In this context, Al-Jadeed’s Washington correspondent, Pedro Ghanem, rushed to make an exclusive interview with Israeli Ambassador Yechiel Leiter following a round of negotiations between the Lebanese and Israeli delegations, giving him airtime to comment on the talks.

During an interview with MP Hassan Fadlallah, a member of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, George Salibi, host of the “Halak Shu” program on Al-Jadeed, posed a question on behalf of Israeli army spokesperson Avichai Adraee to his guest, who declined to answer it.

Ayoub believes that such matters transcend normalization with Israel and reach the level of professional ethics. He argues that “the most egregious aspect of this is that of George Salibi and the question he raised while his country negotiates directly with the Israelis in Washington and concluding an agreement with them that can only be described as a complete violation of Lebanese sovereignty. Nothing prevents the deployment of Lahad militia operatives in villages whose inhabitants have not been displaced, or mercenary companies contacting Lahad agents in Israel to determine if they can exploit them or their children should the security zone be established” in southern Lebanon.

In an interview with “Voice of the People” radio, university professor and researcher Jad Melki links the Lebanese media’s promotion of the Israeli narrative to the official Lebanese discourse that has criminalized the resistance. He points out that the media chaos facilitated by the Lebanese presidency is being met with widespread condemnation from the Lebanese public.

He gives as an example the video that went viral on the social media, in which a young Lebanese woman, participating in a survey about the possibility of peace with Israel, says: “They party like us, they talk like us, and they value women like us,” attempting to draw parallels between Lebanese and Israelis. Maliki says this video wouldn’t have gained such widespread attention had there not been a negative reaction and rejection of what the young woman said.

Malki add: “In all media coverage, those on the fringes, the extremes, attract the largest audience, even though they might represent only one percent. For example, today in the United States, those who talk about abortion are very few. A large segment is on the extreme right, and a small segment is on the extreme left. These are the ones who attract the most attention. But the majority of the population, those in the middle, and most of them are rational on this issue, accept abortion under certain circumstances, but not always. The same applies to all issues,” Maliki explains.

Opinion Polls and the Transparency of Representation

Public opinion polls typically reflect people’s views on a particular topic by taking the opinions of a representative sample encompassing all segments of society according to rigorous scientific standards. However, things take a different turn in a country like Lebanon, where those concerned question the representativeness of public opinion polls and the extent to which the institutions conducting them are subject to political funding.

Hussein Ayoub states: “There are questions raised about the timing of most opinion polls in Lebanon like who funds them, and what are their objectives, do they have Lebanese or foreign agendas.” He points out also that scientific standards are absent from many opinion polls, especially in the way questions are formulated. “It’s not just about asking the question, but also about selecting the sample,” he says, asking rhetorically: “Can you ask a drowning person if they would like to travel to La La Land?” He stresses the necessity for a scientific methodology related to types of questions asked, timing, sample selection, and target audience.

Among the polls that sparked controversy in Lebanon was the one held by “International Information,” which showed a significant increase in public support for signing a peace agreement with Israel, from 25 percent in August 2025 to 49 percent this year. But there was much criticism on the way the organization used in conducting the poll. Ayoub points out that the poll overlooked the fact that 26 percent of respondents refused to answer and were given alternatives—a percentage that, if included, could have altered the poll’s results whilst mentioning other shortcomings, errors, and flaws common in most opinion polls.

Political parties and research centers

Jumana Baalbaki focuses on several Lebanese political parties that rely on research centers to conduct polls for purely internal purposes: Gauging popularity and/or identifying factors that benefit the party in its battles with its rivals. She questions whether research institutions classified as independent, such as Ipsos, International Information, and Araa, are truly free from the influence of business interests in their work and results, especially since many of these polls are conducted or commissioned by political parties to reinforce a particular viewpoint.

Neither Ayoub nor Baalbaki believes that opinion polls in Lebanon—like the media—actually reflect the pulse of the street. “Perhaps a more accurate approach would be to hold a public referendum, provided its results are not manipulated as happens in elections,” Baalbaki explains. Ayoub argues that “the problem with opinion polls is more serious than with the media, in that most of the funding is external.”

He points to the electoral climate where polling institutions compete to demonstrate their support for one candidate or another, resulting in figures determined by who pays the most. There are always exceptions, whether in the media or polling institutions, but they are few in a country like Lebanon, governed by sectarianism and sharp internal divisions, amidst the extremely delicate and complex circumstances the country is experiencing.

A study on media platforms and news sources and their impact on political trends during the 2026 Israeli war on Lebanon, supervised by Dr. Jad Melki, Journalism and Media Studies Professor at the Lebanese American University, revealed a radical shift in how Lebanese people access news. According to a survey of 1,000 participants, television stations lost their position as the primary source of war news for the first time to social media, specifically to WhatsApp. The study showed 73 percent of those following war news received their information via mobile phones, 63 percent via television, and only 2 percent via radio.

The study indicates that despite the fact that 50% of survey participants closely followed war news, 82% did not share any war-related content on social media. WhatsApp again emerged as the most used platform, with 53% of respondents using it, followed by Facebook at 22%, Instagram at 14%, and TikTok at the bottom, with less than 7%.

The study reveals that despite the sharp political differences among respondents, there was widespread agreement regarding the stance towards Israel; with 87% of those surveyed considering Israel as the enemy, 51% the United States as an enemy, and 38%, as Iran as the enemy. Regarding the future path, 54% chose diplomacy as the sole means for liberation, while 35% in favour of armed resistance.

The study concludes that media usage in Lebanon reflects and reinforces political polarization. The shift from traditional media like television to social media platforms is a double-edged sword. While it threatens social cohesion during wartime, it also empowers the new generation with broader global perspectives and a more critical outlook, particularly if they transcend their sectarian divisions.

The lack of trust in traditional media and polls has fostered critical thinking, analytical skills, and the ability to read between the lines. In a country like Lebanon, there are no single friends or enemies, and the country is governed by a sectarian system characterized by sectarian power-sharing in all state institutions. The media, often referred to as the fourth estate, struggles to transcend its role as a mirror of this sectarian power-sharing system. This raises doubts about its ability to represent the pulse of the street and transforms it into a platform for loud noise, still striving to convince the audience that it represents the majority.

This article, originally written in Arabic, appeared in Al Quds Al Arabi and is reprinted in crossfirearabia.com.  Sama Abu Sharar is a professional journalist, writer and translator with skills in three languages: Arabic, French and English. She is currently residing in Beirut and writes on different Palestinian and Lebanese issues for publications such as the online Palestine Chronicle and Al Quds Al Arabi, a prestigious Arabic language daily newspaper published in London. Her articles appear in translated form in crossfirearabia.com.