Ali Khamenei Archives - CrossFireArarbia

Iran-US Talks in Muscat: Winners and Losers

CrossFireArabia
April 12, 2025

EDITOR’S NOTE: This editorial, written by Abdul Bari Atwan, chief editor of the Arabic Al Rai Al Youm website, on Saturday, 12 April, relates to the first talks of the Tehran-Washington negotiations that started in Muscat, Oman relating to the Iran nuclear file.

Iran succeeded in scoring a major goal against the United States in the clash of wills that began today, Saturday, in the Omani capital, Muscat, by insisting that the negotiations be “indirect,” contrary to what its American adversary wants: Namely “direct” negotiations as announced by US President Donald Trump at the White House in his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week, who was surprised by this shocking announcement.

The US delegation, led by Trump’s Advisor Steve Witkoff, is participating in these talks from a weak and defeated position, especially after the failure of the US plan to impose tariffs on more than 200 countries worldwide. America has become friendless, and even turned its friends into enemies, especially in Europe and Southeast Asia like South Korea and Japan.

Strategies of negotiations

Iran, represented in the negotiations by veteran Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, the man who led the negotiations for the first nuclear agreement with the six major powers in 2015 and possesses extensive experience in the art and strategies of negotiation, did not submit to the “threats and intimidation” adopted by President Trump.

They imposed their conditions in full on their American opponents and insisted on limiting the negotiations to the nuclear issue, not addressing other issues such as missile and drone systems, and severing ties with the arms of the resistance in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. And they got what they wanted.

The one who called for a return to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian-American crisis and backed down from his threats of a devastating military strike was President Trump. This happened when he realized the threats of military strikes, coupled with the dispatch of three American aircraft carriers and squadrons of giant B-52 bombers, backfired.

These did not intimidate the Iranians, but prompted a response from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who declared a state of emergency in the Iranian military, placed giant missile platforms, advanced submarines, and ground and naval forces on high alert, and threatened to destroy all of the 10 military bases surrounding his country and housing 50,000 soldiers, close the Strait of Hormuz, and prevent Gulf oil exports to the entire world.

The Iranians do not trust President Trump, who tore up the nuclear agreement in 2018, and is well aware he has become an Israeli puppet. He also realizes that America, defeated in Ukraine, did not simply march to Moscow waving white flags, ready to sell Ukraine and its people to the Russians and surrender to all of its conditions, including the annexation of a fifth of Ukrainian territory to Russia, without consulting its European allies, whom it has become embroiled in this war.

When President Trump demands that the Muscat negotiations reach a quick agreement within two months, this is due to his bitter experience in the Vienna negotiations, which lasted a year-and-a-half and ended in failure due to Iran’s cunning use of the “yes, but” theory, without offering any concessions.

Globally hated…

We do not believe that this theory will be abandoned in the Muscat negotiations, especially since America, which is now globally hated and has lost all of its allies in the West and the East, has become weak, and is on the brink of bankruptcy due to the huge deficit in its annual general budget ($1.4 trillion) and its public debt that has reached more than $42 trillion.

What will encourage Iran to harden its position in these negotiations is China’s strong and defiant stance in the trade war against the United States. Its president, Xi Jinping, declared he will respond in kind to America and its president, and will fight this war to the end, no matter how costly the results.

He has decided to raise customs duties on American goods by a historic rate of more than 125 percent, and has given the green light to his allies in the BRICS group to declare war on the dollar and the global SWIFT financial system, through which America controls the global economy and financial movement.

Trump, wounded by the failure of his gamble to ignite a trade war, and the internal and global revolt against it, with the beginning of the decline in the value of the dollar and the escalation of the recession in the American economy as its first fruits, was forced to stop this war less than three days after its announcement under the cover of a three-month freeze on the application of customs duties.

Crushing military strike

Hence, his threats, i.e. Trump’s necessity of quickly to reach a nuclear agreement didn’t have any effect despite the threat of a crushing military strike. Iran’s respond to Trump forced him to make a major, unprecedented concessions to save face.

Iran, which has suffered significant losses in Lebanon, with the weakening of its powerful military arm in that country (Hezbollah), and in Syria with the fall of the President Assad’s regime, undertook rapid reviews internally and regionally, abandoning many of its policies pursued in recent years, after realizing that the knife is approaching its neck, and that the American-Israeli conspiracy does not only seek to destroy it and remove its military claws and fangs, but also to change the Islamic regime there.

The results of these reviews reflected in the transition from a phase of patience and long-suffering to a phase of confrontation in its military and political aspects, and the strengthening of its allied military arms, starting with the striking Yemen whose arm there is waging heroic wars not only against aircraft carriers and American warships in the Red and Arabian Seas, but also by intensifying ballistic missiles and drone bombardment of the occupied Palestinian interior in Jaffa, Haifa, and Eilat, accelerating the recovery process for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finding other ways to deliver military supplies to it.

After the historic Syrian corridor was closed with the fall of the Assad regime, America became a farce in the first months of Trump’s rule. It’s no surprise that Iran and its allied proxies are among the biggest beneficiaries and gloaters. He who laughs last laughs loudest… and the days will tell!

Opinion

How Will Hawkish Trump Deal With Iran?

CrossFireArabia
February 15, 2025

Ata Şahit

Immediately upon his return to the White House for a second stint, a hawkish Donald Trump has put Iran on notice.

In the first week of February, the US President signed a presidential decree reinstating the maximum pressure policy on Iran, saying that though he was not pleased with the decision, he had no choice but to adopt a firm stance.

A few days later, Trump claimed that a very “frightened” Iran was ready for a deal with the US over the Shia-majority nation’s nuclear programme.

The moot point of his assertion was that he would also prefer a deal rather than Israel carrying its threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. “I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.”

Since Trump assumed office, Iranian officials have consistently voiced their support for dialogue and expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations with the new administration.

On January 14, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed this position in an interview with NBC, emphasising Iran’s openness to talks.

However, any potential for a dialogue appeared to have been decisively shut down following a February 7 statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Addressing members of the Iranian military, Khamenei declared that engaging in negotiations with the US was neither a prudent nor an honourable course of action, unequivocally rejecting the prospect of talks between the two countries.

Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s January approval of the sale of 4,700 additional MK-84 bunker-buster bombs to Israel as part of a broader Iran strategy.

This begs the question: How would Iran-US relations evolve under Trump, and how significant is the threat posed by Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities?

Israel likely to attack Iran nuclear facilities by midyear — report

Trump’s first term and Iran

Trump’s re-election marks a critical turning point for Iran. Even during his first presidency, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure had led to significant economic, political, and military challenges for Tehran.

It was during the first Trump administration that some seismic events – such as the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the re-imposition of economic sanctions, and the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani—intensified the pressure on Iran.

With Trump’s re-election, the Iranian leadership is concerned about the prospect of further escalation of previous policies.

Recent developments in the region indicate that Iran’s deterrence capabilities have reached a critical low.

An analysis of Iran’s national security and defence doctrine reveals that it rests on three principal strategic pillars: the establishment of a forward defence line via non-state actors under the Quds Force, an extensive missile programme, and efforts to achieve nuclear threshold status.

However, Israel’s attacks in 2023 and 2024 have significantly weakened these pillars. Indeed, the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, the destruction of its command structures, and successful Israeli airstrikes against Iranian territory have complicated Iran’s ability to leverage these elements as an effective deterrent.

Moreover, although Iran’s missile programme is still impressive in terms of variety and quantity, its effectiveness was found to be limited during the April and October 2024 attacks. The majority of Iran’s missiles either missed their targets or proved ineffective.

The Israeli strikes on October 26 severely damaged Iran’s missile engine production facilities and solid fuel production capabilities.

In particular, the strikes on the Shahroud missile complex have significantly constrained Iran’s ability to develop long-range missiles. As a result of these strikes, Iran’s most advanced air defence systems (S-300 PMU2) were rendered inoperable.

The remaining systems are limited both in range and capability, thereby increasing Iran’s vulnerability to external attacks. These vulnerabilities have prompted Tehran to reconsider the option of developing nuclear weapons.

While Iran has the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium within a week, integrating a nuclear warhead into a missile system is regarded as a time-consuming process.

Iran’s nuclear programme and rising concerns

Trump’s threats and the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme represent a critical juncture for the country.

Rather than initiating the production of nuclear weapons, Tehran could adopt the more cautious yet effective step of announcing its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Such a move would underscore Iran’s seriousness while seeking to extract more concessions at the negotiating table.

A notable example is North Korea, which in 1993 employed a similar strategy by announcing its intention to withdraw from the treaty, subsequently suspending its decision before ultimately carrying it out.

Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT could be perceived by the international community as a shift toward nuclear weapons production. This, in turn, could escalate regional tensions and potentially encourage Israel to deploy US-made bunker-buster bombs against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, known as the Amad Plan, sought to produce five nuclear weapons between 1999 and 2003.

Under this plan, four warheads for Shahab-3 ballistic missiles and one bomb for an underground test were developed.

According to the Iranian nuclear archive captured by Israel in 2018, Iran has made significant advances in critical technologies, including nuclear warhead design, neutron initiators, and detonation focusing systems. This information is regarded as a contributing factor to Iran’s increased capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Significant similarities exist between China’s first nuclear bomb (codenamed 596) and Iran’s early designs. The findings indicate that Iran is approaching the status of a nuclear threshold state.

Therefore, Trump’s nuclear policy toward Iran is a critical issue, both in terms of differing perspectives within his administration and the broader international context.

Where can the process evolve?

Iran’s nuclear programme remains a priority concern for both Europe and the US.

With the expiration of the UN Security Council (UNSC) snapback sanctions in October 2025, the US-led West risks losing one of its most powerful tools of diplomatic leverage.

In this context, Europe plans to leverage Iran’s vulnerabilities and time constraints to initiate an effective nuclear diplomacy process.

Indeed, a statement by the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – that it is prepared to utilise all diplomatic tools against Iran indicates that patience is waning.

Simultaneously, Iran’s statements suggesting it may reassess its technical capabilities and political intentions have raised concerns within the international community.

The US might intensify pressure by tightening the enforcement of secondary sanctions on the Iranian economy.

As an initial measure, Trump imposed sanctions on a key international network involved in the sale of Iranian oil, delivering a significant blow to Iran’s oil exports.

Expanding sanctions to target major purchasers of Iranian oil, particularly China, could exacerbate Iran’s economic vulnerabilities.

In other words, the US and Europe may capitalise on this window of opportunity by intensifying pressure on Iran while simultaneously presenting clear diplomatic solutions.

In Iran, contrary to Khamenei’s rhetoric, there are indications that a large section of the leadership and population are generally supportive of negotiations with the US.

Recently, the Center for Islamic World Studies, aligned with Supreme Leader Khamenei, conducted a survey on Iran-US negotiations as part of its advisory role in foreign policy.

The study surveyed 119 academics, senior executives, and current and former officials. The results revealed that 86.5 percent of respondents supported direct negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration, while just 5.8 percent opposed the proposal. A further 7.5 percent of respondents indicated that negotiations would be conditional.

Against the backdrop of Trump’s belligerence against Iran, the risk of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities has gone up manifold.

How Tehran decides to navigate the choppy waters of uncertainty will determine the future of US-Iran relations. And, perhaps, of the volatile region too.