Can USS Gerald R. Ford be Sunk?

CrossFireArabia
Opinion
February 24, 2026

By Sufian Al-Tal

Construction of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford began in 2005. Its plans were fully prepared and built on defensive foundations that, based on the data and military science available up to 2005, made it unsinkable.

However, between 2005 and 2025, 20 years of scientific and military development passed, and new sciences emerged and clashed, which the aircraft carrier’s plans and designs at the time did not take into account. In addition, the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, which entered service in 1961, was officially decommissioned on February 3, 2017, after more than 55 years.

Thinking strategically?

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford is one of the most advanced warships in modern history and is often referred to as “unsinkable.” However, while this description is valid in its military context, it remains relative, not absolute. The real question is not whether sinking it is theoretically possible, but whether its defensive design philosophy can still keep pace with the rapid scientific and military advancements the world witnessed between 2005 and 2025.

Work on the design of the aircraft carrier began at the start of the new millennium. This means that the engineering plans and defensive doctrines upon which it was based were grounded in the military science, weapons technologies, and anticipated threat patterns available at the time.

At that time, traditional naval threats, such as anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles, were known and incorporated into existing defense systems. This allowed the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier to be designed as a highly fortified, multi-system vessel capable of absorbing damage without losing combat capability. From an engineering perspective, no naval vessel is designed with the absolute impossibility of sinking in mind, but rather with the principle of survivability after being hit.

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford relies on a complex internal layout that minimizes the risk of cascading sinking, advanced fire suppression and damage control systems, and the ability to continue operating even after sustaining direct hits. However, all of this assumes a specific type of threat and relatively conventional combat scenarios within the parameters of that era.

Hypersonic missiles

Between 2005 and 2025, the military world witnessed significant developments that were not part of the initial design calculations. Among the most prominent of these are the emergence of hypersonic missiles with speeds and trajectories that are difficult to intercept, the growing capabilities of cyber warfare targeting command and control systems, and the rise of drone swarms as a means of overwhelming defenses through saturation. Additionally, advancements in sensor technologies and artificial intelligence have enabled the tracking of small, large, complex, and moving targets. These transformations do not necessarily imply that the aircraft carrier has become weak, but they do raise legitimate questions about the adequacy of the defensive philosophy established two decades ago.

At that time, conventional maritime threats were well-known and integrated into the carrier’s design, which relied on layered defenses and advanced damage control systems. However, between 2005 and 2025, the world experienced tremendous and rapid scientific and military advancements. China, for example, has surged in military spending and innovation, with its development rate increasing by approximately 250–300% between 2005 and 2025, making it one of the world’s closest competitors.

In contrast, the United States maintained its dominance, albeit at a slower pace, with an estimated development rate of 160–180%. Russia, on the other hand, achieved selective modernization while preserving its nuclear capabilities, with an estimated development rate of 140–160%.

Iran, starting from a modest base, made a relatively significant leap in its missile and drone capabilities, with an estimated development rate of 300–350%. In this context, another question arises concerning the thinking of some countries that do not seek to emulate the United States in terms of fleet size or number of aircraft carriers, such as China, Russia, or Iran. Instead of engaging in a costly, conventional arms race, these countries’ military thinking (thinking outside the box) focuses on circumventing this model and seeking unconventional means to neutralize, disable, or directly destroy the platform.

Within this framework, discussions arise regarding technologies based on radiation, microwaves, or other directed energy sources. In principle, there is nothing to prevent the development of devices based on high-powered microwaves, electromagnetic pulses, or high-energy lasers. However, the potential role of these technologies, as currently understood, is not to melt or physically destroy the carrier’s hull, but rather to disable or confuse sensitive electronics, disable radar, navigation, and communication systems, or disrupt flight control systems on the carrier’s deck.

The idea of melting thick marine steel, armored hulls, or parts thereof with beams from combat range is unrealistic given current data, due to the enormous energy requirements, radiation dispersion, and the difficulty of precise targeting of a moving target protected by multiple layers of defense. However, we cannot confirm or deny that there are those who think and work in this field, shrouding their activities in absolute secrecy. Surprising the enemy with unexpected weapons has always been, and remains, a core element of military planning.

The real danger lies not in a super-radiation weapon, but in the integration of multiple fields, such as a cyberattack that disrupts combat command and control systems, electromagnetic jamming that confuses sensor systems, followed by a conventional physical attack. In such a scenario, the carrier transforms from a highly organized platform into a complex system suffering from information bottlenecks, one of the most serious challenges facing modern armies. Military history shows that what is described as secret science is not the discovery of new physical laws (which would be astonishing and groundbreaking if it occurred), but rather innovative applications of known sciences. The novelty lies in the application of these sciences.

This is often in the method of integration and deployment, not in the essence of the science itself. Therefore, despite the possibility of technologies whose details have not been disclosed, it is necessary to mention a Chinese and an Iranian development:

The media is currently reporting on a Chinese achievement dubbed the “aircraft carrier killer,” an air-launched ballistic missile likely designed to target American aircraft carriers and warships. Since this missile is hypersonic and employs a special guidance system, it is capable of maneuvering and evading anti-ship weapons.

Regarding Iran’s threats that a weapon capable of sinking a ship is more dangerous than the ship itself, Israeli sources are discussing the “Whale torpedo,” which is launched underwater, operates in a supercavitational cavity, and moves within a gas bubble that reduces its water resistance. At speeds of up to 360 km/h, it reduces the reaction time of targeted ships and makes interception difficult.

In conclusion, bypassing conventional weaponry has become a reality, and disabling an aircraft carrier is now, theoretically, possible. However, completely sinking one remains a secret weapon, not disclosed by those who possess it, in order to surprise the enemy.

This article is a translated piece of an Arabic version that appeared in Al Rai Al Youm.

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

Analyses Opinion

‘This War is Not Hours’

CrossFireArabia
March 11, 2026

By Dr Hasan Al Dajah

Events in the Middle East are accelerating, foreshadowing a comprehensive regional explosion. However, a deeper reading of the situation transcends the traditional narrative that attempts to portray the conflict as an “Arab-Iranian” or sectarian one that transcends borders. The reality emerging today from the rubble of burning military bases and oil facilities is clear: this war is not ours; it is a major strategic war led by Washington with direct Israeli planning, aimed at reshaping the region to serve absolute Western hegemony, even if the price is turning Arab capitals into arenas of destruction and settling scores in which we have no stake.

For years, the United States promoted the concept of “deterrence” and providing protection to allied countries in exchange for billions of dollars in arms deals and a massive military presence. However, Operation “True Promise 5” and the subsequent precise Iranian strikes have stripped away the fig leaf from these claims. Field reports indicate that US bases, once described as “impregnable fortresses,” have become vulnerable targets themselves, requiring protection. At Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, damage to the AN/FPS-132 early warning radar and the AN/TPY-2 facility resulted in a near-total paralysis of surveillance capabilities.

In Bahrain, home to the Fifth Fleet, the destruction of satellite communications stations led to a loss of centralized control over naval vessels. In Kuwait and the UAE, the casualties and the destruction of F-15 fighter jets revealed that advanced US technology was incapable of countering waves of drones and missiles that disrupted even civilian air traffic and struck vital facilities at Jebel Ali Port, reducing military installations and oil depots to ashes.

This resounding failure raises a fundamental question about the viability of relying on a “security umbrella” that has failed to protect its own perimeter and has become a security burden, attracting attacks rather than repelling them. This is no longer mere political analysis; it has become a public admission emanating from the corridors of Washington. What Senator Lindsey Graham recently revealed represents the pinnacle of terrifying candor. He confirmed that the true agenda is not about spreading “democracy” or protecting allies, but rather about embroiling the Gulf States as the military front and human cannon fodder in a direct confrontation with Iran. This is a prelude to seizing oil wells and managing the region’s wealth for Washington’s benefit, thus paying the price for the American presence, while simultaneously imposing full normalization and strangling China’s energy lifeline.

The United States’ recent attempt to seek refuge in French bases in the UAE, such as Al Dhafra Air Base and Camp de la Paix, is nothing more than a desperate effort to spread losses and hide behind the European umbrella after the deterioration of the original American bases. However, even these shared bases have not been immune to attack.

The strikes have proven that any facility supporting Western operations is a legitimate target in this zero-sum confrontation. The effects of this war extend beyond the military arena, striking at the very heart of daily life. The threat to the Strait of Hormuz has triggered seismic repercussions in global markets. The price of a barrel of oil jumped to around $116, an increase of more than $38, while gas prices in Europe rose by more than €25, and oil shipping costs soared by over 90 per cent, foreshadowing an uncontrollable wave of global inflation.

The United States, which today expresses its “displeasure” at Israel exceeding expectations in striking Iranian fuel depots, is not acting out of a desire for peace, but rather out of fear that the economic game will backfire on it and on oil markets, which cannot withstand the loss of Gulf supplies, especially given the 11 per cent increase in gasoline prices in America and the 70 per cent increase in jet fuel prices. What is happening in Jebel Ali, Manama, Doha, and Kuwait is not a struggle to defend Arab sovereignty, but rather a settling of scores between major powers that want to use Arab land as a chessboard.

The American bases that are groaning today under the weight of the strikes have proven to be a “paper tiger” when it comes to protecting allies, and that their presence is nothing but a magnet for crises that drains Arab capabilities for the benefit of foreign agendas that do not take into account Arab national security.

Arab capitals must realize, before it’s too late, that the “illusion of protection” has completely evaporated under the weight of missiles and drones. To be drawn into Israel’s desire to destroy the region, and to accommodate American ambitions to seize energy resources to finance its expansionist policies, is strategic suicide by any measure.

This raging war is not our war, and staying out of the inferno of this manufactured conflict is the only way to ensure that our wealth and the future of our generations do not become fuel for the schemes of Netanyahu, Trump, and the war profiteers behind them.

The time has come to seriously seek a self-reliant regional security system, one that originates from within the continent and is based on the shared interests of the region’s countries, far removed from foreign bases that today lack even the most basic military effectiveness and have become a strategic burden that itself needs protection after its defensive vulnerabilities have been exposed.

False American promises only increase our subservience and dependence on a modern colonial project that sees Arabs as nothing more than insignificant figures on its debt list, or mere cheap tools in its proxy wars. The true protection of homelands begins today with disengaging from these destructive agendas, and with the explicit acknowledgment that bases that have failed to protect their own walls and platforms will never be a shield for others.

Hasan Al-Dajah, a Professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University, is a columnist in the Jordan Times.

Opinion

The US General Who Swallowed His Own Truth

CrossFireArabia
March 6, 2026

By Jassem Al-Azzawi

General Dan Kaine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered a confidential warning to President Trump with the utmost candor—the kind of candor that democracies rely on and empires routinely ignore. He said: “We don’t have enough ammunition to win this war. It’s not going to be pretty.” This warning wasn’t born of cowardice; it was the last vestige of institutional integrity that still flickers within the halls of American military power.

Trump’s response was that of a circus clown, not a commander-in-chief. Through his “Truth Social” platform—that distorted mirror of American political life—he dismissed the warning with the arrogance of a street vendor, saying: “Oh, no, no, no. If we do it, we’ll win easily.” Thus, a sober assessment became mere publicity, and caution a lie.

But the biggest lie came later. When Kaine’s warning leaked, Trump not only rejected it but completely reversed it. With the confidence of a man who has never been held accountable for anything, he told the American public the general had said the exact opposite—that the United States had plenty of missiles, munitions, and everything else. “That’s not what he said at all,” Trump declared, putting words of false victory in the mouth of a man who had offered only warnings.

And General Cain remained silent

This silence is not just a footnote in this story; it is the story itself. By remaining silent, Cain allowed the American public to absorb the falsehood as truth. He did not say: “No, Mr. President, that’s not what I said.” He did not invoke his oath, nor the soldiers who would pay with their lives for the gap between political rhetoric and logistical reality. He chose the safety of silence over the danger of truth, and in doing so, he betrayed not only himself but the Republic. This is the rot at the heart of American militarism.

As historian Andrew Bacevich has long warned, the professional military has become more of an instrument of imperial ambition than a defender of democratic values, with senior officers more concerned with their next post than with the Constitution they swore to uphold. Kaine’s silence was not a mere slip of the tongue; it was a symptom of a deeper malaise.

The logistical picture Kaine described in private was not theoretical; the calculations were unforgiving.

Current stockpiles of interceptor missiles and precision munitions could not sustain a prolonged air campaign against a country three times the size of Iraq. The Wall Street Journal documented a “worrying gap” in U.S. missile stockpiles, noting that reserves were “far below” the requirements of intensive and sustained operations. Pentagon contractors were instructed to “double or even quadruple” production of Patriot, SM-6, and precision-strike missiles—a tacit admission that the arsenal built for Cold War scenarios is inadequate for the war being fought today.

Consider Gaza: Israel, the most heavily armed military power in the Middle East, with complete air and naval dominance, has turned a tiny coastal strip into a moon-like landscape of devastation over two and a half years, yet it has not broken Hamas. Gaza is only 37 kilometers long. Iran, on the other hand, is a nation of 90 million people, with mountainous terrain, strategic depth, fortified infrastructure, and a combat-hardened Revolutionary Guard. The idea that it will collapse under a few weeks of American airstrikes is not strategy; it is wishful thinking. “God help us if this continues, if it gets to four weeks,” Colonel Daniel Davis warned on the Deep Dive podcast. He was speaking in military terms, and the same prayer applies. Politically.

When Trump now raises the prospect of sending ground troops, he is not escalating from a position of strength, but rather improvising from a position of denial. Admitting that air power and missiles alone cannot achieve the political objective is an admission that the original objective was never honestly assessed. This is the pattern of American wars at the end of an empire: Glittering promises, disastrous calculations, and then a grim and horrific reckoning paid in blood by those who had no seat at the table where the lies were told.

The costs are already piling up—not just in the currency of munitions and riches, but in the currency that empires always ultimately spend and regret most: credibility. America’s word, already devalued by two decades of contrived justifications for war, is getting cheaper by the day.

Democracies can tolerate miscalculations, and they can tolerate bad presidents, but what they cannot long tolerate is the institutionalization of a culture where the truth is whispered behind closed doors and swallowed whole in front of cameras. When the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff allows his words to be weaponized for propaganda — when the man in charge of counting missiles refuses to correct a president who pretends they are plentiful — something far greater than military credibility collapses.

What is crumbling is the social contract between the governed and those who send them to their deaths.

Caine’s silence was not cautious; it was complicity. And in an imperial machine suffering from a shortage of ammunition and a shortage of truth, complicity is the only resource that seems inexhaustible, because when the missiles finally run out, slogans won’t replace them.

Reality will.

Al-Azzawi is an Iraqi writer who contributed this piece to Al Rai Al Youm which was translated and appeared in crossfire.com