CrossFireArabia
Military and strategic expert Nidal Abu Zeid stated the Israeli army’s combat doctrine is undergoing a radical shift, moving from reliance on large-scale conventional ground operations to less costly, selective operations. This shift comes after recent confrontations, particularly in the Gaza Strip, demonstrated the army’s inability to achieve decisive victories through traditional methods.
Abu Zeid added that increasing the Israeli defense budget to approximately 112 billion shekels next year does not reflect strength as much as it reveals a structural predicament, especially given the requirement to reduce reserve forces from 60,000 to 40,000 soldiers. He noted that the army has announced a shortage of approximately 1,300 officers from the rank of lieutenant to captain, and 300 officers with the rank of major. Furthermore, the percentage of those wishing to continue serving has declined to 63%, compared to 83% in 2018.
He pointed out that these indicators constitute a direct impetus for changing the nature of combat within the military doctrine, a shift already evident in the nature of the military operations carried out by the occupation army in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southwestern Syria.
Abu Zeid explained to Jo24 the findings of the “Tarjuman Committee”, which studied the failures of the 7th October war, concluded that it was necessary to establish buffer zones and transfer the battle to enemy territory. He clarified that what is happening on the ground reflects the practical implementation of these recommendations, through the occupation’s adherence to five points in southern Lebanon, its insistence on a buffer zone in southwestern Syria, its adoption of the “yellow line” in Gaza, and its tightening of control over Area C in the West Bank.
He added that the appointment of General Roman Gofman, with his background as an armored officer, as head of the Mossad is unprecedented in the history of intelligence agencies worldwide. It reflects a shift from deterrence based on threats to deterrence based on destruction, and from traditional intelligence work to direct integration with military field operations.
Abu Zeid pointed out that the triad of deterrence, early warning, and swift decisive action, upon which Israeli military doctrine has been based for decades, has been shattered. He emphasized that the army will not return to large-scale conventional operations, but will instead shift towards what are known as “selective operations” or “easy hunting,” operations that are less costly in terms of both personnel and resources, but which require a radical change in military plans and structures.
He explained that this shift clarifies Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir’s objection to the new budget and the reduction in reserve numbers. It also explains the deepening crisis of confidence between him and Defense Minister Yoav Katz, after the latter agreed to the Finance Minister’s demands, revealing a clear rift in the decision-making system within the Israeli establishment.
Abu Zeid asserted that, given these circumstances, it can be said that Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has partially succeeded in restoring “strategic balance” related to the state’s image and foreign relations after the ceasefire. However, it has lost the more critical “strategic balance” related to internal governance.
He pointed out that signs of strategic imbalance have begun to surface through crises in managing the conflict between the religious and secular factions, the fracturing of the decision-making chain, and even former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar’s statement that “the state is trembling.”
Abu Zeid explained that combining the shift in the nature of the war with the loss of internal strategic balance could lead to what is known as “hyperextension”—a mismatch between what politicians want and the actual tools and capabilities available. This, in his estimation, indicates that Israel has begun to devour itself from within.
marwan
