Even before Trump’s coming of age, which is a long way away, or more accurately so, coming to power, one often wondered about the status of the European Union (EU) in the world of changing circumstances and the existential meaning of its presence on the world power map among the increasing differences among its member states.
Although and frankly, differences always existed within the Union, the Russian invasion of Ukraine made those differences more acute, sharper and penchant materializing between those Europeans fearing being next on the Russian menu, those who want an assertive position against Moscow, those reluctant either way, and those who are out rightly pro-Russia.
Evidently, having unity among the 27 European countries which are not necessarily different in their political structures, yet having necessarily different strategic interests end up with infighting, recriminations and threats.
As well what makes things near-impossible, is that the EU does not have a mechanism to expel a fellow-member from the Union, so one is always beleiving that there is hope that an obtrusive member of the Union would walk out voluntarily in the manner made by the British Brexit.
Now it is more complicated. Not only the EU is having to deal with a possible Russian threat, but also a looming trade war with the US that is compounded with the distinct possibility that America may be withdrawing its protection umbrella from Europe.
Of course, this legitimately raises the question about the future of NATO; a question which was raised before especially after the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This ultimately means a new form of a military alliance will be required for the EU.
Ideally, one would have thought a smaller EU entity, leaner and meaner, with incorporation of Britain in it, would the best option, while the rest of Europe, from its center to its eastern side, hitched by accords with Russia and the USA.
This would be far better instead of the current large European crippled Levathian with Britain running like a headless chicken proposing to be the bridge between the USA and EU, a link both sides of the Atlantic believe it’s too far a gap for any meaningful effect.
Having said all that, there is a window of opportunity now with the new government in Germany, showing more courageous initiatives in wanting to see a reset of the Atlantic relationship, which falls well with President Macron of France, the other core member of the EU which has the idea of creating a single European army to protect the EU and its interests.
When it comes to transnational trade, the absurdity of the war of tariffs will hurt all including the American economy, though European companies whose main market is in the USA will go and invest in America, but those US companies whose main market is Europe, will invest in the EU.
Essentially, the seismic shift in relations across the Atlantic is set to commence with most probably less profits but more fairness.
Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris, France
With the conclusion of the first meeting between President Donald Trump and His Majesty King Abdullah, Jordan finds itself facing a real political test. The strategy of buying time with an administration that has been in office for only a few weeks may not offer much room for maneuvering, making it increasingly difficult to navigate the direction of US policy. Jordan has sought to carve out a space for itself by engaging with the American president and promoting an alternative that has broader Arab support. However, this approach requires swift action and the presentation of practical alternatives that could gradually shape Trump’s perspective.
Jordan now needs to build strong alliances to manage the next phase and counter the looming threat of forced displacement of Gaza’s population—a proposal that Trump has openly suggested as the only solution. Regionally, Jordan finds itself alongside Egypt as both countries face direct pressure from the US displacement plan. This shared challenge has reinforced their cooperation on various regional issues over the years, yet expanding the Arab alliance has now become an urgent necessity. The multiple forms of US pressure on Egypt make it crucial to establish a stronger, more resilient Arab coalition, with Saudi Arabia playing a central role.
Trump views Saudi Arabia as a gateway to regional peace and a key economic partner, not only for the United States, but also for a major strategic project aimed at linking India to Europe through the Arabian Peninsula, the Mediterranean, and Italy. This highlights the importance of Saudi Arabia’s role in Trump’s vision. At the same time, Jordan’s southern geography is closely tied to Saudi Arabia within this ambitious economic corridor, which strengthens shared economic interests between the two countries. This growing economic partnership could lay the groundwork for deeper political coordination, including a potential Jordanian-Saudi understanding regarding the proposed displacement policy.
On the international level, Jordan can work to rally support for its political stance, which enjoys broad consensus among key global actors. However, at this stage, prioritising Arab alliances and maintaining effective communication channels with the US administration is far more critical than merely seeking international backing.
Domestically, Jordan’s internal front remains the most crucial. The current climate presents an opportunity for the state to reinforce national unity, as growing regional instability has heightened public awareness of external threats. This requires decisive steps to foster genuine political participation and address long-standing grievances of exclusion and marginalization. A shift in political discourse, engagement strategies, and governance methods is necessary to strengthen national cohesion. Uniting Jordanians under an inclusive and representative state framework will be vital in shaping a new phase in the country’s history.
What remains striking is how Jordan was suddenly thrust into the equation of resolving the Gaza crisis. From the outset of the war, discussions primarily centered around Egypt due to its direct geographical connection to Gaza. However, Trump’s unexpected move to involve Jordan has now exposed the country to two major risks: the potential displacement of Gaza’s population and, more alarmingly, the forced displacement of West Bank residents. The push to make Jordan part of the US plan for Gaza raises concerns that this could lead to an imposed reality in which Jordan is expected to absorb West Bank residents as well.
Categorically rejecting forced displacement must be Jordan’s top priority. However, achieving this requires a high level of political agility and the ability to engage in direct negotiations with all relevant stakeholders. This approach would strengthen Jordan’s regional role at a time when further Israeli escalation across multiple fronts, including Gaza and the West Bank, seems increasingly likely. Such an escalation could be used by the Israeli government to block political maneuvering and impose new realities on the ground. A military confrontation could shift the issue of displacement from a political debate to an unavoidable reality, forcing all parties to confront its consequences.
The author is an academic writing for The Jordan Times.
The Brussels-Capital Region Parliament made history as the first in Belgium and Europe to pass a resolution calling for sanctions on the Israeli occupation, according to the BDS movement. The resolution urges the Brussels government to withhold weapon licenses to Israel, stop supporting companies linked to its military, and sever cooperation with firms listed in the UN database.
In 2007, Russia’s President Putin gave a now-infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), announcing Russia’s new posture of hostility towards the US and Europe. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, many looked back at Putin’s 2007 Munich speech as a revealing moment of his intentions.
This year’s MSC could be a similar watershed. This time, the warning bells ring from across the Atlantic. US Vice President JD Vance delivered one of the most hostile speeches by a US official to Europe in decades. Rather than addressing the Russian or Chinese threats, Vance argued that Europe faced a “threat from within,” accusing the EU and national governments of censorship and ignoring popular demands on issues like illegal migration.
Meanwhile, away from Munich, US President Donald Trump held a phone call with Putin, setting the stage for negotiations between the US and Russia for a peace agreement in Ukraine – without involving European counterparts in the discussions. The day before, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth announced some of the US expectations from this deal: Ukraine should drop its NATO membership bid, European countries would need to provide the forces to enforce the agreement, and these forces would not be covered by NATO’s Article 5 guarantees.
The transatlantic picture in which the MSC took place was even bleaker. Since Trump’s inauguration one month ago, the new president had promised (and now imposed) tariffs against countries across the world, including Europe. He has threatened to annex the territory of allies like Canada and Denmark.
Normally, the MSC is an opportunity for the United States to reaffirm its commitment to Europe and the Atlantic alliance. This year, it could be remembered as the time when the US started the process of abandoning Europe – or even going aggressively after it.
An attack on Europe
Vance’s speech and the reactions to it have dominated the discussions at the MSC. Although the conference theme was “multilateralization”, the real topic on everyone’s mind was: how would Trump’s second administration approach Europe?
As the pre-conference report argued: “Donald Trump’s presidential victory has buried the US post–Cold War foreign policy consensus that a grand strategy of liberal internationalism would best serve US interests.” That this consensus was gone was clearly visible in the conference. Despite perfunctory references to shared values, Vance’s speech did not talk about the alliance between Europe and North America, nor about the common threats and how to face them.
And he has voiced support for anti-EU parties. Vance pronounced his speech in Germany, just weeks before federal elections, and argued that there should not be “firewalls” in government – a clear reference to the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) which has so far been kept out of governing coalitions. After the speech, Vance met with the AfD leader.
Additionally, Vance criticized Romania for canceling its 2024 elections and accused the EU of censoring free speech. But Vance failed to acknowledge that the very election that brought Trump and him to power in November was the subject of major foreign interference by Russia, China, and Iran. Rather than sitting idly by, US agencies took active measures to counter these malign actions and prevent disruptions – like raising awareness, coordinating with the media, and keeping politics out of the fight. With his speech, Vance seems to be arguing for the exact opposite approach.
All these issues did not touch on security and defense, the core of the MSC’s discussions. But they did lure in the background of Vance’s speech. A few months ago, Vance argued that the EU should not regulate tech companies owned by Elon Musk. If the Europeans did so, he argued, the US should reduce its security commitments to NATO. Hence, American assurances could become bargaining chips to resolve other issues.
How will the EU respond?
Vance’s Munich speech marks a new era in US relations with Europe. While the themes are not new – Trump has never been a fan of NATO, and enjoys courting Europe’s far-right – the extent of the rhetorical change cannot be understated. Ukraine’s President Zelensky, speaking in Munich the day after Vance, spelled out the challenge in clear terms: “We can’t rule out the possibility that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that threaten it.”
The reaction from European leaders has been strong so far. EU Commission President Von der Leyen called for an emergency clause in the EU treaties to allow member states to boost defense spending [8]. French President Macron called for a summit of European leaders in Paris on Monday, February 17 – to sketch out a common position on the upcoming negotiations over Ukraine, and on making up for US security guarantees from Europe.
The greatest challenge, however, will be transforming outrage into meaningful action. Europeans have long ignored calls to take charge of their own security. Domestic constraints over spending, divisions and the continued belief that Uncle Sam will have their back have stood in the way of ambitious choices. Will this time be different?
This opinion was written by Giuseppe Spatafora for the Anadolu news website.
Immediately upon his return to the White House for a second stint, a hawkish Donald Trump has put Iran on notice.
In the first week of February, the US President signed a presidential decree reinstating the maximum pressure policy on Iran, saying that though he was not pleased with the decision, he had no choice but to adopt a firm stance.
A few days later, Trump claimed that a very “frightened” Iran was ready for a deal with the US over the Shia-majority nation’s nuclear programme.
The moot point of his assertion was that he would also prefer a deal rather than Israel carrying its threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. “I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.”
Since Trump assumed office, Iranian officials have consistently voiced their support for dialogue and expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations with the new administration.
On January 14, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed this position in an interview with NBC, emphasising Iran’s openness to talks.
However, any potential for a dialogue appeared to have been decisively shut down following a February 7 statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Addressing members of the Iranian military, Khamenei declared that engaging in negotiations with the US was neither a prudent nor an honourable course of action, unequivocally rejecting the prospect of talks between the two countries.
Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s January approval of the sale of 4,700 additional MK-84 bunker-buster bombs to Israel as part of a broader Iran strategy.
This begs the question: How would Iran-US relations evolve under Trump, and how significant is the threat posed by Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities?
Trump’s re-election marks a critical turning point for Iran. Even during his first presidency, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure had led to significant economic, political, and military challenges for Tehran.
It was during the first Trump administration that some seismic events – such as the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the re-imposition of economic sanctions, and the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani—intensified the pressure on Iran.
With Trump’s re-election, the Iranian leadership is concerned about the prospect of further escalation of previous policies.
Recent developments in the region indicate that Iran’s deterrence capabilities have reached a critical low.
An analysis of Iran’s national security and defence doctrine reveals that it rests on three principal strategic pillars: the establishment of a forward defence line via non-state actors under the Quds Force, an extensive missile programme, and efforts to achieve nuclear threshold status.
However, Israel’s attacks in 2023 and 2024 have significantly weakened these pillars. Indeed, the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, the destruction of its command structures, and successful Israeli airstrikes against Iranian territory have complicated Iran’s ability to leverage these elements as an effective deterrent.
Moreover, although Iran’s missile programme is still impressive in terms of variety and quantity, its effectiveness was found to be limited during the April and October 2024 attacks. The majority of Iran’s missiles either missed their targets or proved ineffective.
The Israeli strikes on October 26 severely damaged Iran’s missile engine production facilities and solid fuel production capabilities.
In particular, the strikes on the Shahroud missile complex have significantly constrained Iran’s ability to develop long-range missiles. As a result of these strikes, Iran’s most advanced air defence systems (S-300 PMU2) were rendered inoperable.
The remaining systems are limited both in range and capability, thereby increasing Iran’s vulnerability to external attacks. These vulnerabilities have prompted Tehran to reconsider the option of developing nuclear weapons.
While Iran has the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium within a week, integrating a nuclear warhead into a missile system is regarded as a time-consuming process.
Iran’s nuclear programme and rising concerns
Trump’s threats and the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme represent a critical juncture for the country.
Rather than initiating the production of nuclear weapons, Tehran could adopt the more cautious yet effective step of announcing its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Such a move would underscore Iran’s seriousness while seeking to extract more concessions at the negotiating table.
A notable example is North Korea, which in 1993 employed a similar strategy by announcing its intention to withdraw from the treaty, subsequently suspending its decision before ultimately carrying it out.
Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT could be perceived by the international community as a shift toward nuclear weapons production. This, in turn, could escalate regional tensions and potentially encourage Israel to deploy US-made bunker-buster bombs against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, known as the Amad Plan, sought to produce five nuclear weapons between 1999 and 2003.
Under this plan, four warheads for Shahab-3 ballistic missiles and one bomb for an underground test were developed.
According to the Iranian nuclear archive captured by Israel in 2018, Iran has made significant advances in critical technologies, including nuclear warhead design, neutron initiators, and detonation focusing systems. This information is regarded as a contributing factor to Iran’s increased capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
Significant similarities exist between China’s first nuclear bomb (codenamed 596) and Iran’s early designs. The findings indicate that Iran is approaching the status of a nuclear threshold state.
Therefore, Trump’s nuclear policy toward Iran is a critical issue, both in terms of differing perspectives within his administration and the broader international context.
Where can the process evolve?
Iran’s nuclear programme remains a priority concern for both Europe and the US.
With the expiration of the UN Security Council (UNSC) snapback sanctions in October 2025, the US-led West risks losing one of its most powerful tools of diplomatic leverage.
In this context, Europe plans to leverage Iran’s vulnerabilities and time constraints to initiate an effective nuclear diplomacy process.
Indeed, a statement by the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – that it is prepared to utilise all diplomatic tools against Iran indicates that patience is waning.
Simultaneously, Iran’s statements suggesting it may reassess its technical capabilities and political intentions have raised concerns within the international community.
The US might intensify pressure by tightening the enforcement of secondary sanctions on the Iranian economy.
As an initial measure, Trump imposed sanctions on a key international network involved in the sale of Iranian oil, delivering a significant blow to Iran’s oil exports.
Expanding sanctions to target major purchasers of Iranian oil, particularly China, could exacerbate Iran’s economic vulnerabilities.
In other words, the US and Europe may capitalise on this window of opportunity by intensifying pressure on Iran while simultaneously presenting clear diplomatic solutions.
In Iran, contrary to Khamenei’s rhetoric, there are indications that a large section of the leadership and population are generally supportive of negotiations with the US.
Recently, the Center for Islamic World Studies, aligned with Supreme Leader Khamenei, conducted a survey on Iran-US negotiations as part of its advisory role in foreign policy.
The study surveyed 119 academics, senior executives, and current and former officials. The results revealed that 86.5 percent of respondents supported direct negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration, while just 5.8 percent opposed the proposal. A further 7.5 percent of respondents indicated that negotiations would be conditional.
Against the backdrop of Trump’s belligerence against Iran, the risk of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities has gone up manifold.
How Tehran decides to navigate the choppy waters of uncertainty will determine the future of US-Iran relations. And, perhaps, of the volatile region too.
CrossFireArabia
