Pezeshkian: Iran Will Not be Bullied, Tells Trump to ‘Go to Hell’

One couldn’t help but feel a tinge of pleasure in Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian lashing out at Donald Trump. Without mincing his words, and certainly not sticking to diplomatic niceties, no doubt taking his cue from the new boss at the White House, Pezeshkian told the US president a few home truths.

Depending on the translation into English from Persian, he basically told the US president to “go to hell”. This is a phrase that is making great headlines all over the world for its intensity and meaning.

On its part, the social media is having a field day at Pezeshkian, to say the least “forthright” speech at the Iran Entrepreneurs Forum in which he lambasted Trump for the way he is called on Tehran to heed and either go back to the nuclear deal or face the mighty military of the United States.

He didn’t at all like how Trump framed his appeal for Iran to get back to the negotiations table  when he spoke nonchalantly that “there are two ways Iran can be handled: militarily or make a deal.”

In turn,  Pezeshkian and the Iranian leadership starting from Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi became particularly angry at this approach as Trump is now seeking to revive the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal which he muzzled out of in 2018 during his first administration as one of the latest pieces of the US global, foreign and security policies.

Though denied by Iran, Trump said he sent a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei in which he told them to agree to a deal or face the military wrath of the United States with extended crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil sector, its exports and the shutting off of its global financing.

The subsequent utterings on the international media about Trump and his latest obsession in “controlling” the nuclear file of Iran has created a knee-jerk reaction among the country’s leadership which saw what Trump was doing was “coersive diktates” and imposition of maximalists pressure which today, they are in no mood to pay heed to because of so many factors including its ballistic missile attacks on Israel last October where up to 250 missiles landed on different sites of the country.

Pezeshkian, dubbed as a reformist president and one who is willing to listen, was startlingly critical at the way Trump invited, more like dictating, to get back to the nuclear deal under vastly different and stringent negotiating terms, and ones that would strip Iran of its nuclear aspirations and impose an additional and an even tougher monitoring and observation regime than the previously deal allowed for which Pezeshkian and other leaders rejected.

In plain, straight talking, again no doubt like Trump’s abrasive approach Pezeshkian leading a country on the threshold of becoming a nuclear power as many analysts suggest with more than 60 percent uranium enrichment capacity, said Iran would not negotiate with Washington while while being threatened. He essentially delivered the ultimate stab that the US president can “do whatever the hell you want”, as reported by the Iranian state media, Tuesday.

”It is unacceptable for us that they [the U.S.] give orders and make threats. I won’t even negotiate with you. Do whatever the hell you want”, Pezeshkian repeated at the behest of a country long standing up to the United States and to maintain cold and freezing relations with the United States.

Further, and to say the least, this was the ultimate snub delivered by the Iranian president who was in no mood to listen to the antics of the new US president wishing to wield his rhetorical stick around the world and was not afraid of telling him so.

Pezeshkian was especially irked him by the way Trump met the Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky in the White House recently calling it disgraceful and shameful and Iran would not listen to such talk as a way of moving the negotiations forward.

It was Trump, who initially pulled out of the Iran deal officially called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by the then Barack Obama administration with international backing of five major UN powers including Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany in 2015.

Then Trump said the deal was a bad one and wanted to re-negotiate. But since taking the USA out of the deal, Tehran no longer found it necessary to continue to observe the strict regime imposed by JCPOA on Iranian nuclear facilities which slowly started to top up its uranium enrichment levels to where it is today.

As well, Pezeshkian was echoing the words of Ayatollah Khamenei who earlier rejected the prospects of direct talks, calling them neither “smart, wise nor honorable” while saying that Iran will not be bullied into negotiations.

This was seconded by Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi who made it perfectly clear on his X account that “we will NOT negotiate under pressure and negotiation, We will NOT even consider it, no matter what the subject might be, whilst emphasizing that dialogue must be rooted in mutual respect, not threats.”

For all the outward talk however, Iranian officials have stressed as they did so in the past that the country’s nuclear program has been always for peaceful purposes and is open about the country’s nuclear reactors and plants as proved in its current consultation with the different world powers of the United Nations Security Council.

The above-analysis is written by Dr Marwan Asmar, chief editor of the crossfirearabia.com website.

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After ‘Muzzling Out’ Trump Now Wants a Nuclear Deal With Iran

President Donald Trump said Friday that “interesting days” lie ahead for the US and Iran as he seeks to either negotiate a new nuclear deal with Tehran, or pursue “the other option,” a likely allusion to military action.

Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that the “next thing you’ll be talking about is Iran,” vowing “there’ll be some interesting days ahead.” 

The comments came just hours after Trump said in an interview with Fox Business Network that he sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urging nuclear talks according to Anadolu.

“We’re down to final strokes with Iran. That’s going to be an interesting time, and we’ll see what happens. But we’re down to the final moments. Final moments. Can’t let them have a nuclear weapon,” Trump said in the Oval Office.

“We have a situation with Iran, that something’s going to happen very soon, very, very soon, you’ll be talking about that pretty soon, I guess, and hopefully we can have a peace deal. I’m not speaking out of strength or weakness. I’m just saying I’d rather see a peace deal than the other, but the other will solve the problem,” he added.

Iran’s Permanent Mission to the UN in New York responded to a question about Trump’s statement that he sent a letter to Khamenei, saying they have not received such a letter so far, according to Iranian media reports.

Khamenei had earlier banned negotiations with the Trump administration, which he described as “untrustworthy.”

Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, have frequently said they will not negotiate with the US under pressure and threats.

“As long as the US policy of maximum pressure and threats continues, we will not enter into direct negotiations with the US,” Aragchi said in an interview in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on Friday.

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Javad Zarif and Iran’s Political Feud

After a long-running legal row over his appointment, Iran’s deputy president for strategic affairs, Javad Zarif, announced his resignation on Monday.

In a detailed post on X, the former top diplomat said he had worked with dedication in President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government over the past nine months but endured “the most vile insults, slanders, and threats directed at myself and my family” over the past six months.

He described this period as “the most bitter” of his 40-year political career, referencing the controversy surrounding his appointment as the country’s vice president according to Anadolu.

Many of his critics argued that his appointment violated the Constitution, as his children — born in the US — are natural-born citizens of the US.

“Over the past four decades, I have endured countless insults and accusations for my small role in advancing national interests, from ending the imposed war to bringing the nuclear case to completion, and I have remained silent in the face of a flood of lies and distortions to protect the country’s interests,” he wrote in his resignation letter.

Zarif, who served as foreign minister for eight years under President Hassan Rouhani and played a key role in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, said he was invited by the judiciary chief, who pointed to the country’s current state and advised him to return to academia “to prevent further pressure on the government.”

“I hope that with my departure, obstacles to the people’s will and the government’s success will be removed,” Zarif said.

The former top diplomat had been under intense pressure from conservative political circles, which urged parliament to remove him from his government post.

Notably, Zarif, who had campaigned for Pezeshkian during the elections, also led the committee responsible for selecting candidates for various ministries and government departments.

There had been speculation about his resignation in the past too but he always dismissed them.

There has been no word so far from the president’s office on whether he will accept the resignation. But sources say the resignation will be accepted to prevent further pressure on the government.

On Sunday, Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati was impeached by the parliament over mounting economic woes and depreciating national currency rial.

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How Will Hawkish Trump Deal With Iran?

Ata Şahit

Ata Şahit

Immediately upon his return to the White House for a second stint, a hawkish Donald Trump has put Iran on notice.

In the first week of February, the US President signed a presidential decree reinstating the maximum pressure policy on Iran, saying that though he was not pleased with the decision, he had no choice but to adopt a firm stance.

A few days later, Trump claimed that a very “frightened” Iran was ready for a deal with the US over the Shia-majority nation’s nuclear programme.

The moot point of his assertion was that he would also prefer a deal rather than Israel carrying its threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. “I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.”

Since Trump assumed office, Iranian officials have consistently voiced their support for dialogue and expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations with the new administration.

On January 14, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed this position in an interview with NBC, emphasising Iran’s openness to talks.

However, any potential for a dialogue appeared to have been decisively shut down following a February 7 statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Addressing members of the Iranian military, Khamenei declared that engaging in negotiations with the US was neither a prudent nor an honourable course of action, unequivocally rejecting the prospect of talks between the two countries.

Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s January approval of the sale of 4,700 additional MK-84 bunker-buster bombs to Israel as part of a broader Iran strategy.

This begs the question: How would Iran-US relations evolve under Trump, and how significant is the threat posed by Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities?

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Israel likely to attack Iran nuclear facilities by midyear — report

Trump’s first term and Iran

Trump’s re-election marks a critical turning point for Iran. Even during his first presidency, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure had led to significant economic, political, and military challenges for Tehran.

It was during the first Trump administration that some seismic events – such as the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the re-imposition of economic sanctions, and the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani—intensified the pressure on Iran.

With Trump’s re-election, the Iranian leadership is concerned about the prospect of further escalation of previous policies.

Recent developments in the region indicate that Iran’s deterrence capabilities have reached a critical low.

An analysis of Iran’s national security and defence doctrine reveals that it rests on three principal strategic pillars: the establishment of a forward defence line via non-state actors under the Quds Force, an extensive missile programme, and efforts to achieve nuclear threshold status.

However, Israel’s attacks in 2023 and 2024 have significantly weakened these pillars. Indeed, the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, the destruction of its command structures, and successful Israeli airstrikes against Iranian territory have complicated Iran’s ability to leverage these elements as an effective deterrent.

Moreover, although Iran’s missile programme is still impressive in terms of variety and quantity, its effectiveness was found to be limited during the April and October 2024 attacks. The majority of Iran’s missiles either missed their targets or proved ineffective.

The Israeli strikes on October 26 severely damaged Iran’s missile engine production facilities and solid fuel production capabilities.

In particular, the strikes on the Shahroud missile complex have significantly constrained Iran’s ability to develop long-range missiles. As a result of these strikes, Iran’s most advanced air defence systems (S-300 PMU2) were rendered inoperable.

The remaining systems are limited both in range and capability, thereby increasing Iran’s vulnerability to external attacks. These vulnerabilities have prompted Tehran to reconsider the option of developing nuclear weapons.

While Iran has the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium within a week, integrating a nuclear warhead into a missile system is regarded as a time-consuming process.

Iran’s nuclear programme and rising concerns

Trump’s threats and the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme represent a critical juncture for the country.

Rather than initiating the production of nuclear weapons, Tehran could adopt the more cautious yet effective step of announcing its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Such a move would underscore Iran’s seriousness while seeking to extract more concessions at the negotiating table.

A notable example is North Korea, which in 1993 employed a similar strategy by announcing its intention to withdraw from the treaty, subsequently suspending its decision before ultimately carrying it out.

Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT could be perceived by the international community as a shift toward nuclear weapons production. This, in turn, could escalate regional tensions and potentially encourage Israel to deploy US-made bunker-buster bombs against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, known as the Amad Plan, sought to produce five nuclear weapons between 1999 and 2003.

Under this plan, four warheads for Shahab-3 ballistic missiles and one bomb for an underground test were developed.

According to the Iranian nuclear archive captured by Israel in 2018, Iran has made significant advances in critical technologies, including nuclear warhead design, neutron initiators, and detonation focusing systems. This information is regarded as a contributing factor to Iran’s increased capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Significant similarities exist between China’s first nuclear bomb (codenamed 596) and Iran’s early designs. The findings indicate that Iran is approaching the status of a nuclear threshold state.

Therefore, Trump’s nuclear policy toward Iran is a critical issue, both in terms of differing perspectives within his administration and the broader international context.

Where can the process evolve?

Iran’s nuclear programme remains a priority concern for both Europe and the US.

With the expiration of the UN Security Council (UNSC) snapback sanctions in October 2025, the US-led West risks losing one of its most powerful tools of diplomatic leverage.

In this context, Europe plans to leverage Iran’s vulnerabilities and time constraints to initiate an effective nuclear diplomacy process.

Indeed, a statement by the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – that it is prepared to utilise all diplomatic tools against Iran indicates that patience is waning.

Simultaneously, Iran’s statements suggesting it may reassess its technical capabilities and political intentions have raised concerns within the international community.

The US might intensify pressure by tightening the enforcement of secondary sanctions on the Iranian economy.

As an initial measure, Trump imposed sanctions on a key international network involved in the sale of Iranian oil, delivering a significant blow to Iran’s oil exports.

Expanding sanctions to target major purchasers of Iranian oil, particularly China, could exacerbate Iran’s economic vulnerabilities.

In other words, the US and Europe may capitalise on this window of opportunity by intensifying pressure on Iran while simultaneously presenting clear diplomatic solutions.

In Iran, contrary to Khamenei’s rhetoric, there are indications that a large section of the leadership and population are generally supportive of negotiations with the US.

Recently, the Center for Islamic World Studies, aligned with Supreme Leader Khamenei, conducted a survey on Iran-US negotiations as part of its advisory role in foreign policy.

The study surveyed 119 academics, senior executives, and current and former officials. The results revealed that 86.5 percent of respondents supported direct negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration, while just 5.8 percent opposed the proposal. A further 7.5 percent of respondents indicated that negotiations would be conditional.

Against the backdrop of Trump’s belligerence against Iran, the risk of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities has gone up manifold.

How Tehran decides to navigate the choppy waters of uncertainty will determine the future of US-Iran relations. And, perhaps, of the volatile region too.

Ata Şahit

Ata Şahit

Ata Şahit is an executive producer for TRT.

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