Hamas Archives - Page 5 of 25

Israel Threatens to Resume War…

CrossFireArabia
March 4, 2025

Israel has threatened to resume its genocide war in Gaza, setting a deadline of 10 days for Hamas to release the remaining captives, a move that violates the ceasefire agreement.

Israel’s Channel 12, citing an Israeli official, said on Monday that the occupation government has set a deadline 10 days from now for Hamas to release the remaining captives in Gaza before a return to war.

“We are currently at a dead end regarding the deal negotiations,” the official told Channel 12.

At the parliament on Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened, “I tell Hamas: If you do not release our hostages, there will be consequences that you cannot imagine.”

Defence Minister Israel Katz later said if Hamas did not free the captives, “the gates of Gaza will be locked, and the gates of hell will open”.

“We will return to fighting, and they will face the (army) with forces and methods they have never encountered—until a decisive victory,” he said in a statement.

Israel Violates Ceasefire

Israel has imposed a block on all aid entering Gaza following the end of the first phase of the ceasefire deal. Netanyahu’s office issued a statement on Sunday morning confirming the decision.

The move, which coincides with the holy month of Ramadan, came after Hamas refused to accept the extension of the first phase of the ceasefire deal.

Israel said that it had accepted a last-minute proposal put on the table by the US president’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, for a temporary ceasefire over Ramadan and Passover.

According to Israel, the proposal also outlined the release of all captives still in Gaza in two stages, with the second stage contingent on negotiating a permanent ceasefire.

“With the end of phase one of the hostage deal, and in light of Hamas’ refusal to accept the [US envoy Steve] Witkoff outline for continuing the talks – to which Israel agreed, Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided that starting this morning all entry of goods and supplies into the Gaza Strip will cease,” the statement said.

“Israel will not allow a ceasefire without the release of our hostages. If Hamas continues its refusal, there will be further consequences.”

Hamas refused to extend it, noting it will only release captives in phases, per the ceasefire agreement, which Israel is now refusing to continue.

It said it would only accept moving to the second stage, which was supposed to guarantee the definitive end of the assault, an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the release of remaining captives.

Hamas also slammed Israel’s decision to block the entry of aid and adopt the US proposal. In a statement, the movement said this “is a blatant attempt to renege on the agreement and evade negotiations for its second phase.”

“Netanyahu’s decision to block the entry of all humanitarian aid into Gaza is a cheap blackmail and a war crime in an appalling violation of the ceasefire deal. Mediators and the international community must act to place pressure on the occupation and put an end to its punitive and immoral measures against more than two million people in the Gaza Strip.”

Hamas stated that Israel has continued to violate the ceasefire since it took effect, which has resulted in the killing of over 100 people in Gaza and the disruption of the humanitarian protocol. This includes blocking the entry of sheltering and relief aid, further aggravating the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. According to Gaza’s Government Media Office, Israel has committed around 962 violations of the ceasefire agreement according to the Quds News Network.

News

Israeli Army Admits ‘Colossal Failure’ on 7 October

CrossFireArabia
February 28, 2025

The Israeli army released its findings on Thursday after months of investigations into the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, admitting to a “colossal failure” in anticipating the “Al-Aqsa Flood Operation” launched by the Palestinian resistance group.

The investigation report said the military was unprepared for the attack, having been caught off guard by the number of Palestinian fighters who breached military bases and settlements near Gaza, according to Israeli Army Radio.

The findings also revealed that the army was surprised by the speed and coordination of the attack, which exceeded all expectations.

Doron Kadosh, the military correspondent for Israeli Army Radio, reported that the army admitted it had not considered the possibility of a large-scale surprise attack like the one on Oct. 7.

Kadosh wrote on his X that a threat of such an attack was never taken seriously or even considered, which left the army unprepared to counter it.

The investigation findings confirmed that Hamas fighters completely overran the Israeli army’s Gaza Division for several hours, specifically between 6:30 a.m. and 12:30 p.m.

During this time, the Israeli military had no control over the area near Gaza. It took around 10 hours for the army to regain operational control over the region, which Hamas had effectively seized.

According to Army Radio, the findings exposed the army’s reliance on flawed strategic assumptions, including the belief that “Gaza posed a secondary threat that did not require significant military attention and that Hamas was deterred and focused on maintaining calm for economic benefits.”

The investigation further concluded that the army allowed “a severe security threat to develop along its borders by over-relying on the defensive barrier while significantly weakening border defense forces, including a shortage of troops in areas near Gaza.”

Additionally, the findings pointed to a sense of “arrogance” within the army and “overconfidence” in its intelligence superiority, with a firm belief that any potential Palestinian attack would be preceded by an intelligence warning.

“There was no one who saw or detected any sign of this event in advance, not even at the lowest intelligence level,” one of the central investigations found.

However, the lack of such a warning caused a major shock to military leadership and contributed to the chaos of the attack’s initial hours.

Several Israeli political, military, and security officials have previously admitted to personal responsibility for the failure to prevent the Oct. 7 attack.

As a result, some officials resigned, most notably Aharon Haliva, chief of the army’s Military Intelligence Directorate.

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday criticized the Israeli army for not sending him the findings of the investigations.

According to the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, Netanyahu’s office sent a letter to the Ministry of Defense demanding an explanation for why the army had not submitted its investigation findings on Oct. 7.

However, Netanyahu has so far refused to take any responsibility for the attack or to establish an official investigation committee into the events of that day.

The first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement took effect on Jan. 19, pausing the Israeli war that has killed more than 48,300 people, mostly women and children, and left the enclave in ruins.

Last November, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Israel also faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice for its war on the enclave.

Opinion

Putting The Cart Before The Horse

CrossFireArabia
February 26, 2025

With the approach of the Cairo Summit to discuss the Palestinian issue and the reconstruction of Gaza, Arab leaders find themselves facing three main scenarios to make decisive decisions that determine the future of Gaza and the fate of the Palestinians the day after the cessation of the war. The dilemma is no longer limited to reconstruction only but also includes the political and administrative arrangements that ensure the stability of the sector and prevent the recurrence of the devastating conflict.

From the American side, it seems that the Trump administration is adopting a more stringent approach, as it recently stated the necessity of displacing Palestinians from Gaza as a “solution” to ensure regional security, which reflects its traditional position biased towards Israel and complicates any Arab efforts to find an independent solution for the sector.

This American position raises great concerns in Arab and international circles, given the disastrous consequences it carries for the Palestinians and the entire region, especially in light of the widespread international rejection of forced displacement policies.

The first scenario involves adopting a comprehensive regional solution led by Arabs, aiming to place Gaza under temporary Arab administration, which may include Egypt and perhaps some Gulf states, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. In this scenario, a transitional body would be established to administer the Strip, which would undertake reconstruction operations, organize basic services, and reorganize the security situation in a way that prevents the recurrence of the conflict.

This body could also work to pave the way for comprehensive Palestinian elections to be held later, so that Gaza would be part of a unified Palestinian entity.

This temporary administration would work to restructure institutions within the Strip, ensure the regular provision of health and education services, and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged by the war. It would also undertake the tasks of securing the crossings and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, while imposing strict control to prevent the infiltration of any elements that might contribute to destabilization.

It is expected that the contributing Arab states would have different roles, as Egypt could handle security aspects, while the Gulf states would contribute to financing and reconstruction. This option requires Arab and international consensus, as well as internal Palestinian acceptance, which may be difficult in light of the differences between the factions.

Israel may not view this scenario favorably, as it strengthens the Arab role in Gaza and limits its influence there. In addition, the success of this scenario depends on the Arabs’ ability to impose a unified vision and work to reduce external interventions that may hinder this solution. Ultimately, this scenario remains a realistic option, but it is fraught with challenges that require active diplomacy and strong political will.

As for the second scenario, it is to support the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority and grant it full control over Gaza after reaching internal understandings with the various factions, including Hamas. In this framework, the security services are integrated into a unified framework under the supervision of the Authority, and the administrative institutions are unified, with an Arab and international commitment to provide financial and logistical support to ensure the success of this transition.

One of the main pillars of this scenario is rebuilding trust between the various Palestinian factions, which requires intensive efforts from regional and international mediators, especially Egypt and the United Nations. This proposal also requires providing guarantees that the faction leaders will not be targeted or excluded from the political scene, which necessitates establishing a joint governance mechanism for a transitional period.

This scenario depends primarily on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to impose its effective control over the Strip, which is doubtful, especially in light of the deep differences between the West Bank and Gaza, and the lack of trust between the Palestinian parties.

In addition, Hamas’s acceptance of this proposal may be conditional on effective participation in governance, which may not be acceptable to Israel or some regional powers. Moreover, this solution faces obstacles related to the extent of the international community’s ability to commit to funding reconstruction, and to ensuring that Israel does not obstruct any efforts aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority’s control over the Strip.

The third scenario, which may be the most complex, is to impose an international solution under the auspices of the United Nations, whereby international peacekeeping forces are deployed to oversee the administration of Gaza for a transitional period, during which the Strip is rebuilt, and the political conditions are prepared to find a comprehensive Palestinian settlement.

In this scenario, the infrastructure is rehabilitated, security guarantees are provided to prevent the outbreak of new confrontations, while the way is opened for an internal Palestinian dialogue under international auspices to reach an agreement on the future of governance in Gaza.

This scenario also includes international supervision of the rehabilitation of civilian institutions in Gaza, ensuring the distribution of aid, and preventing the use of resources in any military activities that may lead to a renewal of the conflict.

It could also contribute to reactivating the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis through an international mechanism that ensures the implementation of any understandings reached.

However, this option faces several obstacles, most notably the rejection by some Palestinian forces of any direct international intervention in Palestinian affairs, and Israel may refuse to deploy international forces near its borders, preferring to keep Gaza under siege or in a state of instability that keeps it weak and unable to pose a security threat.

Moreover, any international intervention will require consensus among the major powers, which may be difficult to achieve in light of global political tensions. Each of these scenarios carries its own challenges, and the optimal choice remains linked to the extent of the Arabs’ ability to unify their positions and make bold decisions that go beyond narrow political calculations.

The main challenge lies in reaching a solution that spares Gaza further destruction, establishes a new phase of stability and development, and ensures that the Palestinian issue is not exploited in regional conflicts. The question remains: Will the Cairo Summit be able to overcome Arab differences and present a unified vision to save Gaza and its future?

Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

News

Back on Track: Israel Poised to Free 620 Palestinians Prisoners

CrossFireArabia
February 26, 2025

Israel is set to release 620 Palestinian detainees after days of stalling by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The expected release as announced by Hamas will now proceed as originally scheduled.

Hamas had stated that Israel violated the ceasefire agreement, in place since 19 January 19, by freezing the release of Palestinian detainees. It insisted Israel failed to uphold its commitments, after Hamas released Israeli prisoners as agreed. Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi warned that no releases would mean that the deal to release more of the hostages would be off-the-table.

The Israeli government is angry because of the way the Israeli hostages are being released through “humiliating ceremonies” especially after an Israeli prisoner expressed gratitude to Hamas fighters upon release, kissing their foreheads.

However, Israel soon caved in under pressure from the countries sponsoring the negotiations mainly, the USA, Egypt and Qatar.

Opinion

Who is Going to Rebuild Gaza?

CrossFireArabia
February 25, 2025

No official announcement was made following the Riyadh Summit, which was considered fraternal, friendly, and consultative rather than formal. The summit, held a few days ago, was attended by the Gulf states, along with Jordan and Egypt, in anticipation of the Cairo Summit scheduled for March 4. The Cairo Summit is expected to approve and announce a new Arab plan for rebuilding Gaza as an alternative to Trump’s plan. However, more importantly, the Arab plan presents a comprehensive political approach linking the Gaza issue to the establishment of a Palestinian state and a peaceful resolution in the region. This approach counters Israel’s new policies, which are based on political hegemony—not only in Palestine by eliminating the two-state solution but also by expanding Israel’s security boundaries to include parts of Syria and Lebanon and inciting the U.S. into a confrontation with Iran.

The Egyptian-Arab approach is still in its final stages of preparation. It takes into account a combination of financial, technical, political, and security aspects concerning Gaza. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa has proposed modifications to the plan originally put forward by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union, which estimated the cost of rebuilding Gaza at over $50 billion in a rapid and preliminary needs and damage assessment report (IRDNA). Instead, Mustafa proposed a more realistic and feasible plan costing no more than $20 billion, to be implemented in three phases. The Egyptians have incorporated this into their reconstruction plan, which includes dividing Gaza into three safe zones, using temporary housing (caravans) and tents, and developing a technical vision for redesigning the sector’s infrastructure through specialized Egyptian companies.

The Arab approach links the reconstruction plan to several key elements. The first is the technical, logistical, and financial aspect of rebuilding. The second is reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) to counter Israeli claims of its incompetence, with reform measures covering political and security aspects. The third element concerns the administration of Gaza in the post-occupation phase. A significant development has occurred with the Palestinians agreeing on a temporary administrative committee responsible for technocratic affairs. Hamas has accepted this arrangement, and President Mahmoud Abbas has reluctantly agreed to it, as it implicitly means that the PA will not return to Gaza.

The most challenging aspect of the Arab plan lies in the security arrangements during the reconstruction phase. Arab states refuse to deploy security forces or enter Gaza without a clear vision for ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. As Arab diplomats emphasize, what is needed is not just a roadmap for resolving the Palestinian issue, but rather an agreement on final-status issues and recognition of a Palestinian state—followed by a roadmap for implementation, not the other way around.

The most contentious issue in the Arab approach is Hamas’s weapons. Israel, along with the United States, will not accept Hamas retaining its weapons in Gaza. Israel has made it clear that it links the second phase of the process to this condition, and the U.S. has accepted this demand. On the other hand, the Arab side ties the issue of disarming non-state actors to the establishment of a Palestinian state that would have the exclusive right to possess weapons. The key question remains: Who would disarm Hamas? The only legitimate entity that could do so is a recognized Palestinian state, which remains the missing piece in U.S. policies that align with Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision.

The Arabs hope that this approach will establish a new framework for relations with the United States and offer alternative strategic options. They even believe it could persuade President Donald Trump to secure several achievements—perhaps even earning him a Nobel Peace Prize in the end.

This is undoubtedly a highly optimistic approach, but it represents a new Arab attempt to present a united position and alternative strategic options. However, the biggest challenge this vision overlooks lies in the details. As the saying goes, “the devil is in the details.” What kind of Palestinian state is actually possible under the current circumstances? What was previously proposed by Trump himself? Is there a single Palestinian—any Palestinian—who could accept a state comprising only 30% of the West Bank, without East Jerusalem, and without control over borders? How could Hamas and its supporters—or even the majority of Palestinian refugees—be convinced of such a proposal, even if there were Israeli and American acceptance of the new Arab approach?

Mohammad Abu Rumman is a columnist in The Jordan Times.