Putting The Cart Before The Horse

With the approach of the Cairo Summit to discuss the Palestinian issue and the reconstruction of Gaza, Arab leaders find themselves facing three main scenarios to make decisive decisions that determine the future of Gaza and the fate of the Palestinians the day after the cessation of the war. The dilemma is no longer limited to reconstruction only but also includes the political and administrative arrangements that ensure the stability of the sector and prevent the recurrence of the devastating conflict.

From the American side, it seems that the Trump administration is adopting a more stringent approach, as it recently stated the necessity of displacing Palestinians from Gaza as a “solution” to ensure regional security, which reflects its traditional position biased towards Israel and complicates any Arab efforts to find an independent solution for the sector.

 This American position raises great concerns in Arab and international circles, given the disastrous consequences it carries for the Palestinians and the entire region, especially in light of the widespread international rejection of forced displacement policies.

The first scenario involves adopting a comprehensive regional solution led by Arabs, aiming to place Gaza under temporary Arab administration, which may include Egypt and perhaps some Gulf states, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. In this scenario, a transitional body would be established to administer the Strip, which would undertake reconstruction operations, organize basic services, and reorganize the security situation in a way that prevents the recurrence of the conflict. 

This body could also work to pave the way for comprehensive Palestinian elections to be held later, so that Gaza would be part of a unified Palestinian entity. 

This temporary administration would work to restructure institutions within the Strip, ensure the regular provision of health and education services, and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged by the war. It would also undertake the tasks of securing the crossings and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, while imposing strict control to prevent the infiltration of any elements that might contribute to destabilization. 

It is expected that the contributing Arab states would have different roles, as Egypt could handle security aspects, while the Gulf states would contribute to financing and reconstruction. This option requires Arab and international consensus, as well as internal Palestinian acceptance, which may be difficult in light of the differences between the factions. 

Israel may not view this scenario favorably, as it strengthens the Arab role in Gaza and limits its influence there. In addition, the success of this scenario depends on the Arabs’ ability to impose a unified vision and work to reduce external interventions that may hinder this solution. Ultimately, this scenario remains a realistic option, but it is fraught with challenges that require active diplomacy and strong political will.

As for the second scenario, it is to support the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority and grant it full control over Gaza after reaching internal understandings with the various factions, including Hamas. In this framework, the security services are integrated into a unified framework under the supervision of the Authority, and the administrative institutions are unified, with an Arab and international commitment to provide financial and logistical support to ensure the success of this transition.

One of the main pillars of this scenario is rebuilding trust between the various Palestinian factions, which requires intensive efforts from regional and international mediators, especially Egypt and the United Nations. This proposal also requires providing guarantees that the faction leaders will not be targeted or excluded from the political scene, which necessitates establishing a joint governance mechanism for a transitional period.

This scenario depends primarily on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to impose its effective control over the Strip, which is doubtful, especially in light of the deep differences between the West Bank and Gaza, and the lack of trust between the Palestinian parties. 

In addition, Hamas’s acceptance of this proposal may be conditional on effective participation in governance, which may not be acceptable to Israel or some regional powers. Moreover, this solution faces obstacles related to the extent of the international community’s ability to commit to funding reconstruction, and to ensuring that Israel does not obstruct any efforts aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority’s control over the Strip.

The third scenario, which may be the most complex, is to impose an international solution under the auspices of the United Nations, whereby international peacekeeping forces are deployed to oversee the administration of Gaza for a transitional period, during which the Strip is rebuilt, and the political conditions are prepared to find a comprehensive Palestinian settlement. 

In this scenario, the infrastructure is rehabilitated, security guarantees are provided to prevent the outbreak of new confrontations, while the way is opened for an internal Palestinian dialogue under international auspices to reach an agreement on the future of governance in Gaza. 

This scenario also includes international supervision of the rehabilitation of civilian institutions in Gaza, ensuring the distribution of aid, and preventing the use of resources in any military activities that may lead to a renewal of the conflict. 

It could also contribute to reactivating the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis through an international mechanism that ensures the implementation of any understandings reached. 

However, this option faces several obstacles, most notably the rejection by some Palestinian forces of any direct international intervention in Palestinian affairs, and Israel may refuse to deploy international forces near its borders, preferring to keep Gaza under siege or in a state of instability that keeps it weak and unable to pose a security threat. 

Moreover, any international intervention will require consensus among the major powers, which may be difficult to achieve in light of global political tensions. Each of these scenarios carries its own challenges, and the optimal choice remains linked to the extent of the Arabs’ ability to unify their positions and make bold decisions that go beyond narrow political calculations. 

The main challenge lies in reaching a solution that spares Gaza further destruction, establishes a new phase of stability and development, and ensures that the Palestinian issue is not exploited in regional conflicts. The question remains: Will the Cairo Summit be able to overcome Arab differences and present a unified vision to save Gaza and its future?

Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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For South Lebanon, All You Need is Few Miracles!

The fourth round of negotiations between representatives of the Lebanese Government, in the person of the Lebanese Ambassador to Washington, and representatives of the Israeli government, under the cuddling attitude of the State Department, to reach some kind of agreement between the two odd neighbors in the Middle East, look like a friendly, yet an absurd endeavor of witch-hunting, that can only render the caterers and planners of the event, happy! For each team are supposed to ask their counterparts to agree to things that are beyond their jurisdiction or authority, to say yes or no, under the current circumstances!


Israel wants the government of Lebanon to agree to a peace accord with it like the ones concluded, long time ago, with Egypt, PLO and Jordan, just to give a finger to Iran and its Shia active and militarily strong allies in Lebanon. For their part, the Lebanese delegation would be shyly telling the Israeli negotiators that before any other item is considered, Israeli forces have to be out of Lebanese territories first.

Official Israel and Lebanon are fully aware that such meetings will lead to nowhere, as long as back home and on the ground, where the real cooking is taking place, ‘chefs’ are having good time doing their best to burn the food further!


But as hopeful amateurs, certain individuals in Washington DC who are probably not educated enough or familiar with Middle Eastern zig-zags, or just pretending to be up to something, seem to be rehearsing for
future similar events!


A special tailored ceasefire in Lebanon now will be absolutely not useful for the Israelis. But it could be arranged with American urging and blessing, just to give the impression that something can be done. It will be a message to the Iranians and the world that, yes we can have a ceasefire in Lebanon now, it is your turn to be flexible on the Hormuz entanglement! While the original story was a complete reverse, meaning we can have a ceasefire around Hormuz, only if we had one in south Lebanon! But here is the real picture on the ground.


Israel is holding the whole area of south Lebanon and its nearly 400 villages as a hostage, thanks to its ability to hit any spot in Lebanon and in Beirut in particular. It is a bargaining chip to pressure the Lebanese government to submit to an official deal that would by-pass Hezbollah and the Shia component in the Lebanese Parliament. While Hezbollah and their local allies refuse to concede their arms to the central government in Beirut, claiming that such a move would be interpreted as a concession to Israel.


So, if I were to advice the Israelis on how to outsmart their opponents in Lebanon, I would tell them, you can stop your absurd war in Lebanon immediately, and start withdrawing your soldiers from areas they entered after the last ceasefire announced between Iran and the US and Israel, and wait for their reaction to that!


And if I were to advice Hezbollah, I would tell them do not target villages or civilians within Israel international borders and make clear that you only target Israeli military presence within Lebanese international borders, and wait for a reaction!

And finally, if I were to advice the Americans on this particular issue, which looks actually like a replicate of their other similar moves and initiatives in the region, since June 2025, when President Trump, willingly swallowed the pill prescribed to him by Dr. Netanyahu, to end the Iranian headache, I would say this: Might, like cash, is not the answer to all problems! It is only a temporary remedy, like the cash that cannot buy you happiness, but the delusion that you are experiencing
it!


The entanglement in south Lebanon will not be solved by apprentices in history and geography meeting in air-conditioned elegant rooms in Washington DC, but there on the grounds of south Lebanon, where valleys, trees, rivers, mountains, villages and people have long time ago, concluded among themselves, without external interference, an eternal verbal memorandum of understanding, that they were doomed to live or perish there in rotation, exactly like the four seasons of the
year!


It all worked out smoothly there since, without miracles!

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Iran is Writing The Final Chapter!

By Ziyad Farhan Al-Majali

In major wars, results are not always measured by the ‘noise volume’, number of airstrikes, or the extent of the military maps displayed on TV screens. Sometimes the noise is louder than the decisive action, and the roar is stronger than the ability to end the battle.

From this perspective, the Israeli-American war on Iran can be read as a tumultuous moment in the history of regional conflict. Here however, it was not the final moment which Israel desired and was looking for.

Tel Aviv wanted to present the war as its declaration of its superiority, one that would be final. It wanted to say that its reach could penetrate deep inside Iran, that the old balance of deterrence was broken, and that the aftermath of the strike would not be the same as it was before.

Therefore, Israel’s “lion roar” was to be loud from the very beginning: Threatening rhetoric, painful strikes, psychological warfare — a clear attempt to portray Iran as a state exposed to Israeli and American power.

But the roar by itself, however loud it boomed, was not enough to bring about a political end. True, Iran suffered heavy blows, with sensitive facilities, infrastructure and sites sustained significant damage, finding itself facing a broad economic, military, and psychological siege and pressure.

Yet, despite all this, the war did not topple the Iranian government, nor did it remove the state from the regional equation, nor did it end its nuclear program as a negotiating issue, nor did it break its deterrent and maneuvering capabilities.

Herein lies the central paradox of this war. Israel raised the stakes to their highest points, but it did not achieve a decisive victory. Israel sought to eliminate the so-called Iranian threat with a single strike or a series of blows, only to discover that Iran is not a military site that can be wiped off the map, nor a single facility whose destruction would end the conflict.

Rather, it is a deep-rooted, expansive state with multiple levers of pressure: From the Strait of Hormuz to Lebanon, from missiles to air corridors, from allies to the capacity for long-term patience. Iran is a tough nut!

Perhaps the most dangerous revelation of the war is that it did not produce a definitive answer, but rather raised even greater questions. Can military force alone reshape Iran? Can bombing impose a stable political settlement? Will weakening Tehran lead to its expulsion from the region, or will it push it to rebuild its influence more cautiously and covertly? Was the war the beginning of the end, or the start of a new phase of a postponed conflict?

Iran emerged from the war wounded, but it didn’t exit the negotiating table. It appeared battered, but it did not collapse. Maybe besieged but it is still holding cards. Whilst today Iran might be in a predicament, but it has not lost its ability to negotiate, to threaten, and wait for the next move.

This is precisely is what is making the outcome far more complex than what Israel has tried to portray: The war may have succeeded in inflicting pain on Iran, but it did not  eliminating the Iranian state and its apparatus.

While Israel may have achieved a significant show of force, it did not achieve an outright and decisive victory. The decisive outcome it sought remained incomplete, and the deterrence it aimed to restore remained contingent on what would follow after the war: Would Iran back down? Would it retaliate? Would it accept American terms? Would it open the Strait of Hormuz according to Washington’s wishes? And would the Lebanese front be detached from Tehran’s calculations, or would it remain part of the long-term equation of retaliation?

Therefore, the war does not appear to be the end of the conflict with Iran, but rather a new chapter in a broader, protracted struggle. In this chapter, Israel raised its voice to the maximum, but it could not write the final chapter. States do not fall through mere bluster, regional projects do not end with a single blow, and conflicts that have accumulated over decades are not resolved in days, no matter how intense the fighting is.

In short, Israel’s “roar” was loud, perhaps painful, and perhaps unprecedented in some aspects, but it was not enough to topple Iran or remove it from the scene. The din of war has risen, the region has been shaken, and calculations have shifted, but Iran remains on the precipice, not outside history.

Therefore, the most accurate description of this phase is not a complete Israeli victory, nor an Iranian resistance without cost, but rather a war whose end is not yet in sight: A war in which Israel roared loudly, but was not able to bring down Iran.

This article was reproduced from the Jo24 Arabic website in Jordan and appears in the www.crossfirearabia.com.

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