Palestinian Authority Archives

The A, B, C to Rebuilding Gaza

CrossFireArabia
March 13, 2025

By Dr Raad Mahmoud Al-Tal

According to the Gaza reconstruction plan report from the temporary Arab Summit in Cairo, Gaza’s economy shrank by 83 per cent in 2024. Unemployment rose to 80%, and inflation reached 309.4 per cent in October 2024 due to severe supply shortages. On the humanitarian side, 91 per cent of Gaza’s population faces food insecurity, and this number is expected to rise to 1.95 million by April 2025. The healthcare system is collapsing, with 64 per cent of primary health centers out of service, and 25 per cent of the injured require long-term rehabilitation. Education is also in crisis, with 745,000 children out of school because schools were either destroyed or used as shelters. Over a million children need psychological and social support, and there are between 17,000 and 18,000 unaccompanied children, which makes child care even more difficult.

The damage in Gaza is divided into three categories: areas completely destroyed, which need the rubble cleared and infrastructure rebuilt from scratch; semi-destroyed areas, which need repairs to restore basic services; and lightly damaged areas, which require limited work to restore services and ensure ongoing reconstruction. The damage is assessed by comparing the current situation to how things were before the crisis, and the affected assets are classified into three levels: fully destroyed, partially damaged, and lightly damaged.

The reconstruction plan has two phases. The first phase, early recovery, will take 6 months and cost $3 billion. This phase includes clearing rubble, repairing main roads, providing 200,000 temporary housing units, and restoring 60,000 damaged homes. The second phase, which is the main reconstruction phase, will take 5 years and cost $50 billion. It is split into two parts: The first part, lasting 2 years at a cost of $20 billion, involves finishing the rubble removal, building 200,000 homes, repairing 20,000 acres of farmland, and setting up water desalination plants and sewage treatment facilities. The second part, lasting 2.5 years at a cost of $30 billion, involves building 200,000 more homes, developing ports, creating an industrial zone, and building a coastal road.

Housing has been the hardest-hit sector, with 15,000 homes completely destroyed. The plan aims to build 150,000 new homes and provide 100,000 temporary homes, costing $15 billion. About 30 per cent of Gaza’s farmland was also destroyed, requiring the rehabilitation of 10,000 hectares at a cost of $5.6 billion. The water and electricity sectors also need significant investment to keep providing essential services to the people. The total cost of reconstruction is estimated at $53 billion over 10 years. The funds for this will come from international donors, humanitarian organizations, and local investments. Around $4.5 billion will be for development projects, and $18 billion will go toward infrastructure.

For the reconstruction plan to succeed, it is important to get enough financial resources to fix the huge damage in Gaza. This will help restore normal life and improve the economic and social situation, leading to long-term sustainable development. To ensure the plan works, it is crucial to have different sources of funding. These could include the United Nations, international financial organizations, donor countries, investment funds, government agencies, development banks, and civil society groups.

An international trust fund will be set up to manage the funds efficiently, ensuring transparency and proper oversight. The Egyptian government will also hold a high-level conference in Cairo, in partnership with the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations, to gather the necessary support for the reconstruction plan. This conference will bring together donor countries, international and regional financial institutions, the Palestinian and international private sectors, and civil society organizations. It will be a key event to secure financial resources and suggest investment projects that can be implemented with the help of supporting organizations.

The writer is head of the Economics Department – University of Jordan – r.tal@ju.edu.jo

Opinion

Rebuilding Gaza: The Arab Plan V. Trump’s Displacement

CrossFireArabia
March 13, 2025

By Michael Jansen

The Muslim world has added its considerable weight to the plan adopted by the Arab summit for the reconstruction of Gaza while Palestinians remain in the strip. A meeting last week in Jeddah at foreign minister level of the 57-member Organisation for Islamic Cooperation extended full support to the detailed plan drawn up by Egypt. Therefore, both the Arab world and worldwide Muslim Umma have rejected the proposal of Donald Trump to expel 2.3 million Palestinians from Gaza and transform the devastated coastal trip into a “Middle Eastern Riviera.”

The 91-page $53 billion Egyptian plan itself is a major accomplishment as it was drawn up in less than 30 days. Its framework was presented last month to a mini-summit in Saudi Arabia of the Gulf countries, Egypt and Jordan, and approved on by Arab foreign ministers ahead of the maxi-summit.

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During the first six-month $3 billion stage of the plan Hamas would cease administering Gaza and a committee of Palestinian technocrats overseen by the Palestinian Authority would clear rubble from the main north-south Salaheddin highway. Palestinian residents would shift to seven relatively clear sites where 200,000 temporary housing units would be built to shelter 1.2 million. Additionally, 60,000 damaged buildings would be repaired to house thousands. Egypt and Jordan would train a Palestinian police force to enable a reformed Palestinian Authority to take over Gaza’s governance from Hamas. Nothing was said about disarming Hamas’ military wing which could be a contentious issue.

The second $20 billion two-year reconstruction stage would focus on permanent housing and rehabilitation of agricultural land, electricity, water, sewage and telecom-munications. The third 2.5-year stage costing $30 billion would continue with housing and build an industrial zone, a fishing port, a commercial seaport, and an international airport. Funding would be raised from donors in the Gulf, Europe, the US and international financial institutions. Disbursement and investment would be internationally supervised.

It is hardly surprising that the US and Israel should reject the Arab/Muslim plan. US National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes issued a statement which said, “The current proposal does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable, and residents cannot humanely live in a territory covered in debris and unexploded ordnance. President Trump stands by his vision to rebuild Gaza free from Hamas. We look forward to further talks to bring peace and prosperity to the region.” Trump, however, did not propose a Gaza free from Hamas but a Gaza free from Palestinians. This is neither acceptable nor legal under international law.

Despite, Hughes dismissal, Washington appears to be divided. Trump’s regional envoy Steve Witkoff said, “There’s a lot of compelling features” in Egypt’s plan for postwar Gaza, and observed that there was “a path” for Hamas to leave Gaza.

The Israeli foreign ministry said the Egyptian plan “fails to address the realities of the situation.” For the ministry these “realities” were created by the October 7th, 2023, raid on southern Israel by Hamas which killed 1,200. Naturally, the ministry reiterated Israel’s support for Trump’s plan as “an opportunity for the Gazans to have free choice based on their free will.” By this, the ministry meant bombed and starved Palestinians would freely choose to leave Gaza although Gazans have said they have chosen to stay in the strip despite dire conditions.

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Gazans are determined to resist a second Nakba, their catastrophic 1948 expulsion from their cities, towns and villages. This left them homeless, landless and stateless and the world has done nothing to remedy their situation over the past 77-years although the “path” to a Palestinian state has been charted since 1988 when the Palestinian National Council issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence and a call for a mini-state in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, 22 per cent of the Palestinian homeland.

While 30 per cent of Gazans are indigenous, 70 per cent were driven into the Gaza strip from nearby areas. Many still live in UN refugee camps. More than 30,000 took part in the Great March of Return by protesting along the border between Gaza and Israel. The demonstrations began on March 30, 2018, and continued until December 27, 2019. The mainly peaceful protesters demanded the right to go home in areas conquered by Israel in 1948 and an end to the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Israeli snipers opened fire at protesters, killing 266 youngsters and injuring almost 30,000 others, Gaza’s health ministry reported. Many of the injured received crippling wounds in the legs.

These demonstrations should have been proof positive that Gazans are not going anywhere else. For them, Gaza is their home, their present and their future. The Arab plan is designed to provide a decent life for native Gazans and refugees alike in a scrap of territory which amounts to one per cent of their occupied Palestinian homeland.

The writer is a columnist in The Jordan Times.

Opinion

Putting The Cart Before The Horse

CrossFireArabia
February 26, 2025

With the approach of the Cairo Summit to discuss the Palestinian issue and the reconstruction of Gaza, Arab leaders find themselves facing three main scenarios to make decisive decisions that determine the future of Gaza and the fate of the Palestinians the day after the cessation of the war. The dilemma is no longer limited to reconstruction only but also includes the political and administrative arrangements that ensure the stability of the sector and prevent the recurrence of the devastating conflict.

From the American side, it seems that the Trump administration is adopting a more stringent approach, as it recently stated the necessity of displacing Palestinians from Gaza as a “solution” to ensure regional security, which reflects its traditional position biased towards Israel and complicates any Arab efforts to find an independent solution for the sector.

This American position raises great concerns in Arab and international circles, given the disastrous consequences it carries for the Palestinians and the entire region, especially in light of the widespread international rejection of forced displacement policies.

The first scenario involves adopting a comprehensive regional solution led by Arabs, aiming to place Gaza under temporary Arab administration, which may include Egypt and perhaps some Gulf states, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. In this scenario, a transitional body would be established to administer the Strip, which would undertake reconstruction operations, organize basic services, and reorganize the security situation in a way that prevents the recurrence of the conflict.

This body could also work to pave the way for comprehensive Palestinian elections to be held later, so that Gaza would be part of a unified Palestinian entity.

This temporary administration would work to restructure institutions within the Strip, ensure the regular provision of health and education services, and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged by the war. It would also undertake the tasks of securing the crossings and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, while imposing strict control to prevent the infiltration of any elements that might contribute to destabilization.

It is expected that the contributing Arab states would have different roles, as Egypt could handle security aspects, while the Gulf states would contribute to financing and reconstruction. This option requires Arab and international consensus, as well as internal Palestinian acceptance, which may be difficult in light of the differences between the factions.

Israel may not view this scenario favorably, as it strengthens the Arab role in Gaza and limits its influence there. In addition, the success of this scenario depends on the Arabs’ ability to impose a unified vision and work to reduce external interventions that may hinder this solution. Ultimately, this scenario remains a realistic option, but it is fraught with challenges that require active diplomacy and strong political will.

As for the second scenario, it is to support the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority and grant it full control over Gaza after reaching internal understandings with the various factions, including Hamas. In this framework, the security services are integrated into a unified framework under the supervision of the Authority, and the administrative institutions are unified, with an Arab and international commitment to provide financial and logistical support to ensure the success of this transition.

One of the main pillars of this scenario is rebuilding trust between the various Palestinian factions, which requires intensive efforts from regional and international mediators, especially Egypt and the United Nations. This proposal also requires providing guarantees that the faction leaders will not be targeted or excluded from the political scene, which necessitates establishing a joint governance mechanism for a transitional period.

This scenario depends primarily on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to impose its effective control over the Strip, which is doubtful, especially in light of the deep differences between the West Bank and Gaza, and the lack of trust between the Palestinian parties.

In addition, Hamas’s acceptance of this proposal may be conditional on effective participation in governance, which may not be acceptable to Israel or some regional powers. Moreover, this solution faces obstacles related to the extent of the international community’s ability to commit to funding reconstruction, and to ensuring that Israel does not obstruct any efforts aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority’s control over the Strip.

The third scenario, which may be the most complex, is to impose an international solution under the auspices of the United Nations, whereby international peacekeeping forces are deployed to oversee the administration of Gaza for a transitional period, during which the Strip is rebuilt, and the political conditions are prepared to find a comprehensive Palestinian settlement.

In this scenario, the infrastructure is rehabilitated, security guarantees are provided to prevent the outbreak of new confrontations, while the way is opened for an internal Palestinian dialogue under international auspices to reach an agreement on the future of governance in Gaza.

This scenario also includes international supervision of the rehabilitation of civilian institutions in Gaza, ensuring the distribution of aid, and preventing the use of resources in any military activities that may lead to a renewal of the conflict.

It could also contribute to reactivating the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis through an international mechanism that ensures the implementation of any understandings reached.

However, this option faces several obstacles, most notably the rejection by some Palestinian forces of any direct international intervention in Palestinian affairs, and Israel may refuse to deploy international forces near its borders, preferring to keep Gaza under siege or in a state of instability that keeps it weak and unable to pose a security threat.

Moreover, any international intervention will require consensus among the major powers, which may be difficult to achieve in light of global political tensions. Each of these scenarios carries its own challenges, and the optimal choice remains linked to the extent of the Arabs’ ability to unify their positions and make bold decisions that go beyond narrow political calculations.

The main challenge lies in reaching a solution that spares Gaza further destruction, establishes a new phase of stability and development, and ensures that the Palestinian issue is not exploited in regional conflicts. The question remains: Will the Cairo Summit be able to overcome Arab differences and present a unified vision to save Gaza and its future?

Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

Opinion

Who is Going to Rebuild Gaza?

CrossFireArabia
February 25, 2025

No official announcement was made following the Riyadh Summit, which was considered fraternal, friendly, and consultative rather than formal. The summit, held a few days ago, was attended by the Gulf states, along with Jordan and Egypt, in anticipation of the Cairo Summit scheduled for March 4. The Cairo Summit is expected to approve and announce a new Arab plan for rebuilding Gaza as an alternative to Trump’s plan. However, more importantly, the Arab plan presents a comprehensive political approach linking the Gaza issue to the establishment of a Palestinian state and a peaceful resolution in the region. This approach counters Israel’s new policies, which are based on political hegemony—not only in Palestine by eliminating the two-state solution but also by expanding Israel’s security boundaries to include parts of Syria and Lebanon and inciting the U.S. into a confrontation with Iran.

The Egyptian-Arab approach is still in its final stages of preparation. It takes into account a combination of financial, technical, political, and security aspects concerning Gaza. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa has proposed modifications to the plan originally put forward by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union, which estimated the cost of rebuilding Gaza at over $50 billion in a rapid and preliminary needs and damage assessment report (IRDNA). Instead, Mustafa proposed a more realistic and feasible plan costing no more than $20 billion, to be implemented in three phases. The Egyptians have incorporated this into their reconstruction plan, which includes dividing Gaza into three safe zones, using temporary housing (caravans) and tents, and developing a technical vision for redesigning the sector’s infrastructure through specialized Egyptian companies.

The Arab approach links the reconstruction plan to several key elements. The first is the technical, logistical, and financial aspect of rebuilding. The second is reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) to counter Israeli claims of its incompetence, with reform measures covering political and security aspects. The third element concerns the administration of Gaza in the post-occupation phase. A significant development has occurred with the Palestinians agreeing on a temporary administrative committee responsible for technocratic affairs. Hamas has accepted this arrangement, and President Mahmoud Abbas has reluctantly agreed to it, as it implicitly means that the PA will not return to Gaza.

The most challenging aspect of the Arab plan lies in the security arrangements during the reconstruction phase. Arab states refuse to deploy security forces or enter Gaza without a clear vision for ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. As Arab diplomats emphasize, what is needed is not just a roadmap for resolving the Palestinian issue, but rather an agreement on final-status issues and recognition of a Palestinian state—followed by a roadmap for implementation, not the other way around.

The most contentious issue in the Arab approach is Hamas’s weapons. Israel, along with the United States, will not accept Hamas retaining its weapons in Gaza. Israel has made it clear that it links the second phase of the process to this condition, and the U.S. has accepted this demand. On the other hand, the Arab side ties the issue of disarming non-state actors to the establishment of a Palestinian state that would have the exclusive right to possess weapons. The key question remains: Who would disarm Hamas? The only legitimate entity that could do so is a recognized Palestinian state, which remains the missing piece in U.S. policies that align with Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision.

The Arabs hope that this approach will establish a new framework for relations with the United States and offer alternative strategic options. They even believe it could persuade President Donald Trump to secure several achievements—perhaps even earning him a Nobel Peace Prize in the end.

This is undoubtedly a highly optimistic approach, but it represents a new Arab attempt to present a united position and alternative strategic options. However, the biggest challenge this vision overlooks lies in the details. As the saying goes, “the devil is in the details.” What kind of Palestinian state is actually possible under the current circumstances? What was previously proposed by Trump himself? Is there a single Palestinian—any Palestinian—who could accept a state comprising only 30% of the West Bank, without East Jerusalem, and without control over borders? How could Hamas and its supporters—or even the majority of Palestinian refugees—be convinced of such a proposal, even if there were Israeli and American acceptance of the new Arab approach?

Mohammad Abu Rumman is a columnist in The Jordan Times.

News

Arab States Seeks Gaza Rebuild Without Displacement

CrossFireArabia
February 5, 2025

Egypt and Palestine held talks Wednesday to discuss recovery plans for the war-torn Gaza Strip without displacing Palestinians from the territory.

This came during a meeting held in Cairo between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and Palestinian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohamed Mustafa.

A statement released after the meeting reiterated Egypt’s support for the Palestinian government and its reform plans.

The statement underlined the importance of “empowering the Palestinian Authority politically and economically to assume its duties in the Gaza Strip as part of the occupied Palestinian territories.”

It highlighted the urgent need for advancing recovery projects in Gaza, ensuring aid delivery and clearing rubble without displacing Palestinians from the enclave.

Abdelatty also reviewed Egypt’s efforts to maintain the Gaza ceasefire deal, and implement all its terms.

Trump said during a news conference in Washington with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu late Tuesday that the US “will take over” Gaza after relocating Palestinians elsewhere under an extraordinary redevelopment plan that he claimed could turn the enclave into “the Riviera of the Middle East.”

The US president first triggered uproar on Jan. 25 by suggesting that Palestinians in Gaza should be relocated to Jordan and Egypt, calling the enclave a “demolition site” after Israel’s war. His proposal, however, was vehemently rejected by Amman and Cairo.

A six-nation Arab ministerial meeting in Cairo on Saturday firmly rejected Palestinian displacement from Gaza and renewed calls for implementing a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Trump’s proposal came after a ceasefire agreement took effect in Gaza on Jan. 19, suspending Israel’s genocidal war that has killed more than 47,500 Palestinians and left the enclave in ruins.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants in November last year for Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

Israel also faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice for its war on the enclave.