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Gulf Escalation: A Blaze Awaits The Region

CrossFireArabia
January 29, 2026

By Dr Marwan Asmar

With the Abraham Lincoln destroyer entering Middle East waters, everyone is gearing up for another US–Israeli war on Iran—the second in less than eight months.

Anxiety is gripping the region from the Gulf to Iran and all the way to Israel. Foreign states are warning their citizens in these countries to leave, while some airlines have suspended flights to the region. Once again, the Middle East is on a war footing, with fears that a wide conflict could erupt at any moment.

With an additional 7,000 US troops moving to the region, along with jets and fighter planes, the buildup is being described as the biggest “get-ready” military move since 2003, when the US launched its major war on Iraq and reshaped the region. Today, Middle Eastern countries are jittery about the current situation and the possibility of looming instability.

US President Donald Trump is not helping matters. He says he is weighing all options but keeps everyone guessing about his next move. He has warned that if the Iranian government continues its iron-fisted crackdown on protesters, the US could intervene militarily and wage another war on Tehran—much to the delight of the Israeli government, which is reportedly playing a behind-the-scenes role in encouraging unrest in Iran.

Although Trump is raising the war tempo and increasingly saber-rattling through military entrenchment, he is also sending mixed signals. He is not as boisterous as he was when he launched US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025. What he really wants is to push Iran back to the negotiating table and secure a lasting deal on its nuclear programme. He claims Iran’s facilities have been dealt a significant blow and may never recover, but this seems unrealistic, given how far Iran has advanced in nuclear enrichment.

While Trump describes Israel as a “role model” ally and urges Arab countries to follow suit—a claim many find laughable—Washington appears to be diverging from Tel Aviv over objectives on Iran and may even be at odds with it. Analysts say Israel wants strikes, even multiple ones, to change Iran’s regime and is less concerned about the chaos that could follow.

The United States, by contrast, appears more cautious. US officials do not necessarily want a new regime in Iran, uncertain of what might replace it. They prefer the logic of “the devil you know rather than the devil you don’t.” Washington wants a regime it can work with, despite ideological differences, notwithstanding Trump’s bombastic rhetoric, which Tehran may exploit if it chooses to play the “Mr Nice Guy.”

One analyst suggests Trump wants tangible gains from Iran, preferably access to its oil resources through US petroleum companies, but this may be a pipe dream.

If that fails, Trump is likely to push for a revamped nuclear deal to replace the 2015 agreement, which reached its term in September 2025 and is up for renewal. He wants a deal stamped with a distinctly “Trumpian” identity, even though many issues are already settled. Needless to say, Trump wants to claim credit for clinching the deal.

Today, the region stands on the edge of a precipice. It is touch-and-go. Many experts argue that a Middle East war is not imminent because it is neither politically nor economically feasible. Yet logic often takes a back seat in Trump’s world, especially with Israel pushing for a new wave of attacks on Iran, this time targeting its ballistic missile programme.

Iran, however, says it is ready. It has warned it will strike US bases in the region and beyond if it detects even a hint of an imminent attack. Iranian political and military leaders insist they will not remain sitting ducks for Washington or Tel Aviv. As a result, the region is caught in an escalating poker game.

While many believe Iran and its regional allies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, have been significantly weakened over the past two years, neither the US nor Israel can be certain of Iran’s real capabilities. This uncertainty leaves them unsure about their next move—or Iran’s.

All this makes both Israel and the United States nervous about unpredictable scenarios across the region. Everyone is waiting, tapping their fingers, bracing for what may come next.

This article was originally published in Countercurrents.org

Analyses

Historical Kick: Weighing The Hit Against Iran

CrossFireArabia
January 14, 2026

EDITOR’S NOTE: This is a reprint of an article written by me and posted in 2008 about Israel gearing up to hit Iran’s nuclear facilities. Perceptive is the fact it took Israel and and the USA 17 years, in June 2025, to make a direct hit on Iran and its nuclear facilities. Today, US President Donald Trump, and with the current protests in Iran, is weighing the options for another direct on Iran. However Tehran said it will retaliate with more launches on Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities just as it did last year as well on as US military bases. The reprint is made here with the same title, Weighing the hit against Iran as it appeared in the Media Monitors Network.

Will Israel hit Iran’s nuclear facilities, or won’t they? You would think everyone would be talking about it on the international level, and it might be the case judging from the newspaper articles that are being churned out about a possible nuke followed by regional conflagration.

In Jordan news is in full throttle: Yes Israel is contemplating a hit on Iran and it is in line with its power-hungry policies to dominate the region even if it eventually destroys itself.

Newspapers here see Israel as careless and would not only be prepared for that slippery-slope of a nuclear exchange but would use her nukes as a deterrent force to stop Iran from gaining her own nuclear capability.

Iran is not afraid, saying time and again, her nuclear development is for peaceful purposes and it will have a nuclear capability come what may regardless of what Israel is trying to do and of the international nuclear inspectors monitoring her activities which is more than can be said of Israel whose nuclear reactors and capabilities remain a state secret.

On a more personal level, I briefly talked to my wife about the possible hit in Iran, which I thought was well probable after reading the recent articles, and she just looked and said the issue is being blown out by media talk: There “won’t be war” and it is “media hype”.

Someone else just made fun of the issue. All this was going on when International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohammad Al Baradei was warning that if a strike does happen then it will surely turn the region into a ball-fire.

Ball-fire or not, the journalists and media were having a field day, now they say is the best time to strike because US President George W. Bush is nearing his tenure in office and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is in trouble over allegation of corruption charges and accepting bribes, and so the theory states if he is going to go then he wants to go in style.

But such reports and opinions are being made when the actual devastation and the far-reaching consequences of a potential strike and the subsequent military and nuclear exchange is underplayed and even treated as a daily occurrence where people will just pick up the pieces and continue with their lives.

People, including the media are not fully aware of what a nuclear exchange would mean, in terms of the scale of human losses, of radiation, devastation, the so-called nuclear winter of darkness, the nuclear holocaust that would actually make the area, the region and the geography completely uninhabitable for many years to come.

While this maybe the case in the West with the media there long tackling these issues, especially at the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, here the media has taken more of a sedate view about tackling these subjects especially since more important issues were on the scene.

That is up till now. Seeing the issue as an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, today the media is using the possible strike as a point of titillating us into fright regardless of the cynicism of many people like my wife who keep saying its media scare-mongering. But, and regardless again, what is required is a real cold analysis of the situation as it exists.

Would Israel be willing to take a chance and strike, whether military or nuclear, knowing full-will that the present Iran has the long-range missile capability, and knowing also the United States is not too sure and can’t make up its mind about the strike while playing lip service to negotiation and diplomatic talk.

Iran is not Iraq; this is not 1982 when Israeli F 16s flew over the region and bombed the Ozreiq reactor being built by under Saddam Hussein. Despite the fact the Americans are in Iraq, and the Israelis are flexing their muscles against the Palestinians and frequently threatening the Lebanese and Syrians, the security and military environment in the region is changing,

New powers like Iran, Syria, Turkey and non-state actors like Hizbollah and maybe Hamas are increasingly making headways in the region and internationally, and therefore a direct hit on Iran by Israel would not be received at all well by the Europeans who already recognize Israel’s intransigence on the Middle East process regardless if they want to do something about it or not.

Today, Israel’s image is increasingly at stake, an image that has come to be increasingly tarnished since the start of the Intifada in the year 2000, and Israel would definitely not want to rock the boat by seeking to pot practice with its own nuclear war heads and missiles–guessed at 200 in the late 1990s–on states like Iran.

The other important thing to remember is that Israel values its own existence and survival; that’s why it will not practice adventurist measures to the point where it may destroy itself through nuclear striking other nations even though such would be surgical strikes or limited which are nullified for all intense and purpose.

Hence survival is not only a security argument but an ideological one that involves an entity, identity and statehood. An Israeli state even if it does survive a nuclear exchange would probably be sitting in an ocean of radiation still far to be within the parameters of Europe, and certainly too far to remain as the United States valuable ally because if all things are destroyed there would be no need to have a “trusted friend” in the Middle East.

These continue to be in the realm of possibilities and conjectures. However, and against the argument of nuclear hit on Iran is the fact that American troops are in Iraq, in the middle of what would become a “nuclear ball-fire”. This is, unless of course, Israel refuses to give warning and go for the element of surprise and unleashes its weapons against Iran in the hope of preemption, a doctrine the US used for launching its 2003 war to remove Saddam Hussein and destroy his so-called weapons of mass destruction which were subsequently proved false.

Opinion

Netanyahu’s Middle East Vision

CrossFireArabia
December 15, 2025

By the end of December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to visit Washington to meet US President Donald Trump, marking his fourth visit in less than a year since Trump assumed office. Unlike previous visits, this one comes after President Trump imposed his vision for ending the war in Gaza and outlined his broader concept of regional peace—giving the visit a distinctly political dimension.

At the core of the discussions will be the transition to the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement, the appointment of an American general and a monitoring center, and the mechanism for administering Gaza ahead of the arrival of an international peace force. The visit is also expected to address Israel’s relations with its regional surroundings, particularly Egypt. Reports suggest the possibility of a simultaneous visit by the Egyptian president to Washington, reflecting a clear American desire to initiate direct engagement and promote the concept of “economic peace,” along with major regional projects that Trump views as the backbone of future relations, especially in the energy and gas sectors.

Yet even as President Trump speaks of a regional peace vision, the days preceding the visit remain open to further escalation. Indicators point toward a qualitative Israeli escalation across four fronts: Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria. These fronts have been deliberately kept open, transformed into continuous theaters of operation where Israel calibrates the level of military activity according to its security assessments.

Lebanon remains the most prominent arena of this escalation. Ongoing discussions about Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its capabilities coincide with Israel’s continued direct targeting of the group’s positions and operatives. This comes amid growing American pressure on the Lebanese government and army to take concrete steps toward disarming Hezbollah.

While the group is fully aware of its inability to engage in a comprehensive regional war, and the need to avoid providing direct justifications for escalation, it nevertheless finds itself compelled to use the weapons issue domestically to reshape internal power balances. At the same time, Hezbollah seeks to secure the future framework of its relationship with Syria, particularly if the Syrian-Lebanese border shifts from being merely a site of interdiction to a direct target zone.

This reality severely constrains Hizbollah’s response options while granting Israel continued latitude to strike the group’s infrastructure, capitalising on the absence of a decisive resolution to the weapons issue and on Lebanon’s institutional confusion over how to address it, whether through phased timelines or alternative formulas such as placing weapons under army control. From Israel’s perspective, this ambiguity justifies continued targeting until a decisive moment is reached.

Within this context, Israel’s strategy of imposing a new reality across its border fronts aligns closely with the transition to the second phase of President Trump’s plan. This approach corresponds with Israel’s efforts over the past two years to redraw geographical and security realities in Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, and even the West Bank. While the Trump administration opposed a formal declaration of annexation in the West Bank, it did not object in practice to Israel’s on-the-ground measures, allowing these changes to solidify as irreversible facts.

Security measures taken today may therefore establish realities that will be difficult to reverse in the future. From Washington’s perspective, redrawing borders may be seen as laying the groundwork for what it terms “regional peace,” treating the new border realities as spaces for potential economic or developmental investment.

Netanyahu’s visit to the White House thus represents a pivotal moment. He will seek to position himself as a central actor in the next phase, consolidate new realities along Israel’s immediate borders, and secure U.S. backing in addressing non-adjacent fronts, most notably Iraq, and above all Iran.

Iran is left to grapple with an increasingly severe internal reality marked by mounting economic, social, service-related, and security challenges, and is simultaneously categorized as part of the camp of “obstructors of regional peace” in Trump’s framework, opening the door to intensified pressure and varied forms of targeting in the period ahead.

Dr Amer Al Sabaileh, a professor in the University of Jordan contributed this analysis to the Jordan Times.

Analyses

Gaza: Changing The Middle East Face

CrossFireArabia
October 8, 2025

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation marked a turning point in the modern political history of the Middle East. Its repercussions have gone far beyond the Palestinian and regional arenas, extending to the international system and reshaping the foreign policies of global powers toward the region.

The timing of the operation was particularly significant: it came at a transitional moment in the regional order, in the absence of consensus among international and regional actors on the rules of the game. While a fragile balance of deterrence existed between the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—led by Iran (alongside the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad)—and Israel, the latter was in the midst of a new phase of regional integration through the Abraham Accords.

Several Arab capitals had already normalized relations, and others were on their way, creating an unprecedented political landscape. This shift coincided with the declining influence of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and the rising centrality of the Gulf states. Many analysts began describing this new configuration as a “New Middle East”: wealthy, economically driven, and detached from historical conflicts—unlike the “Old Middle East,” where entrenched crises defined politics.

Turkey, meanwhile, had entered its own phase of recalibration. Once a champion of the Arab Spring and regional Islamist movements, Ankara sought reconciliation with Arab states, even attempting to restore ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime (though rebuffed by Damascus), while focusing more narrowly on national security and northern Syria.

On the Palestinian front, Israel had grown complacent toward Gaza, convinced Hamas had no incentive to disrupt the status quo. Tensions, however, were mounting in the West Bank, with small armed groups emerging in places like Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. Within Israeli and Western policy circles, talk was spreading about the prospect of a “mini-state in Gaza” as a substitute for a Palestinian state.

At the international level, President Joe Biden’s administration lacked enthusiasm for either the Abraham Accords or Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” yet it effectively followed the same trajectory: pursuing “regional peace” by integrating Israel into a new economic order and reducing the Palestinian question to daily livelihood concerns—employment, services, and economic relief in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than a political resolution.

The Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent two-year genocidal war in Gaza shattered these calculations and fundamentally restructured strategic assumptions. Whether the outcome will ultimately benefit or harm the Palestinian cause remains too complex to assess in simple terms, but what is clear is that the pre-October 7 regional order no longer exists.

From a Palestinian perspective, the conflict has restored international attention to the cause, leading to a renewed recognition of its centrality. In the Gulf, the previously dominant security paradigm—which cast Iran as the chief threat while framing Israel as a potential partner—collapsed entirely. A new consensus has emerged: Gulf security is inseparable from the Palestinian issue, and the notion of Israel as a “strategic friend” has been critically reassessed.

Skeptics may argue that these shifts have not altered the balance of power on the ground, and they are partially correct. Yet the strategic narrative has changed. Before October 7, the trajectory was toward the erasure of the Palestinian cause (closing UNRWA, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, normalization, and de facto annexation of the West Bank). Today, there is growing recognition—regionally and internationally—that Israeli policies themselves are the root of instability, not Iran or other regional actors. As Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla put it on X (September 25): “When weighing who poses a greater threat to Gulf security and regional stability—Iran or Israel—the evidence points clearly to Israel. Israel’s brutal behavior has made it more dangerous than an exhausted Iran. The Gulf needs a new defensive and geopolitical strategy for the Middle East beyond Iran.”

Israel, however, now perceives a surplus of power and is pressing for a new political and security order that extends beyond the occupied territories. With the partial unraveling of the Iranian alliance and the breakdown of the “Syrian corridor” that once linked Tehran to the Mediterranean, Israel has set its sights on even more ambitious goals, including the proposed “David Corridor” and establishing buffer zones around its borders in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

In response, a tentative regional coalition has begun to take shape, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, with notable support from Turkey and Pakistan. The latter signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia following Israel’s strike on Qatar and has since become more engaged in regional diplomacy. While fragile and constrained, this alignment presents a rare historic opportunity to rebuild a regional balance of power and establish a new deterrence framework.

Another striking development is the shift in Europe’s stance toward Israel. For the first time, Israel has lost significant ground in Western public opinion and media narratives, particularly among younger generations and in universities. This has pushed Israel closer to isolation—a position from which former U.S. President Donald Trump had tried to rescue it through his proposed Gaza peace plan, which was largely about securing U.S. and Israeli interests, without offering real guarantees for Palestinian statehood or ending the occupation.

In conclusion, it is still too early to judge the full strategic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the war in Gaza. Scenarios remain open, and outcomes uncertain. Yet one thing is indisputable: the region today is no longer what it was before October 7.

Abu Rumman is an Academic Advisor of the Politics and Society Institute and Professor of Political Science in The University of Jordan and published this article in The Jordan Times.

Opinion

Hamas, Trump and The Gaza Gamble

Dr Khairi Janbek
October 4, 2025

By Dr Khairi Janbek

One can only have a distant view of the current developments regarding the war on Gaza, and consequently in all honesty, a bird’s eye view of the situation. For all intense and purposes, one assumes the Hamas acceptance of plan presented by US president Donald Trump would represent extremely high-stakes gamble for them.

On the one hand it offers a pathway to end the bloodshed and set the road for reconstruction of the bludgeoned Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the plan demands existential concessions, loss of armaments, leverage, and an an end to the movement’s future. If Hamas accepts with sincerity, and the plan is implemented faithfully, it could mark a turning point towards stabilization, but also with risks of breakdown, backlash, internal splits, and which carry the warnings of a precarious road ahead.

It is important in the meantime to advise against the search for victors and/or the vanquished, because in this time and age, wars do not seem to be launched in order to be decisive, and the view of the Gaza war is no different. Essentially it is to be believed and cardinal to the Trump administration, the issue of arms pertaining to Hamas and Hezbullah are seen as obstacles to peace and to Israel’s normalization with the Arab world. Therefore, the objective, one imagines, is to eliminate those arms to the American administration which has wider objectives in this crucial region of the world.

Here, as well, one has to be careful with words. Is Hamas supposed to surrender all of its weapons, or will there be an accommodating plan for the Islamic movement to keep some of its weapons, so long as it is not seen to constitute any future threat?

On the other side of the equation, are we really at the juncture of seeing the total end of Hamas as an organisation? In other words, are we about to see an amnesty for the Hamas fighters, especially those who surrender their weapons and are willing to partake in the future plans for Gaza away from those who wish to leave and to be provided with a safe passage outside the Gaza enclave?

Or is there a plan within the plan. if indeed, the Trump plan is not in essence a diktat, will there be long and tedious negotiations that will accept a form of political participation for a future-transformed Hamas into less than a political organization and more than an NGO?

Then what about the role of the Arab and Islamic countries, whose leaders met with Trump during the last UN General Assembly and who subsequently welcomed Hamas acceptance of the Trump plan? After all, there is the supposition that Arab and Islamic countries will provide, if not brain, then money and brawn. Essentially, without Arab and to a lesser extent Islamic involvement, no plan will have a leg to stand on. But to what extent the Arabs are willing to get involved still remains to be seen.

Dr Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris.