Opinion Archives - Page 11 of 17

Palestine and Imperial Chaos

Dr Khairi Janbek
November 14, 2024

By Dr Khairi Janbek

When the British conquered the territory, they did not exactly know where to draw the borders of Palestine. British prime minister Lloyd George conferred with his French counterpart Clemenceau and suggested that the borders of Palestine be defined on biblical basis; in accordance with its ancient boundaries from ‘Dan to Beersheba’.

But what about the sparsely-populated territory east of the River Jordan? Although in 1915 the British promised the territory to the Sharif of Mecca in the McMahon correspondence, in the early years of British control, it remained part of Palestine, and not until 1922 did the British separate it from the rest of Palestine and named Emir Abdullah of the Hashemite dynasty as the ruler of the new country Transjordan.

Even when the borders of Palestine became clear to the British, the borders of the future “Jewish National Home” remained open to dispute. Lord Balfour’s letter spoke vaguely of the establishments ‘in Palestine a National Home for the Jewish people’ he did not refer to the whole of Palestine or any specific part of it.

Among the Zionists, the borders of Palestine were just as blurred. The ideal borders, as mapped by the Zionist delegation at the Paris peace negotiations, included south Lebanon (Northern Galilee) and a stretch of land east of the River Jordan as far as the line of the Hijaz Railway.

Weizmann continued to believe that the land east of the River Jordan should be part of the “Jewish National Home.” This was reiterated in his Congress speech 1921 stating “the questions of borders will be answered when Cis-Jordan (West Bank of the River Jordan) will be so full of Jews that we will have to expand to Transjordan.”

The right wing Israeli revisionists continued to claim until the 1950s, the whole of Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River.

However, there was a brief glimmer of hope that an Arab-Jewish understanding might in fact be possible when Emir Faisal, later King of Iraq, and Chaim Weizemann signed an agreement in 1919, recognizing the right of the Jews to immigrate to Israel.

But reality on the ground created a different set factors, when Faisal’s condition of far reaching Arab independence in the region was not fulfilled, he declared the agreement no longer valid. In any case, the agreement did not include representatives of the Palestinian Arabs.

Also in the post-World War I era, another claim on Palestine was made in March 1920, when the General National Syrian Congress, declared that Palestine was nothing but the southern part of the Greater Syria State.

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian historian based in Paris and the above opinion is that of the author and doesn’t reflect crossfirearabia.com.

Opinion

Vile Man

CrossFireArabia
November 12, 2024

Opinion

Religion, Nationalism, Middle East Style!

Dr Khairi Janbek
November 5, 2024

Dr Khairi Janbek

When you consider yourself as a member of the greatest group in existence, irrespective of its characteristics, it is only natural to assume that the values of this group are the greatest, and consequently, the only valid values which are permissible to hold.

However, we must not delude ourselves, because religion cannot be neatly put in the pigeonhole as a moral, or personal spiritual force, for the very ancient nature of organised religion has given it a powerful role in defining peoples personal and group identities,

in other words, religion plays a national as well as personal, moral, and spiritual roles.

Nationalist and religious identities are both manifestations of the need for belonging, as people have the basic need to belong, a need which can be expressed in inclusive or an exclusive way leading to serious consequences.

Dualism

In the context of the Arab world, dualism has ruled supreme, the choice has always been, either religion or nationalism, but Iran, Israel and Turkey, have managed to fuse religion into nationalism. Each one of those countries, reflecting on themselves individually, thought of themselves as great nations, consequently, this meant that great nations require great religions, and not only that, but their own perspective of their own faiths can only be the true path.

The Arab world till now, shows that religion and nationalism remain irreconcilable, which makes it difficult for the Arab individual to understand Iranian, Israeli, and Turkish societies.

In fairness however, one must say that, the reluctance of any Arab state to claim representation of Islam is very likely to bring severe opposition from both Islamists and nationalists.

Therefore by separating Islam from nationalism, the individual Arab state strengthens its own brand of legitimacy, and as we see, every Arab state is comfortable with the abstract notion of an Islamic Umma (greater nation) in as much as it is comfortable with the abstract notion of Arab Umma (greater nation).

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris and the above opinion is that of the author and doesn’t reflect crossfirearabia.com.

Opinion

Jordan: United Kingdom Plan and Dashing The Chance for Peace

Dr Khairi Janbek
October 29, 2024

By Khairi Janbek

In order to reinforce the concept of the unity of the two banks, which was reaffirmed at the Cairo Arab Summit in 1970, and in order to placate the rising Palestinian sentiments, King Hussein unveiled on 15 March, 1972, his United Arab Kingdom Plan (UAK).

In an address to the nation on that day, the late King elaborated on the proposed plan, as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would, after the withdrawal of Israel from the West Bank, become the United Arab Kingdom comprising of two regions: First: Region of Palestine ie. West Bank and any future territories to be liberated and whose inhabitants opt to join in, with Jerusalem as its capital. Second: Region of Jordan, is East Bank and its capital Amman.

Furthermore, Amman would be the administrative capital of both regions. The King would be the head of state. There would be a local parliament and local government for each region, as well as a federal government and a parliament. There would be one federal supreme court and one army.

The late King added, this arrangement is his preference, though he intended to give the Palestinians, after liberation, the opportunity to determine their own future, and pledged to respect their choice.

Despite the fact that this plan was only a proposal, it drew violent reactions from the PLO as well as the Arab states who all in the 1970 Arab League Summit reaffirmed the unity of the two banks.

The late Mr. Yasser Arafat considered the plan a mere ressurection of Jordan’s long standing policy of insisting that the West Bank was an integral part of Jordan, and the Palestinians residents were Jordanian citizens. He considered that, a real threat to his own claim of representing the Palestinian people.

Ties between Jordan and Israel will remain government-to-government but “never people-to-people, and that's precisely because of Israeli politics,” Mustafa Hamarneh, a confidant to Jordan’s late King Hussein, tells The National https://t.co/UVOhx5YQbA
— The National (@TheNationalNews) October 27, 2024

The late president Sadat of Egypt wanted to identify his own regime with the Palestinan cause, and announced before a cheering crowd at the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Cairo on 10 April 1972, the break of diplomatic relations with Jordan. Syria, in order not to be upstaged by Egypt, cut diplomatic relations with Jordan and closed its borders.

Significantly the Plan remained under consideration until the Rabat Arab Summit of 1974, when the Arab states decided the sole representative of the Palestinian people should by the PLO.

The Rabat Summit forced Jordan to withdraw from direct involvement in the peace process at the time when the eyes of the whole world and the attention of the USA, were focused on the settlement of the Arab-israeli conflict.

The Rabat decision confused the issue. Instead of concentrating on the basic problem of Israel’s occupation of Arab lands, the questions of Palestinian national rights and independent Palestinian state were introduced. The nature of the problem changed overnight.

Jordan tried to seperate the issue of withdrawal from the issue of national rights of the Palestinian people. Jordan stood for the ending of the Israeli occupation of all Arab lands; occupied after 1967 war, establish peace and then address the question of Palestinian national rights within the context of inter-Arab relations.

But the Arabs states supported the claims of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO leadership was not prepared to accept Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank in favor of Jordan, fearing that would prevent it from attaining its goal; Creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The various Arab states supported the PLO for their own reasons, and were totally content to dump the Palestinian problem on the shoulders of the PLO.

The Late President Sadat and ex-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, exploited the PLO’s position and the Arab support to it, and manipulated events in order to enable Egypt to sign a separate peace with israel.

The Rabat decision which neutralized Jordan’s role, and paved the way for Egypt’s separate peace with Israel, enabled Tel Aviv to tighten its grip on the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

Developments since Rabat have shown that, Jordan’s position for a comprehensive peace settlement with Israel, would have been the best chance for a lasting peace. A chance dashed in Rabat.

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris and the above opinion is that of the author and doesn’t reflect crossfirearabia.com.

Opinion

Oslo Accords, Old Memories

Dr Khairi Janbek
October 24, 2024

By Dr Khairi Janbek

When the Oslo Accords was signed, the greatest achievement was seen as being, the breakthrough in the impasse of mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. They both recognized each other’s right to exist, and that was all about it. Of course everyone knew then as much as now, that crucial issues were not addressed, but the whole picture was: Israelis and Palestinians will no longer kill each other.

As for how to proceed in order to establish a two-state solution from there on was left to the future to take its own course without any hint even at the end of the five-year transitional period when there was supposed to a be sovereign Palestinian state. From then on it was a matter of illusions; Palestinian illusions as well as Israeli illusions.

For the PLO, the hope was that by accepting 22% of the Palestinian lands and relinquishing the right on the rest of the territories, a Palestinian state can be built with parts of East Jerusalem as its capital, while for the Israelis, a Palestinian “ bantustan” governed by the PLO, dependent on Israel with limited ‘petro-dolar’ support was the limit.

But who came out to make a name for himself right from the start as the fierce opponent of Oslo; it was of course Mr Benjamin Netanyahu. Was his opposition taken seriously, indeed it was, but all hopes were pinned on US support to keep the situation stagnant in the format of a no Palestinian state but also no Israeli re-occupation.

However, this stagnation is brought in back today as Oslo came to end by the Palestinians and Israelis effectively killing each other and a situation of non-contextual relevance to the once seen as a historical agreement. Indeed, when the guns spill death, words tend to be superfluous, but ultimately the guns will stop and the words will start flowing again with the Oslo Accords consigned to the shelves of history.

What would all this mean in a US election year it is hard to say, and even harder to predict. How would the future occupant of the White House call the shots in the Middle East, given the fact, and forgive the cliche, the region is indeed on the brink of a big war.

Will there be a new pressure from the US for a new wider peace accord between the Arabs and the Israelis that can guarantee within it at least, the minimum of Palestinian rights, or a semblance of an accord forced on the wreckage of a post big regional war, for which the winner gets the spoils? It is a hard to tell, but it won’t take too long to find out.

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris and the above opinion is that of the author and doesn’t reflect crossfirearabia.com.