Iran Archives - CrossFireArarbia

Is America Abandoning Europe?

CrossFireArabia
February 17, 2025

In 2007, Russia’s President Putin gave a now-infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), announcing Russia’s new posture of hostility towards the US and Europe. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, many looked back at Putin’s 2007 Munich speech as a revealing moment of his intentions.

This year’s MSC could be a similar watershed. This time, the warning bells ring from across the Atlantic. US Vice President JD Vance delivered one of the most hostile speeches by a US official to Europe in decades. Rather than addressing the Russian or Chinese threats, Vance argued that Europe faced a “threat from within,” accusing the EU and national governments of censorship and ignoring popular demands on issues like illegal migration.

Meanwhile, away from Munich, US President Donald Trump held a phone call with Putin, setting the stage for negotiations between the US and Russia for a peace agreement in Ukraine – without involving European counterparts in the discussions. The day before, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth announced some of the US expectations from this deal: Ukraine should drop its NATO membership bid, European countries would need to provide the forces to enforce the agreement, and these forces would not be covered by NATO’s Article 5 guarantees.

The transatlantic picture in which the MSC took place was even bleaker. Since Trump’s inauguration one month ago, the new president had promised (and now imposed) tariffs against countries across the world, including Europe. He has threatened to annex the territory of allies like Canada and Denmark.

Normally, the MSC is an opportunity for the United States to reaffirm its commitment to Europe and the Atlantic alliance. This year, it could be remembered as the time when the US started the process of abandoning Europe – or even going aggressively after it.

An attack on Europe

Vance’s speech and the reactions to it have dominated the discussions at the MSC. Although the conference theme was “multilateralization”, the real topic on everyone’s mind was: how would Trump’s second administration approach Europe?

As the pre-conference report argued: “Donald Trump’s presidential victory has buried the US post–Cold War foreign policy consensus that a grand strategy of liberal internationalism would best serve US interests.” That this consensus was gone was clearly visible in the conference. Despite perfunctory references to shared values, Vance’s speech did not talk about the alliance between Europe and North America, nor about the common threats and how to face them.

And he has voiced support for anti-EU parties. Vance pronounced his speech in Germany, just weeks before federal elections, and argued that there should not be “firewalls” in government – a clear reference to the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) which has so far been kept out of governing coalitions. After the speech, Vance met with the AfD leader.

Additionally, Vance criticized Romania for canceling its 2024 elections and accused the EU of censoring free speech. But Vance failed to acknowledge that the very election that brought Trump and him to power in November was the subject of major foreign interference by Russia, China, and Iran. Rather than sitting idly by, US agencies took active measures to counter these malign actions and prevent disruptions – like raising awareness, coordinating with the media, and keeping politics out of the fight. With his speech, Vance seems to be arguing for the exact opposite approach.

All these issues did not touch on security and defense, the core of the MSC’s discussions. But they did lure in the background of Vance’s speech. A few months ago, Vance argued that the EU should not regulate tech companies owned by Elon Musk. If the Europeans did so, he argued, the US should reduce its security commitments to NATO. Hence, American assurances could become bargaining chips to resolve other issues.

How will the EU respond?

Vance’s Munich speech marks a new era in US relations with Europe. While the themes are not new – Trump has never been a fan of NATO, and enjoys courting Europe’s far-right – the extent of the rhetorical change cannot be understated. Ukraine’s President Zelensky, speaking in Munich the day after Vance, spelled out the challenge in clear terms: “We can’t rule out the possibility that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that threaten it.”

The reaction from European leaders has been strong so far. EU Commission President Von der Leyen called for an emergency clause in the EU treaties to allow member states to boost defense spending [8]. French President Macron called for a summit of European leaders in Paris on Monday, February 17 – to sketch out a common position on the upcoming negotiations over Ukraine, and on making up for US security guarantees from Europe.

The greatest challenge, however, will be transforming outrage into meaningful action. Europeans have long ignored calls to take charge of their own security. Domestic constraints over spending, divisions and the continued belief that Uncle Sam will have their back have stood in the way of ambitious choices. Will this time be different?

This opinion was written by Giuseppe Spatafora for the Anadolu news website.

Opinion

How Will Hawkish Trump Deal With Iran?

CrossFireArabia
February 15, 2025

Ata Şahit

Immediately upon his return to the White House for a second stint, a hawkish Donald Trump has put Iran on notice.

In the first week of February, the US President signed a presidential decree reinstating the maximum pressure policy on Iran, saying that though he was not pleased with the decision, he had no choice but to adopt a firm stance.

A few days later, Trump claimed that a very “frightened” Iran was ready for a deal with the US over the Shia-majority nation’s nuclear programme.

The moot point of his assertion was that he would also prefer a deal rather than Israel carrying its threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. “I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.”

Since Trump assumed office, Iranian officials have consistently voiced their support for dialogue and expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations with the new administration.

On January 14, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed this position in an interview with NBC, emphasising Iran’s openness to talks.

However, any potential for a dialogue appeared to have been decisively shut down following a February 7 statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Addressing members of the Iranian military, Khamenei declared that engaging in negotiations with the US was neither a prudent nor an honourable course of action, unequivocally rejecting the prospect of talks between the two countries.

Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s January approval of the sale of 4,700 additional MK-84 bunker-buster bombs to Israel as part of a broader Iran strategy.

This begs the question: How would Iran-US relations evolve under Trump, and how significant is the threat posed by Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities?

Israel likely to attack Iran nuclear facilities by midyear — report

Trump’s first term and Iran

Trump’s re-election marks a critical turning point for Iran. Even during his first presidency, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure had led to significant economic, political, and military challenges for Tehran.

It was during the first Trump administration that some seismic events – such as the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the re-imposition of economic sanctions, and the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani—intensified the pressure on Iran.

With Trump’s re-election, the Iranian leadership is concerned about the prospect of further escalation of previous policies.

Recent developments in the region indicate that Iran’s deterrence capabilities have reached a critical low.

An analysis of Iran’s national security and defence doctrine reveals that it rests on three principal strategic pillars: the establishment of a forward defence line via non-state actors under the Quds Force, an extensive missile programme, and efforts to achieve nuclear threshold status.

However, Israel’s attacks in 2023 and 2024 have significantly weakened these pillars. Indeed, the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, the destruction of its command structures, and successful Israeli airstrikes against Iranian territory have complicated Iran’s ability to leverage these elements as an effective deterrent.

Moreover, although Iran’s missile programme is still impressive in terms of variety and quantity, its effectiveness was found to be limited during the April and October 2024 attacks. The majority of Iran’s missiles either missed their targets or proved ineffective.

The Israeli strikes on October 26 severely damaged Iran’s missile engine production facilities and solid fuel production capabilities.

In particular, the strikes on the Shahroud missile complex have significantly constrained Iran’s ability to develop long-range missiles. As a result of these strikes, Iran’s most advanced air defence systems (S-300 PMU2) were rendered inoperable.

The remaining systems are limited both in range and capability, thereby increasing Iran’s vulnerability to external attacks. These vulnerabilities have prompted Tehran to reconsider the option of developing nuclear weapons.

While Iran has the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium within a week, integrating a nuclear warhead into a missile system is regarded as a time-consuming process.

Iran’s nuclear programme and rising concerns

Trump’s threats and the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme represent a critical juncture for the country.

Rather than initiating the production of nuclear weapons, Tehran could adopt the more cautious yet effective step of announcing its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Such a move would underscore Iran’s seriousness while seeking to extract more concessions at the negotiating table.

A notable example is North Korea, which in 1993 employed a similar strategy by announcing its intention to withdraw from the treaty, subsequently suspending its decision before ultimately carrying it out.

Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT could be perceived by the international community as a shift toward nuclear weapons production. This, in turn, could escalate regional tensions and potentially encourage Israel to deploy US-made bunker-buster bombs against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, known as the Amad Plan, sought to produce five nuclear weapons between 1999 and 2003.

Under this plan, four warheads for Shahab-3 ballistic missiles and one bomb for an underground test were developed.

According to the Iranian nuclear archive captured by Israel in 2018, Iran has made significant advances in critical technologies, including nuclear warhead design, neutron initiators, and detonation focusing systems. This information is regarded as a contributing factor to Iran’s increased capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Significant similarities exist between China’s first nuclear bomb (codenamed 596) and Iran’s early designs. The findings indicate that Iran is approaching the status of a nuclear threshold state.

Therefore, Trump’s nuclear policy toward Iran is a critical issue, both in terms of differing perspectives within his administration and the broader international context.

Where can the process evolve?

Iran’s nuclear programme remains a priority concern for both Europe and the US.

With the expiration of the UN Security Council (UNSC) snapback sanctions in October 2025, the US-led West risks losing one of its most powerful tools of diplomatic leverage.

In this context, Europe plans to leverage Iran’s vulnerabilities and time constraints to initiate an effective nuclear diplomacy process.

Indeed, a statement by the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – that it is prepared to utilise all diplomatic tools against Iran indicates that patience is waning.

Simultaneously, Iran’s statements suggesting it may reassess its technical capabilities and political intentions have raised concerns within the international community.

The US might intensify pressure by tightening the enforcement of secondary sanctions on the Iranian economy.

As an initial measure, Trump imposed sanctions on a key international network involved in the sale of Iranian oil, delivering a significant blow to Iran’s oil exports.

Expanding sanctions to target major purchasers of Iranian oil, particularly China, could exacerbate Iran’s economic vulnerabilities.

In other words, the US and Europe may capitalise on this window of opportunity by intensifying pressure on Iran while simultaneously presenting clear diplomatic solutions.

In Iran, contrary to Khamenei’s rhetoric, there are indications that a large section of the leadership and population are generally supportive of negotiations with the US.

Recently, the Center for Islamic World Studies, aligned with Supreme Leader Khamenei, conducted a survey on Iran-US negotiations as part of its advisory role in foreign policy.

The study surveyed 119 academics, senior executives, and current and former officials. The results revealed that 86.5 percent of respondents supported direct negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration, while just 5.8 percent opposed the proposal. A further 7.5 percent of respondents indicated that negotiations would be conditional.

Against the backdrop of Trump’s belligerence against Iran, the risk of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities has gone up manifold.

How Tehran decides to navigate the choppy waters of uncertainty will determine the future of US-Iran relations. And, perhaps, of the volatile region too.

Ata Şahit

Ata Şahit is an executive producer for TRT.

Analyses

Jordan, Trump and The High Stakes of Politics

CrossFireArabia
February 3, 2025

The recent remarks by US President Donald Trump suggesting the displacement of Gaza’s residents to Egypt and Jordan as a “practical solution” for Gaza’s reconstruction carries significant risks. This proposal not only overlooks the fundamental complexities of the issue, from the acceptance of displacement by Gaza’s residents to the logistical feasibility of relocating populations and securing the consent of all involved parties, but also reveals that forced displacement appears to be Trump’s primary solution, one that the region may have to contend with for years to come.

It is essential to remember that we are observing Trump in the early phases of his political return. He is eager to present himself as a strong and decisive leader capable of imposing solutions, even if they appear coercive. However, as with many theoretical ideas that seem simple at first glance, the real challenge lies in their practical implementation.

We are living through an unprecedented era. The events following October 7 have fundamentally altered the region. Gaza is witnessing destruction on a scale it has never seen before. Amid this devastation, Israel appears to be betting on worsening the humanitarian crisis, hoping to make life in Gaza unbearable for its residents. This coincides with difficulties in finding realistic reconstruction solutions or even implementing humanitarian relief efforts that adequately respond to the scale of the disaster.

Israel’s strategic vision is focused on achieving demographic displacement in Gaza and redrawing its geographic landscape. These goals might seem attainable if the crisis continues, and the humanitarian catastrophe deepens. What is alarming, however, is that proposing Jordan as an option in this context may implicitly lay the groundwork for considering it a destination for displaced Palestinians from the West Bank as well, should this theory of forced displacement extend beyond Gaza.

Indeed, Israel is actively pursuing this scenario by seeking to reshape the geography of the West Bank through dismantling densely populated areas, such as the refugee camps in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. This objective aligns with the vision of the Trump administration, which supports Israel’s ambitions under the framework of “Judea and Samaria.” Neither Egypt nor Jordan has had sufficient opportunity to directly engage with the US administration to present alternatives or explain the security, economic, and political risks associated with these proposals.

Jordan’s strategic response should focus on warning against these scenarios while presenting viable alternatives. Highlighting the potential shocks these steps could inflict on a key ally like the United States is crucial. Additionally, Jordan has several cards to play, particularly in the economic domain. These include regional energy projects, development initiatives, and the reconstruction of Syria. Such endeavours could offer the US tangible benefits across multiple fronts, forming the foundation for alternative approaches.

In short, navigating Trump’s looming flood of proposals requires a nuanced understanding of American perspectives and avoiding direct confrontation whenever possible. At the same time, Jordan must strengthen its position with robust Arab support. Elevating strategic relations with Saudi Arabia is particularly crucial, given its dominant role in the current and upcoming phases and its centrality to Trump’s economic and political ambitions, including regional peace efforts.

Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Washington may signal a new escalation in the region. The Gaza conflict remains unresolved, and tensions in the West Bank and Lebanon persist. If the conflict extends further to Iran, a broader escalation could stretch from Iraq to Iran, potentially resulting in the imposition of forced displacement as a grim humanitarian reality, especially if violence escalates once again in Gaza and intensifies in the West Bank.

Dr Amer Al Sabaileh is a professor and a columnist at the Jordan Times

Analyses

A Gaza War Reader

CrossFireArabia
January 21, 2025

By Dr. Tariq Sami Khoury

Despite the Gaza truce announcement, the question everyone is asking: Did this war end in victory or defeat?

Did the Zionist entity achieve its strategic goals, or did the Palestinian resistance factions impose a new equation on the ground? The mass destruction and great human losses open the way for a deeper analysis of the situation from multiple angles.

Zionist entity…Goals successes or victory illusions?

Israel launched its aggression on Gaza with unprecedented brutality, resulting in the near-total destruction of the Strip’s infrastructure, and the deaths of more than 250,000 people between those killed and wounded with the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents.

Also the Israeli aggression extended to southern Lebanon and Syria, whilst targeting Yemen and Iran in clear attempts to expand the scope of the confrontation.

But did the Zionist entity achieve its goals?

1) Eliminating the resistance: Despite all attempts at genocide and continuous bombing, the Israeli army was unable to end the resistance or dismantle its infrastructure. The resistance proved its ability to continue to confront, and to carry out qualitative military operations till the last minute.

2) Recovering Its prisoners: Israel did not succeed to recover all its prisoners. In the end it was forced to enter into negotiations with the resistance under their own terms, which showed Israel was unable to impose its will by military force alone.

3) No deterrence: Instead of imposing a new equation to deter the resistance, Israel faced continuous missile strikes that reached deep into its territories and imposed a new and unprecedented reality on the Israeli internal front and unbearable political and security pressure on the Zionist leadership.

Legendary Palestinian resistance…

Despite the Israel ferocity and the intense destruction, the Palestinian resistance emerged strong and cohesive. The battle it fought was not only for defense, but to establish a new equation in the conflict, as it was able to:

1) Survive despite the bombardment: Israel was unable to break the resistance will or push its fighters to surrender and remained able to respond and maneuver till the last moment, which shows the failure of the Zionist plan to crush it.

2) Imposing negotiating equations: The resistance was able to impose itself as a key party in any future solution, and succeeded in confirming that the prisoners are not just a pressure card, but a negotiating element that changes the equation.

3) Maintaining morale: Despite Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe, the Palestinian people came out to celebrate the truce, in scenes that reflect their steadfastness and ability to overcome hardships. That is a psychological defeat for the Zionist entity.

Regional and international dimension… Exhaustion or victory?

Israel expanded the scope of its aggression to Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and even Iran to attempt to weaken any future threats. But this did not lead to decisive results. Rather it opened up several fronts without achieving any strategic gains.

1) Northern front (Lebanon and Syria): Despite its continuous bombing, Israel was not able to stop the force of the axis of resistance, but faced more threats leading to the exhaustion of its forces.

2) Yemeni front: The air strikes on the country failed to stop Yemen from participating in the conflict equation by targeting the ships in the Red Sea going to the Israeli Port of Eilat, and which added a new strategic dimension.

3) Iranian Front: The Zionist strikes did not deter Iran or stop its support for the axis of resistance, but strengthened its position whilst prompting it to escalate its support for the Palestinian resistance.

Truce.. Rest bite and an opportunity?

With the ceasefire announcement, it can be said the resistance emerged victorious through its ability to withstand and maintain its position to influence the future. In contrast, while the Zionist entity may have achieved some of its field goals, it failed to draw a decisive victory and end of the resistance.

Conclusion.. Victory and defeat

The battle was not equal in terms of military strength, but victory is not only measured by the ability to destroy; it is by steadfastness and ability to continue. Israel did not achieve a decisive victory, but fought a long war of attrition, while the Palestinian resistance emerged more solid and able to impose a new reality in the regional equation.

In the final analysis, the fact remains that liberating the land and restoring rights can only be achieved through continuous resistance, and that every Zionist attempt to eliminate the Palestinian people will be met with a will that does not know surrender. Thus, Palestine remains the compass of the free.

The author is a Jordanian writer and contributed this piece in Arabic for the JO24 website.

Opinion

Syria: 10 Days That Shook The World

Dr Khairi Janbek
December 10, 2024

Dr Khairi Janbek

Without much ado, the western media is currently preoccupied with this question: Are the Syrian rebels Jihadis? This is while the Arab media appears to be in a state of euphoria about the Syrian rebels seen as liberators. The issue however is about two perspectives, the first being cautious about the next phase for the country, and this is for understandable reasons, while the second reflects optimism for the next stage and also for understandable reasons.

Now, the fear of dividing Syria on ethnic and sectarian grounds has its blueprint in the colonial history of Syria and certainly not a product of today and/or creative chaos utterances.

Looking back

In fact, on 1 July, 1922, the French colonial authorities divided Syria into federal statelets: statelet of Damascus, statelet of Aleppo, statelet of the Alawites, and the statelet of the Druze. Of course, the idea was that the country would be easier to rule and a regional and a sectarian balance would guarantee political stability. Of course, the Kurds were outside this formula as they were struggling to create an independent state of their own.

But what about Syria now, to paraphrase John Reed, after the 10 days that shook the world. Indeed, the two regional police stations in the region, Turkey and Israel seems to be gaining major influence in the current affairs, while the third police station, Iran, has lost out in this formula.

Rivalry

For all intents and purposes, no one is naive enough to think that the march towards Damascus could have occurred without Turkish support, and the Israeli foreign minister has confirmed that talks were held between his government and the Druze as well as the Kurds of Syria, whom he described as having good relations with them.

But what about the Russians? One would venture to say that they are like to stay in Syria as most probably, paying guests of the new Syrian government, renting their military installations from them.

Undoubtedly, no matter how much we can be optimistic about the future of all-inclusive democratic Syria, we will always reluctantly fall back on our cognitive dissonance regarding the case of Iraq, and make the mistake of comparison with the post-Saddam era of terrorism, sectarianism an ethnic strife.

This is simply because, we forget that in Iraq there was superpower which brought down the regime and destroyed all the functioning institutions of the country favoring when religious Islamic sect over another, and supporting one ethnicity against others. While in Syria, its the Syrians themselves brought down the Ba’ath regime.

On the face of it, the rebels don’t seem to want to be the new masters of Syria and they are working very hard to protect and preserve the functioning institutions of the country, and claim their adherence to pluralism and for an all inclusive new regime.

But two important questions remain outstanding, and only time will tell how these will unfold: To what extent will there be Turkish and Israeli influence on the emerging regime, and more importantly, what would be the share of those two police stations of the country?

In other words, how will Turkey perceive the future of the Kurds in Syria, and where does Israel see its border posts with the “new” Syria?

In all likelihood, the rebels will keep their word of wanting a stable pluralist Syria, but let us not forget also, that a future spark of ethnic, regional or sectarian conflict, will very likely turn all into extremists in the country.

Dr Khairi Janbek is Jordanian commentator based in Paris.