‘New’ Syria: What Next For The Region

The swift fall of several Syrian cities, with little to no resistance from the Syrian regime or its allies, especially Russia, has drawn significant attention. Moscow’s inaction to prevent these rapid territorial advances underscores the shifting dynamics of the Syrian conflict.

Several factors must be considered to assess this new phase in Syria. The current developments are not merely a continuation of the initial Syrian conflict but reflect broader regional implications in the post-October 7 landscape. Israel’s strategy of “fragmenting fronts” as a counter to the concept of their unity has rendered Syria’s geographic arena an inevitable next focus. Although Syria has long been targeted by airstrikes, missile attacks, and assassinations, the current escalation coincides with the temporary pause in the conflict in Lebanon.

Syria’s geography serves as the logistical backbone for Iranian-aligned forces, including Hezbollah, making it a critical component in the regional equation. The ignition of the Syrian front aligns with Israel’s objective to disrupt the logistical corridor connecting Tehran and Beirut and secure its own strategic perimeter. 

This latest shift on the ground in Syria complicates an already intricate situation. Multiple factions are mobilizing to defend their interests or expand their influence amid signs of a redrawn Syrian map. Notably, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, has garnered attention by rebranding himself under his real name, Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa. In interviews with CNN and The New York Times, Jolani emphasized the dissolution of HTS, presenting himself as a political figure capable of engaging with international stakeholders rather than as the leader of a proscribed militant group.

Militarily, the rapid advances of fighters from Aleppo to Hama signal a looming confrontation in Homs, a pivotal city in the Syrian conflict. Homs’ strategic location connects the Syrian coast with Damascus and borders Lebanon, serving as Hezbollah’s last operational lifeline. With the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, Hezbollah faces the challenge of regrouping for what could be an existential battle. Losing this confrontation would strip Hezbollah of its regional power and relegate it to a vulnerable position within Lebanon.

The speed of these territorial shifts reflects not only the weakened state of the Syrian army but also the neutralization of its allies. Iran, once expected to be a key supporter of both Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, finds itself constrained by a U.S.-Israeli-led blockade encompassing land, sea, and air routes. Russia, on the other hand, has displayed a largely indifferent stance, underscoring its limited capacity or willingness to intervene. The sole remaining card for Iran is the deployment of Iraqi militias to Syria, though these forces are now targets of intensified American and Israeli strikes, further diminishing Tehran’s ability to influence the battlefield. 

Israel, meanwhile, continues its strategy of reshaping regional security dynamics. After Gaza and Lebanon, it is now turning its focus to Syria. By leveraging the current chaos, Tel Aviv is positioning itself to establish new buffer zones deep inside Syrian territory, using the ongoing conflict to justify pre-emptive strikes on perceived threats.

Amid these developments, Jordan faces significant challenges along its borders with Syria and Iraq. The prolonged instability and the emergence of new players in the Syrian theatre require Jordan to maintain heightened vigilance. To mitigate potential threats, Amman must strengthen its military alliances and adopt proactive security measures. These strategies are necessary for the unpredictability of this phase and the diverse range of threats encircling Jordan’s borders.

Dr Amer Al Sabaileh is a university lecturer and a columnist for The Jordan Times

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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Can Israel Change The Middle East?

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

In the short term, Israel is no longer in a hurry to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia, which it considers the grand prize in the Islamic world. Although its leaders view normalization as necessary, indeed inevitable, over the long run, what Netanyahu and his team currently see is an unprecedented historical opportunity that has not occurred since the founding of the State of Israel. They are thus pushing to implement sweeping and profound changes to the Palestinian situation, through displacement, expulsion, settlement expansion, annexation, and the Judaization of Jerusalem, from Gaza to Jerusalem and the West Bank. For the Israeli right, these policies take precedence over any other strategic interests.

It is not only about the Palestinians. The Israeli right’s ambitions today extend to constructing new and unprecedented spheres of regional influence and redefining Israeli security. This includes striking at any source of potential future threats and establishing Israel as the dominant regional power.

There are three key variables that must be taken into account when analyzing the current geopolitical shifts and the repercussions of Israel’s war on Gaza, not only in terms of the Palestinian issue, but also on a regional and global scale.

The first variable can be described as “Political Netanyahuism.” Today’s Israel is no longer the Israel of the past—this marks the era of Benjamin Netanyahu, especially post-Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood.” This era has unleashed the historical project of the Israeli right-wing in full force, with no intention of reversing course. The key features of this project include, first, a complete abandonment of the peace process, a rejection of the Oslo Accords and their consequences, and the annexation of large parts of the West Bank—effectively nullifying the Palestinian Authority’s political relevance and perhaps returning to a system of disconnected “cantons.” Additionally, this entails the Judaiztion of Jerusalem. Second, Netanyahuism is reflected in a complete structural shift of Israel toward the right, with the near-total erosion of the secular-leftist stream in Israeli politics. Third, it involves the deep penetration of religious ideology into Israel’s security and military institutions, leading to their full domination by religious-nationalist elements.

Even if Netanyahu were to exit the political scene, this would not alter the course of these policies or shift current events. Israel post-Netanyahuism will not be the same as it was before. The historical Zionist dream persists—ideologically, strategically, and religiously—even if tactical approaches differ. This new political reality is not merely shaped by individuals like Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich; rather, they are products of a broader environment and not anomalies within it.

The second variable is the major Arab strategic collapse—a process that began decades ago but reached a far more dangerous stage in the past 15 years, especially after so called “the Arab Spring”. The resulting transformations led to the fragmentation and collapse of numerous Arab states and the weakening of the entire Arab geopolitical map—in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. It now seems as though the Arab geopolitical landscape, shaped after World War I, is disintegrating. This has created a strategic opportunity for Israel to expand, particularly following the recent decline in Iran’s regional influence over the past year in the wake of the war on Gaza.

The third variable is the return of Donald Trump to the White House—this time accompanied by a team that is more Zionist and ideologically aligned with the Israeli right than ever before. The unprecedented genocide unfolding in Gaza, the (implicit) green light granted to settlers and Netanyahu’s government in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and the statements made by Trump’s team concerning Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria all suggest an unprecedented alliance—perhaps even an organic one—between a hardline right-wing American administration and an extremist Israeli right. Although US policies have historically been biased in favor of Israel, the situation has never reached this level of alignment and support.

These three variables together shape a new political landscape, they significantly impact Jordan’s strategic perspective on national interests and security and necessitate a reevaluation by political elites who previously believed that there were multiple factions within Israel with whom one could engage, or that American influence could constrain the Israeli right, or that an effective Arab strategic space could be mobilized to counter such dangerous transformations.

The writer is a columnist in the Jordan Times

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Netanyahu Has Irked Trump. Why?

What should one make of the recent White House meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu?

Well, this time Netanyahu was almost summoned to the White House to be told few home truths. This meeting was not like the first time when Netanyahu came to the White House in early February when it was all glow to be unexpectedly told that Trump wants the USA to take over Gaza.

This time around, the meeting was more subdued, almost in a rush, like an after-thought on the part of Trump who keeps chopping and changing as he figures out how he wants to conduct America’s foreign policy in his second “robust” administration.

This time around, although Trump displayed the usual friendliness to Netanyahu, he was somewhat distant because of the tariffs the White House is set upon to start imposing on the rest of the world including best-friend Israel. Its leaders, businessmen are still in shock because Washington has slammed a 17 percent tariff on its products entering the United States.

Israeli industrialists continue to be up-in-arms. It was they who appealed to Netanyahu to seek Washington clarification because they argued that the new tariffs will cost them up to $3 billion in losses, reduce Israeli exports by 26 percent and increase unemployment by 26,000. They are already in a bad situation because of the war on Gaza but this latest step will surely cripple them.

At the White House meeting last Monday, with a chitchat in front of the cameras that looked as if it was a rehearsed meeting with Trump dominating the conversation and everyone taking their que to speak only when they are told, he pointed out to Netanyahu that he “may not” consider reversing tariffs on Israeli exports because “we give Israel $4 billion a year. That’s a lot.” He really sounded like lecturing to the Israelis.  

For a man considered to be greatly influenced by the Israeli lobby that seemed to be tough talking for in the immediate conversation Trump told Netanyahu that there would be and for the first time direct face-to-face talking with Iranians about their nuclear file.  

This seemed to be another unsuspecting blow. If there was a “shock” on his face, Netanyahu didn’t show it as he just nodded; the Israeli Prime Minister was looking for a tough military stance on Iran, possibly going to war and striking the country’s nuclear facilities. It was he, who persuaded Trump in 2018 to exit from the 2015 nuclear deal brokered by the UN with other world powers of Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany at the behest of the Barack Obama administration.

Now with Trump in the driving seat, and wanting a “tainted-Donald” deal, Netanyahu couldn’t but agree with an alluring American president. If he had any misgivings, he kept them to himself except to say Tel Aviv and Washington had an objective not to let Iran have nuclear weapons, but Tehran constantly said and throughout the past years that their nuclear program was for peaceful purposes unlike the clandestine extensive Israeli nuclear program.

Although he may not have outwardly shown it, Trump may have been a little irritated by Netanyahu in other ways. Take Gaza for example when Israel restarted its war on the enclave on 19 March exactly two months after a ceasefire took effect ending a 15-month genocide and which was brokered by Trump and his team lead Steve Witkoff.

The recent talks in the White House, and shown in front of the cameras suggest Trump would have like more time for the Doha negotiations to take hold between Hamas and Israel to see the release of the 59 remaining hostages – which include one American who is still deemed to be alive – hidden in the Gaza enclave.

The relaunching of the war, and so quickly, and with the breaking of the 19 January ceasefire is adding to the tension between Washington and Tel Aviv and is sending signals that Netanyahu wants to continue the war in Gaza and doesn’t particularly care about the remaining hostages, and whether they come out of their nightmare dead or alive.

Trump, and as shown by the White House meeting, is showing a diversion from thoughts projected by Netanyahu. As well as Iran, he has told Netanyahu, he favors Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and that he has a ‘very, very good relationship with Turkey and with their leader…”, adding that “I happen to like him, and we never had a problem” and he offered to mediate between Israel on any problem between the two countries.

Such words may have suddenly added to the glum mood of the Israeli PM who fears that Turkish influence in Syria despite the fact it is Israel that is today bombarding different Syrian cities and occupying parts of their territory, a situation that increased after the toppling of the Bashar Al Assad regime on 9 December, 2024 by a new government in Damascus, and which is seen as a threat to Israeli security by Tel Aviv.

What is worrying Netanyahu is the fact Trump recognizes Turkish influence and Syria and Ankara’s relationship with the new government in Damascus, and apparenty the man in the White House, is “ok” with it.

With all this going on, Netanyahu is not sure anymore of the way the White House is going despite the fact that Washington continues to be the main supplier of weapons to Tel Aviv. But with Trump as “fickle-minded” as he is, all cards are on the table for a new and changing relationship between the USA and the rest of the world with the strong possibility of including Israel in the new international set of thinking.

This comment is written by Dr Marwan Asmar, chief editor of the crossfirearabia.com website. 

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