Can Joseph Aoun Get Lebanon Out of its Rut?

By Dr Khairi Janbek

We have grown accustomed to Lebanon being in the headlines as a result of blood and destruction, but no longer. Whether due to the weakening of Iran, determination of the international community and/or both, all this appears to be changing.

Lebanon has now officially elected a new president, ending a long period of political crisis that has long left the country without a head of state since the term of former president Michel Aoun expired in late October 2022. After protracted negotiations and intense political maneuvering, not to mention Arab and international pressure, general Aoun, with a tough military reputation who has lead the army since 2017, has become the latest leader of the country.

General Aoun takes office amidst a period of significant economic and social challenges for Lebanon, as the country is grappling with an acute and ongoing financial crisis, soaring rates of unemployment, and the collapse of its currency, in addition to the refugee crisis and deteriorating infrastructure that has left Lebanon hanging by a thread.

In fact to top it all, the powerful sectarian political groups which hindered the election of a president for the past 26 months and more will not likely disappear with the election of general Aoun despite the seemingly robust character of the new leader.

The new 14th Lebanese president in his first address to parliament, vowed to work with all political factions to implement reforms and tackle the pressing economic issues that has long log-jammed the country. His speech was one that had determination and a sense of purpose and appeal with a rallying-cry for all of the fractious political groups of Lebanon.

Having said that, and despite the election in the Lebanese Parliament, the country’s future still remains uncertain with challenges. The new president will need to navigate carefully the deeply entrenched political system which often leads to gridlock and an inability to implement meaningful change.

Additionally, the country’s economy remains in freefall, with millions of Lebanese struggling to afford basic goods and services. Therefore, it is clear the road ahead will be a challenging one to say the least. Logically for many, the focus has already turned to whether the new president can live up to the promise of healing the nation and lead it towards a more stable system.

From the Arab and international perspectives, the messages of support from both seem to be encouraging, but this support will need to be translated into monetary terms for re-building the country. It is said there is the promise of $10 billion earmarked for this effort but frozen on the condition that Lebanon elects a president based.

Now this hurdle has been overcome and passed. At the end of the day as well, General Aoun is seen as the consensus candidate for the Arab countries as well as the international community. In this sense, the release of the re-building funds may look optimistic but there is still the snag of the question of Hezbollah and Israel’s future belligerent intentions towards the country, issues that are still to be ironed out.

The new Lebanese administration needs guarantees from Hezbollah in as much as it needs guarantees from the new Lebanese administration, and the Arab and international community eagerly awaits the results of this dimension because, putting it bluntly, no one wishes to see their investments blown up in another war nor their money burnt in smoke.

All that one can say under the circumstances, is that General Aoun, and he is the fourth president to be chosen from the military establishment, can negotiate with Hezbollah to surrender their heavy weapons to the Lebanese Army while keeping their light weapons; at least for the time being, and stay away from the Litani River as demanded by Israel.

But this will need considerable political dexterity and acumen.

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian analyst based in Paris

Related Posts

Trump, Netanyahu Rift Hits Rock Bottom: View From Amman

By Saleem Ayoub Quna

The Epic Fury Operation launched by the US against Iran in February 2026, will go down in modern history as the first open military conflict, where a superpower like the United States, has willingly and openly played the role of a war-proxy, on behalf of its smaller ally, Israel.

The difference of attitude between the two close allies, US and Israel, in relation to what they perceived as Iran’s threat, imminent or potential, was a key factor behind the gradual crumbling of the American-Israeli coordinated military and intelligence efforts, to bring down the regime in Tehran.


Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu’s extreme right-wing government, kept saying Iran posed an imminent existential threat to Israel, and therefore it must be brought down by force. While the US position was constrained by its previous international commitments on the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as stipulated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and the P5+1 powers, during the administration of President Obama.


Since that moment Netanyahu kept vigorously urging, more likely lecturing the US and the West, on the dangers of the JCOPA agreement. When Donald Trump was elected President in 2017, things took an important and completely different turn. In the following year, he took the United States out of that internationally-backed deal as he had promised to do during his election campaign. He also kept his promises of moving the US Embassy to Occupied Jerusalem and recognize the occupied Syrian Golan Heights as part of Israel.


These symbolic and important gestures, whetted Netanyahu’s appetite for more American concessions to Israeli demands.


Netanyahu’s golden opportunity came when Trump was re-elected to his second term in 2023, the same year when Hamas launched its massive assault on the Israeli settlements in the so-called “Gaza enevlope”. Other militias connected and supported by Iran, including the Houthis in north Yemen, Hezbollah in south Lebanon, Syria under the previous regime and Shia factions in Iraq coordinated their efforts to stand by Hamas during that long and unprecedented confrontation with Israel.

For its part, Iran did not shy from making it clear that it helped create this “chain” of resistance factions to encircle Israel from three directions.

The second turning magical point in the US position on the issue of direct military intervention against Iran came about when Israel succeeded in serving Hezbollah, the severest military blow ever, in the pagers’ operation and the subsequent assassination of Hezbollah’s top leaders, including its charismatic Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on Sept 27, 2024.


Trump was very impressed with all of that Israeli action and Netanyahu gave himself the full credit for this unexpected success.


Accordingly, Netanyahu’s plan to Trump was simple. Based on the Israeli accumulated intelligence and expertise on the Iranian internal scene and emulating its operation against Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon, accompanied by massive American air strikes would provide both allies with the best chance to finish the Ayatollahs in Tehran once and for all!


But as events unfolded, all of Netanyahu’s plans, personally and strongly endorsed by Trump and his military aides, suddenly started crumbling, one after the other. His relations with Trump slipped into stages of deterioration by the day and week as the closure of the Hormuz Strait by Iran, started hurting the world economy led by the US.


Here new red lights went on and the phone calls between the two men became more intense and vulgar. Then Trump decided to pass on the torch to his deputy, JD Vance, who seemed comfortable to tell Netanyahu what Trump avoided to do!


Conclusion: It is tricky to switch roles of allies in wars. A smaller entity can always stay safe as long as its leaders know the limits of their power and leverage. When people like Netanyahu think they have more power and clout than they actually have, versus their stronger ally, then irritation starts to brew, especially in the case of Trump who likes to show he is always in the driving seat. It also means that the leadership on the side of stronger partner has some problems of its own!


Whether it is a wrangle, rift, collision, divorce or worse between Trump and Netanyahu, we will not know for certain, until the negotiators in Switzerland close their files and head back home!

Continue reading
Will The US-Iran Deal Last?

By Ali Bakir

On June 15, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced via the US social media platform X that a peace deal between the US and Iran had been reached, following over two months of mediation by his country. Sharif expressed gratitude to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye for their significant contributions, stating that the official signing ceremony would take place on June 19 in Switzerland. Following this announcement, a memorandum of understanding was signed electronically by US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance on the US side, and by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on the Iranian side.

The reported agreement is characterized as a framework peace deal aimed at ending the 2026 Israel/US-Iran war and transitioning the current ceasefire into a broader diplomatic process. Although the text of the agreement has not yet been published, key reported elements include immediate cessation of military operations, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, and a 60-day negotiation period to address unresolved issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, alongside discussions on sanctions relief and access to frozen Iranian assets during follow-up negotiations.

This agreement follows two significant developments. First, Israel conducted military strikes on Iranian targets in western and central Iran around a week ago, marking the first such actions since April. Explosions were reported in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and other cities in response to Iranian missile launches that were highly performative. Second, Trump warned that Iran would “pay the price” for what he described as slow progress in negotiations to end the conflict, indicating that the US could resume strikes against Iranian infrastructure.

5 bullet points on the agreement

Although the agreement does not necessarily mean that the root causes that prompted the war have fully disappeared, a few observations are worth mentioning and analyzing.

First, a lot of narrative spinning is occurring publicly at the moment. While the main parties are trying to sell the agreement as a victory, there are factions within the broader regional camps (such as hardliners in both Iran and Israel) that oppose it. Critics in Iran have labeled the agreement a “humiliating capitulation,” arguing that it involves unjustified concessions. Hardline opponents have publicly criticized the negotiating team, with Iranian MP Mahmoud Nabavian stating that the latest draft is “more damaging” than previous versions. Similarly, Israeli officials emphasized that Israel was not directly involved in negotiating the US–Iran deal and does not necessarily consider itself bound by its provisions. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that Israel would not withdraw from territory seized in Lebanon and would continue to act against threats from Hezbollah and Iran if necessary.

Second, the timing of the agreement suggests that Iran was running out of options. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) focused on messaging and performative measures, the gap between their narrative and reality widened, with Iran’s ability to endure further pressure significantly diminishing. Trump’s counter-blockade against Iran’s restriction of the Strait of Hormuz imposed significant economic costs on Iran, leading to the decision to sign the agreement. It is estimated that the blockade could have cost Iran over $24 billion in just two months — almost equal to Iran’s reported total reserves of foreign currency — leaving the regime with little choice but to agree to the terms or face economic collapse.

Third, despite the negative reactions from hardliners in both Iran and Israel, the agreement highlights Trump’s genuine interest in reaching a resolution with Iran, especially following last year’s swift 12-day war between Israel and Iran. However, radical elements in both Iran and Israel seem intent on using procrastination, escalation, or military actions to sabotage meaningful attempts to achieve peace. Given that there is reportedly a 60-day negotiation period following the signing of the agreement, it is likely that these factions will continue to work against a comprehensive resolution.

Fourth, while Pakistan played a significant role in the mediation process, Qatar’s involvement was also crucial, as acknowledged by American, Pakistani, Saudi, and Turkish officials. Notably, neither the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman nor the ministry itself reported any independent measures taken by Qatar, apart from endorsing Pakistan’s mediation efforts. In fact, a Qatari spokesman denied any independent role in the mediation at this stage. Qatar’s involvement appears to have been executed at the request of the United States and had several dimensions.

Primarily, Qatar facilitated technical issues between the US and Iran, such as enabling the transfer of Iranian funds without direct US involvement, thereby avoiding the perception of it being a US initiative or taxpayer-funded. Additionally, Qatar played a role in establishing a communication channel between the United Arab Emirates and Iran, which emerged later in the mediation process. Finally, Qatar aligned itself with Saudi Arabia’s position, providing support for the Pakistani initiative.

Changing actors

Fifth, two awkward positions regarding the agreement can be highlighted. Firstly, the Europeans have been largely inactive in resolving the crisis yet somehow managed to host the official signing ceremony between the Americans and Iranians. Instead of crediting Pakistan, Switzerland offered to host the ceremony, which can be seen as an act of opportunism. Secondly, Oman, historically a favored mediator between the US and Iran, has been notably absent from this current arrangement. Oman’s position during this war was not popular in the Gulf Cooperation Council and beyond. According to a senior US administration official, Oman was removed from its mediation role in negotiations with Iran after the US concluded that Muscat had acted “very duplicitously” during the talks.

Finally, we must approach the prospects of the agreement with caution. It is essential to recognize that this is not a comprehensive peace agreement but rather a transitional framework. The future of the agreement will largely depend on the outcomes of negotiations in the next 60 days. Given that several factions within Iran and Israel are opposed to the agreement, we should not dismiss the possibility of sabotage, particularly from Israel.

Ali Bakir is an assistant professor of international affairs, security, and defense at Qatar University and senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Anadolu

Continue reading

You Missed

‘We Must Resist The Israelisation of Our Societies – Francesca Albanese

‘We Must Resist The Israelisation of Our Societies – Francesca Albanese

Kier Starmer Quits The Labour Party Leadership

Kier Starmer Quits The Labour Party Leadership

Israel Killed Raghad on The Way to School

Israel Killed Raghad on The Way to School

Trump, Netanyahu Rift Hits Rock Bottom: View From Amman

Trump, Netanyahu Rift Hits Rock Bottom: View From Amman

Youngest Palestinian Doctor Gets Guinness

Youngest Palestinian Doctor Gets Guinness

Palestine: 70 Killed Since The Start of 2026

Palestine: 70 Killed Since The Start of 2026