Mideast on War Footing: Is US Strike on Iran Coming?

CrossFireArabia
Analyses
January 29, 2026

As US military assets continue to move into the Middle East, analysts warn that Washington is edging closer to a possible confrontation with Iran, weighing options that range from intensified economic pressure and a naval blockade to direct military action.

Recent developments have heightened fears that a US-led escalation could be imminent.

“It’s looking increasingly likely that with this buildup of military assets, President Donald Trump – and probably the Israelis – are preparing for a military escalation against the Iranians,” Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the RANE Network, told Anadolu.

On Wednesday, Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social that a “massive armada” was heading toward Iran, expressing hope that Tehran would “come to the table” and negotiate with Washington. He warned that the fleet was prepared to “rapidly fulfill its mission with speed and violence, if necessary.”

Trump said the deployment was larger than the one previously sent toward Venezuela and confirmed that it is led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, one of the world’s largest aircraft carriers, which hosts electronic-warfare aircraft capable of disrupting Iranian radar systems.

The New York Times reported that the carrier strike group is accompanied by three warships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of long-range precision strikes. The US has also reportedly deployed around a dozen additional F-15E attack planes, along with Patriot and THAAD air-defense systems to protect against potential Iranian retaliation.

Steffan Watkins, a consultant specializing in tracking military ships and aircraft, said the US is also shipping supplies and deploying additional surveillance aircraft. “Preparations for operations targeting Iran appear to be underway,” he wrote Thursday on the American social media platform X.

“Time is running out,” Trump warned Iran, threatening that any future attack “will be far worse” than last year’s US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Although the rhetoric comes in the wake of Iran’s crackdown on protests, Bohl said Washington’s broader objective appears to be forcing changes in Iran’s foreign and security policies.

The goal is to see “if they can get Iran’s government to change its foreign policies, to give up on its missile program and its nuclear energy program,” he said.

Limited and targeted strikes

Analysts say one of the most likely military options under consideration is a campaign of limited, precision strikes targeting Iran’s military, missile and nuclear infrastructure.

“They could go after the missile program again – strike drones and missiles and manufacturing. They can try to destroy launchers, remains of Iran’s air force, some infrastructure related to the military-industrial complex,” Bohl told Anadolu.

During the 12-day war with Israel last June, the US struck three major Iranian nuclear facilities – Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan – using bunker-buster bombs, claiming the attacks crippled Iran’s nuclear program.

Bohl said it remains unclear whether Washington would allow Israel to initiate a new round of strikes or whether a joint US-Israeli campaign would unfold.

Another option, he added, would involve phased strikes rather than a single, overwhelming attack.

“We could be seeing a version of what we saw in Iraq back in the 1990s, where the US would strike Iraq, wait to see if that would create a concession process for the Iraqis and then strike again to try to again shift the Iraqis’ behavior,” he said. “And that could take weeks, even months to unfold.”

Blockade and attacks on infrastructure

Experts also suggested that the US might try to impose naval and aerial blockade on Iran.

“Imposing a new blockade on the Iranians and trying to seize their tankers like they did in Venezuela is escalatory,” Bohl said.

He added that Washington could also attempt to restrict Iranian airspace, limiting civilian flights in a bid to inflict economic damage.

“They could enhance their cyber campaign to try to cripple Iran’s infrastructure, particularly during this time where there’s still a lingering protest movement after those major crackdowns earlier this month,” he said. “So, disrupting infrastructure would also be a choice.”

The USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group could also be used to intercept Iranian oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf, he added.

However, Scott Lucas, a professor of international politics at the Clinton Institute at University College Dublin, cautioned that a blockade and seizure of Iranian vessels could be challenging.

“I think it would be very risky for the US to do what it’s done with Venezuela, which is to seize Iranian oil tankers,” he said.

“I think the prospect of that setting off a regional crisis is much greater, especially since Iran has the capacity to close off the Strait of Hormuz, and about 20% of the world’s oil supply goes through that waterway.”

Broad escalation and strikes on leadership

Analysts also warned that Washington could opt for a broader military campaign aimed at severely degrading Iran’s leadership and command structure.

“We are seeing reports that President Trump wants something ‘decisive,’ which is more of a major campaign to probably attack as many targets as possible and increasingly consider assassinations of top Revolutionary Guards and even some of the leadership like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,” said Bohl.

Such an approach could include attacks on senior commanders within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, political leadership nodes, and command-and-control infrastructure, analysts said.

Experts warned that efforts aimed at full regime change would almost certainly provoke retaliation against US forces and allies across the Middle East.

Bohl added that Trump believes Iran’s deterrence has comprehensively failed, as their missiles and drones have not stopped previous attacks.

“He (Trump) may believe that Iran isn’t able to carry out those sorts of comprehensive strikes on energy infrastructure,” he said. “That would encourage him to go on into a larger and more substantial campaign.”

Targeted assassinations and covert operations

A more limited alternative would involve targeted assassinations and covert operations rather than an overt large-scale war.

While analysts largely rule out a full US ground invasion of Iran, Bohl said Trump has demonstrated a preference for deploying special forces on high-risk missions.

“President Trump ran on a platform of avoiding another Iraq war, but he is very commando-happy and he likes to use his special forces,” said Bohl.

Such operations could include the destruction of high-value military targets or the assassination of individuals linked to Iran’s missile, drone or nuclear programs, analysts said.

“They have targeted Iranian leaders in the past. They assassinated the leader of the Quds Force … Gen. Qasem Soleimani at the start of 2020,” Lucas explained.

Bohl also pointed to US actions in Venezuela and North Korea as examples of attempts to apply pressure through targeted operations rather than regime-wide campaigns.

However, Bohl said that a repeat of Venezuela, where Washington reaches an understanding with the regime and takes out key leaders, does not appear to be a “viable option” in the case of Iran.

More economic pressure

Iran’s economy continues to be heavily constrained by sanctions. Earlier this month, the US announced an additional 25% tariff on countries trading with Tehran and imposed new sanctions on vessels and companies accused of transporting Iranian oil.

Bohl said Washington may seek to further destabilize Iran economically in hopes of forcing it back to negotiations.

The idea is to crack Iran’s politics by causing more economic damage and pushing them toward what are essentially surrender terms, he said.

Iran is already grappling with a severe economic crisis, marked by the rapid devaluation of the rial, which helped trigger nationwide protests late last December.

Lucas, however, argued that additional sanctions may have limited effect without broad international support.

“I think the Trump folks can bluster a bit, but they really can only tighten sanctions if they have international action on the sanctions,” he said, adding that countries such as Russia and China are unlikely to support further pressure.

What comes next

Analysts said several indicators could signal whether the US is moving closer to escalation.

Bohl said warning signs include commercial airlines avoiding Iranian airspace, the evacuation of foreign embassies, travel advisories urging civilians to leave Iran, and Israeli authorities placing the population on heightened alert.

He added that the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln in the US Central Command area of responsibility significantly shortens the timeline for potential action.

Given that Iran has already been struck in previous confrontations and that tensions remain extremely high, any move could rapidly spiral.

“Because it is kind of an undeclared war between the two sides already, it could really turn on a dime and begin sudden escalation,” Bohl warned.

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

Analyses

Netanyahu, Iran and The ‘Destructive’ Israeli Personality

CrossFireArabia
June 8, 2026

By Dr Adnan Naeem

The recent escalation between Israel and Iran suggests that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is currently experiencing one of his most complex and perplexing political moments. The man who has long relied on military force as a tool to resolve conflicts and impose realities now finds himself besieged by outcomes that fall short of his stated objectives and the immense cost borne by the entire region.

In Gaza, after months of war, destruction, and continuous military operations by the Israeli army, fundamental questions remain unanswered: Where is the victory promised to the Israelis? Where are the strategic achievements that justified the continuation of the war? The Gaza battle was transformed from a project for a swift resolution into an open-ended war of attrition, with the political, security, and humanitarian costs increasing daily and rapidly.

As for the northern front (Lebanon), Netanyahu has failed to impose the equations he repeatedly wanted to create. Instead of restoring Israel’s image of deterrence, new realities have emerged confirming that the region does not respond to threats, and that the power balance has become far too complex to be determined by the rhetoric of force or displays of military capability.

At the heart of these shifts, Iran has emerged as a model distinct from the many adversaries Israel has traditionally dealt with. Tehran does not merely declare its right to retaliate; it exercises this right whenever it perceives its interests or sovereignty are threatened. The recent regional confrontations demonstrated that a policy of threats is no longer sufficient to subdue or deter adversaries while military calculations have become far more costly and complex than Netanyahu imagined.

It is to be noted while Netanyahu sometimes speaks of opportunities for negotiation or security and political arrangements, he at the same time continues to generate the conditions for escalation. How can peace be built while the circle of confrontation widens? And how can the world be convinced of the seriousness of the political process when the language of force remains the sole instrument for managing the conflict?

He appears like a cunning fox, claiming to be engaged in negotiations for peace but focusing on security matters rather than the political file. The security file establishes a limited, relative stability, not a lasting one, waiting to reignite conflict in the region, particularly on the Lebanese front.

Netanyahu works on downplaying and delaying the importance of resolving the political issue first. He thus evades political obligations and commitments under international pressure regarding Lebanese rights for instance, most importantly ( is a complete withdrawal, even from the Shebaa Farms, demarcation of borders, including maritime borders, and Lebanese rights to the gas fields off the Lebanese coast – the Karish field).

This contradiction reveals a crisis deeper than a mere disagreement over military tactics; it reflects a personal political predicament facing Netanyahu. He understands – as he approaches the general elections – that a ceasefire could open the door to domestic accountability regarding security and political failures, and could revive questions about his political future, not to mention corruption cases and crises such as his dismantling of the judicial system and the conscription of Haredim. Therefore, it seems the continuation of the tension gives him more room to maneuver than political compromises would.

Within Israel itself, and as the general elections approaches, the gap between Netanyahu and growing segments of society widens. The opposition is gaining strength, protests continue unabated and the families of fallen and wounded soldiers are raising their voices in an unprecedented manner. Meanwhile, criticism is mounting from security and military figures who believe the government lacks a clear vision to resolve the crisis.

Today, Netanyahu’s image resembles that of his missiles: Soaring into the sky, creating a deafening roar, but quickly returning to reality, where difficult questions and stubborn facts await him. Wars may postpone crises, but they do not eliminate them, and escalation may temporarily alter the landscape, but it does not create a lasting victory.

Conversely, the United States appears more inclined toward de-escalation and preventing the region from erupting into a full-blown war. Washington understands its strategic interests require containing the conflict, not expanding it. It prefers pursuing political and security arrangements that reduce the likelihood of a major confrontation. However, this approach clashes with Netanyahu’s desire to keep the region on the brink of conflagration, hoping to alter the facts on the ground or escape the demands of domestic politics.

Between heaven and earth, Netanyahu oscillates between the rhetoric of power and the reality of impotence, between his political ambitions and the limits of what military force can achieve. As for the region, it continues to pay the price for this oscillation, which has so far produced nothing but more tension and instability.

This article, written by Dr Adnan Naeem, an Israeli affairs expert, was published in the Arabic Maannews website and reprinted in crossfirearabia.com

Analyses

Iran: ‘Strategic Patience’ to ‘Sustained Confrontation’

marwan
June 7, 2026

By Najih Mohammad Ali

In a clear and direct language, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affirmed that regional “peace and stability will not be achieved unless there is withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories.” This stance followed Hezbollah’s Secretary-General’s rejection of the Washington talks, emphasizing his refusal to separate the arenas and the “Dahieh for the North” equation.

This statement expresses a coherent strategic vision that considers regional stability inextricably linked to ending occupations and aggressions. It places the defense of Lebanon, Syria, and the region among Iran’s political and military priorities.

This shift to a strategy of “eternal war”—or continuous confrontation—and reflects a pragmatic and principled decision made by Tehran after decades of pressure and aggression. Iran did not abandon the idea of a settlement in vain; rather, it realized that relying on partial agreements with Washington, which imposes unilateral conditions and disregards the rights of peoples, is no longer a viable option.

The cowardly assassination of Martyr Qassem Soleimani, followed by direct strikes targeting high-ranking Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, proved that relying solely on “strategic patience” is mistaken for weakness. Therefore, Iran has shifted to a doctrine of active deterrence based on the entire axis of resistance, making any aggression costly for its adversaries.

This transformation was not the result of the absolute dominance of a hardline faction, as Zionist-American narratives and their Arab proxies (and, of course, the Iranian opposition abroad) claim. Rather, it is a natural evolution of the Iranian elite that stood united in the face of external aggression.

After significant losses, the priority of maintaining national and revolutionary cohesion emerged. Defending revolutionary principles—exporting the spirit of resistance and confronting arrogance—has become an essential part of the regime’s identity that has become a source of strength to prevent internal collapse whilst uniting the people behind the leadership in the face of sanctions. Pragmatists and hardliners alike now agree that continued confrontation better protects national interests than concessions that could lead to disintegration.

The leaders of the Iranian regime believe—and I think they are right—that continuing the confrontation will yield greater strategic gains than any fragile peace agreement. History proves that America understands only the language of force and attrition. From Vietnam to Afghanistan, wars of attrition forced Washington to withdraw.

Today, the “Axis of Resistance” is cleverly applying this equation: Linking the arenas to prevent separate deals that would weaken Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen, and imposes a heavy price on its adversaries. Iranian diplomacy has been transformed into the diplomacy of the field, as General Soleimani envisioned, and is now a flexible tool that buys time and exposes the contradictions of the other side, while maintaining full military readiness.

The American-Israeli strikes have already altered Tehran’s calculations in favor of adopting an offensive-defensive posture. Instead of settling for limited responses, Iran is developing comprehensive deterrent capabilities through its natural allies, who represent the will of the region’s peoples in the face of occupation.

This is a calculated escalation, a precise strategic calculation based on resilience and strategic depth. Within the elite, a balance prevails between caution, fearing losses, and resolve, which sees resistance as the only path to dignity and independence.

Compared to the previous “strategic patience,” the strategy of sustained confrontation has proven effective in preserving battlefield gains and preventing the regional collapse of the resistance axis. It has succeeded in exhausting the enemy and strengthening internal unity, despite economic challenges primarily attributed to unjust sanctions, not Iranian policy.

The most serious risk facing this strategy lies in the possibility of miscalculation by adversaries and their attempts to impose a full-scale war, but Iran has repeatedly demonstrated an exceptional capacity for resilience and adaptation.

We are indeed facing a “simmering cold war,” where there is no false peace imposed by force, nor a total war that destroys everyone. This situation serves Iran and its axis because it maintains the strategic balance, prevents surrender, and opens the door to a comprehensive and just settlement based on withdrawal from occupied territories and respect for the sovereignty of states.

In conclusion, this “perpetual war” relies on the long-term vision of the Iranian character. It is not a whim, but an existential choice imposed by the ongoing aggression against Iran and the peoples of the region.

Iran is defending itself and the dignity of the nation, and affirms that true stability begins with ending aggression, occupation, and foreign interference. This path, despite its difficulties, reinforces Tehran’s position as an indispensable regional power and paves the way for a new balance of power that respects the rights of peoples. The region needs such firm stances to achieve an honorable peace, not surrender.

The author is a researcher in Iranian and regional affairs and this article is reproduced from the Arabic Al Rai Al Youm website and reprinted in crossfirearabia.com.