Mideast on War Footing: Is US Strike on Iran Coming?

As US military assets continue to move into the Middle East, analysts warn that Washington is edging closer to a possible confrontation with Iran, weighing options that range from intensified economic pressure and a naval blockade to direct military action.

Recent developments have heightened fears that a US-led escalation could be imminent.

“It’s looking increasingly likely that with this buildup of military assets, President Donald Trump – and probably the Israelis – are preparing for a military escalation against the Iranians,” Ryan Bohl, a senior Middle East and North Africa analyst at the RANE Network, told Anadolu.

On Wednesday, Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social that a “massive armada” was heading toward Iran, expressing hope that Tehran would “come to the table” and negotiate with Washington. He warned that the fleet was prepared to “rapidly fulfill its mission with speed and violence, if necessary.”

Trump said the deployment was larger than the one previously sent toward Venezuela and confirmed that it is led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, one of the world’s largest aircraft carriers, which hosts electronic-warfare aircraft capable of disrupting Iranian radar systems.

The New York Times reported that the carrier strike group is accompanied by three warships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, capable of long-range precision strikes. The US has also reportedly deployed around a dozen additional F-15E attack planes, along with Patriot and THAAD air-defense systems to protect against potential Iranian retaliation.

Steffan Watkins, a consultant specializing in tracking military ships and aircraft, said the US is also shipping supplies and deploying additional surveillance aircraft. “Preparations for operations targeting Iran appear to be underway,” he wrote Thursday on the American social media platform X.

“Time is running out,” Trump warned Iran, threatening that any future attack “will be far worse” than last year’s US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Although the rhetoric comes in the wake of Iran’s crackdown on protests, Bohl said Washington’s broader objective appears to be forcing changes in Iran’s foreign and security policies.

The goal is to see “if they can get Iran’s government to change its foreign policies, to give up on its missile program and its nuclear energy program,” he said.

Limited and targeted strikes

Analysts say one of the most likely military options under consideration is a campaign of limited, precision strikes targeting Iran’s military, missile and nuclear infrastructure.

“They could go after the missile program again – strike drones and missiles and manufacturing. They can try to destroy launchers, remains of Iran’s air force, some infrastructure related to the military-industrial complex,” Bohl told Anadolu.

During the 12-day war with Israel last June, the US struck three major Iranian nuclear facilities – Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan – using bunker-buster bombs, claiming the attacks crippled Iran’s nuclear program.

Bohl said it remains unclear whether Washington would allow Israel to initiate a new round of strikes or whether a joint US-Israeli campaign would unfold.

Another option, he added, would involve phased strikes rather than a single, overwhelming attack.

“We could be seeing a version of what we saw in Iraq back in the 1990s, where the US would strike Iraq, wait to see if that would create a concession process for the Iraqis and then strike again to try to again shift the Iraqis’ behavior,” he said. “And that could take weeks, even months to unfold.”

Blockade and attacks on infrastructure

Experts also suggested that the US might try to impose naval and aerial blockade on Iran.

“Imposing a new blockade on the Iranians and trying to seize their tankers like they did in Venezuela is escalatory,” Bohl said.

He added that Washington could also attempt to restrict Iranian airspace, limiting civilian flights in a bid to inflict economic damage.

“They could enhance their cyber campaign to try to cripple Iran’s infrastructure, particularly during this time where there’s still a lingering protest movement after those major crackdowns earlier this month,” he said. “So, disrupting infrastructure would also be a choice.”

The USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group could also be used to intercept Iranian oil tankers leaving the Persian Gulf, he added.

However, Scott Lucas, a professor of international politics at the Clinton Institute at University College Dublin, cautioned that a blockade and seizure of Iranian vessels could be challenging.

“I think it would be very risky for the US to do what it’s done with Venezuela, which is to seize Iranian oil tankers,” he said.

“I think the prospect of that setting off a regional crisis is much greater, especially since Iran has the capacity to close off the Strait of Hormuz, and about 20% of the world’s oil supply goes through that waterway.”

Broad escalation and strikes on leadership

Analysts also warned that Washington could opt for a broader military campaign aimed at severely degrading Iran’s leadership and command structure.

“We are seeing reports that President Trump wants something ‘decisive,’ which is more of a major campaign to probably attack as many targets as possible and increasingly consider assassinations of top Revolutionary Guards and even some of the leadership like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,” said Bohl.

Such an approach could include attacks on senior commanders within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, political leadership nodes, and command-and-control infrastructure, analysts said.

Experts warned that efforts aimed at full regime change would almost certainly provoke retaliation against US forces and allies across the Middle East.

Bohl added that Trump believes Iran’s deterrence has comprehensively failed, as their missiles and drones have not stopped previous attacks.

“He (Trump) may believe that Iran isn’t able to carry out those sorts of comprehensive strikes on energy infrastructure,” he said. “That would encourage him to go on into a larger and more substantial campaign.”

Targeted assassinations and covert operations

A more limited alternative would involve targeted assassinations and covert operations rather than an overt large-scale war.

While analysts largely rule out a full US ground invasion of Iran, Bohl said Trump has demonstrated a preference for deploying special forces on high-risk missions.

“President Trump ran on a platform of avoiding another Iraq war, but he is very commando-happy and he likes to use his special forces,” said Bohl.

Such operations could include the destruction of high-value military targets or the assassination of individuals linked to Iran’s missile, drone or nuclear programs, analysts said.

“They have targeted Iranian leaders in the past. They assassinated the leader of the Quds Force … Gen. Qasem Soleimani at the start of 2020,” Lucas explained.

Bohl also pointed to US actions in Venezuela and North Korea as examples of attempts to apply pressure through targeted operations rather than regime-wide campaigns.

However, Bohl said that a repeat of Venezuela, where Washington reaches an understanding with the regime and takes out key leaders, does not appear to be a “viable option” in the case of Iran.

More economic pressure

Iran’s economy continues to be heavily constrained by sanctions. Earlier this month, the US announced an additional 25% tariff on countries trading with Tehran and imposed new sanctions on vessels and companies accused of transporting Iranian oil.

Bohl said Washington may seek to further destabilize Iran economically in hopes of forcing it back to negotiations.

The idea is to crack Iran’s politics by causing more economic damage and pushing them toward what are essentially surrender terms, he said.

Iran is already grappling with a severe economic crisis, marked by the rapid devaluation of the rial, which helped trigger nationwide protests late last December.

Lucas, however, argued that additional sanctions may have limited effect without broad international support.

“I think the Trump folks can bluster a bit, but they really can only tighten sanctions if they have international action on the sanctions,” he said, adding that countries such as Russia and China are unlikely to support further pressure.


What comes next

Analysts said several indicators could signal whether the US is moving closer to escalation.

Bohl said warning signs include commercial airlines avoiding Iranian airspace, the evacuation of foreign embassies, travel advisories urging civilians to leave Iran, and Israeli authorities placing the population on heightened alert.

He added that the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln in the US Central Command area of responsibility significantly shortens the timeline for potential action.

Given that Iran has already been struck in previous confrontations and that tensions remain extremely high, any move could rapidly spiral.

“Because it is kind of an undeclared war between the two sides already, it could really turn on a dime and begin sudden escalation,” Bohl warned.

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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Trump, Netanyahu Rift Hits Rock Bottom: View From Amman

By Saleem Ayoub Quna

The Epic Fury Operation launched by the US against Iran in February 2026, will go down in modern history as the first open military conflict, where a superpower like the United States, has willingly and openly played the role of a war-proxy, on behalf of its smaller ally, Israel.

The difference of attitude between the two close allies, US and Israel, in relation to what they perceived as Iran’s threat, imminent or potential, was a key factor behind the gradual crumbling of the American-Israeli coordinated military and intelligence efforts, to bring down the regime in Tehran.


Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu’s extreme right-wing government, kept saying Iran posed an imminent existential threat to Israel, and therefore it must be brought down by force. While the US position was constrained by its previous international commitments on the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as stipulated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and the P5+1 powers, during the administration of President Obama.


Since that moment Netanyahu kept vigorously urging, more likely lecturing the US and the West, on the dangers of the JCOPA agreement. When Donald Trump was elected President in 2017, things took an important and completely different turn. In the following year, he took the United States out of that internationally-backed deal as he had promised to do during his election campaign. He also kept his promises of moving the US Embassy to Occupied Jerusalem and recognize the occupied Syrian Golan Heights as part of Israel.


These symbolic and important gestures, whetted Netanyahu’s appetite for more American concessions to Israeli demands.


Netanyahu’s golden opportunity came when Trump was re-elected to his second term in 2023, the same year when Hamas launched its massive assault on the Israeli settlements in the so-called “Gaza enevlope”. Other militias connected and supported by Iran, including the Houthis in north Yemen, Hezbollah in south Lebanon, Syria under the previous regime and Shia factions in Iraq coordinated their efforts to stand by Hamas during that long and unprecedented confrontation with Israel.

For its part, Iran did not shy from making it clear that it helped create this “chain” of resistance factions to encircle Israel from three directions.

The second turning magical point in the US position on the issue of direct military intervention against Iran came about when Israel succeeded in serving Hezbollah, the severest military blow ever, in the pagers’ operation and the subsequent assassination of Hezbollah’s top leaders, including its charismatic Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on Sept 27, 2024.


Trump was very impressed with all of that Israeli action and Netanyahu gave himself the full credit for this unexpected success.


Accordingly, Netanyahu’s plan to Trump was simple. Based on the Israeli accumulated intelligence and expertise on the Iranian internal scene and emulating its operation against Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon, accompanied by massive American air strikes would provide both allies with the best chance to finish the Ayatollahs in Tehran once and for all!


But as events unfolded, all of Netanyahu’s plans, personally and strongly endorsed by Trump and his military aides, suddenly started crumbling, one after the other. His relations with Trump slipped into stages of deterioration by the day and week as the closure of the Hormuz Strait by Iran, started hurting the world economy led by the US.


Here new red lights went on and the phone calls between the two men became more intense and vulgar. Then Trump decided to pass on the torch to his deputy, JD Vance, who seemed comfortable to tell Netanyahu what Trump avoided to do!


Conclusion: It is tricky to switch roles of allies in wars. A smaller entity can always stay safe as long as its leaders know the limits of their power and leverage. When people like Netanyahu think they have more power and clout than they actually have, versus their stronger ally, then irritation starts to brew, especially in the case of Trump who likes to show he is always in the driving seat. It also means that the leadership on the side of stronger partner has some problems of its own!


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Will The US-Iran Deal Last?

By Ali Bakir

On June 15, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced via the US social media platform X that a peace deal between the US and Iran had been reached, following over two months of mediation by his country. Sharif expressed gratitude to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye for their significant contributions, stating that the official signing ceremony would take place on June 19 in Switzerland. Following this announcement, a memorandum of understanding was signed electronically by US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance on the US side, and by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on the Iranian side.

The reported agreement is characterized as a framework peace deal aimed at ending the 2026 Israel/US-Iran war and transitioning the current ceasefire into a broader diplomatic process. Although the text of the agreement has not yet been published, key reported elements include immediate cessation of military operations, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, and a 60-day negotiation period to address unresolved issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, alongside discussions on sanctions relief and access to frozen Iranian assets during follow-up negotiations.

This agreement follows two significant developments. First, Israel conducted military strikes on Iranian targets in western and central Iran around a week ago, marking the first such actions since April. Explosions were reported in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and other cities in response to Iranian missile launches that were highly performative. Second, Trump warned that Iran would “pay the price” for what he described as slow progress in negotiations to end the conflict, indicating that the US could resume strikes against Iranian infrastructure.

5 bullet points on the agreement

Although the agreement does not necessarily mean that the root causes that prompted the war have fully disappeared, a few observations are worth mentioning and analyzing.

First, a lot of narrative spinning is occurring publicly at the moment. While the main parties are trying to sell the agreement as a victory, there are factions within the broader regional camps (such as hardliners in both Iran and Israel) that oppose it. Critics in Iran have labeled the agreement a “humiliating capitulation,” arguing that it involves unjustified concessions. Hardline opponents have publicly criticized the negotiating team, with Iranian MP Mahmoud Nabavian stating that the latest draft is “more damaging” than previous versions. Similarly, Israeli officials emphasized that Israel was not directly involved in negotiating the US–Iran deal and does not necessarily consider itself bound by its provisions. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that Israel would not withdraw from territory seized in Lebanon and would continue to act against threats from Hezbollah and Iran if necessary.

Second, the timing of the agreement suggests that Iran was running out of options. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) focused on messaging and performative measures, the gap between their narrative and reality widened, with Iran’s ability to endure further pressure significantly diminishing. Trump’s counter-blockade against Iran’s restriction of the Strait of Hormuz imposed significant economic costs on Iran, leading to the decision to sign the agreement. It is estimated that the blockade could have cost Iran over $24 billion in just two months — almost equal to Iran’s reported total reserves of foreign currency — leaving the regime with little choice but to agree to the terms or face economic collapse.

Third, despite the negative reactions from hardliners in both Iran and Israel, the agreement highlights Trump’s genuine interest in reaching a resolution with Iran, especially following last year’s swift 12-day war between Israel and Iran. However, radical elements in both Iran and Israel seem intent on using procrastination, escalation, or military actions to sabotage meaningful attempts to achieve peace. Given that there is reportedly a 60-day negotiation period following the signing of the agreement, it is likely that these factions will continue to work against a comprehensive resolution.

Fourth, while Pakistan played a significant role in the mediation process, Qatar’s involvement was also crucial, as acknowledged by American, Pakistani, Saudi, and Turkish officials. Notably, neither the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman nor the ministry itself reported any independent measures taken by Qatar, apart from endorsing Pakistan’s mediation efforts. In fact, a Qatari spokesman denied any independent role in the mediation at this stage. Qatar’s involvement appears to have been executed at the request of the United States and had several dimensions.

Primarily, Qatar facilitated technical issues between the US and Iran, such as enabling the transfer of Iranian funds without direct US involvement, thereby avoiding the perception of it being a US initiative or taxpayer-funded. Additionally, Qatar played a role in establishing a communication channel between the United Arab Emirates and Iran, which emerged later in the mediation process. Finally, Qatar aligned itself with Saudi Arabia’s position, providing support for the Pakistani initiative.

Changing actors

Fifth, two awkward positions regarding the agreement can be highlighted. Firstly, the Europeans have been largely inactive in resolving the crisis yet somehow managed to host the official signing ceremony between the Americans and Iranians. Instead of crediting Pakistan, Switzerland offered to host the ceremony, which can be seen as an act of opportunism. Secondly, Oman, historically a favored mediator between the US and Iran, has been notably absent from this current arrangement. Oman’s position during this war was not popular in the Gulf Cooperation Council and beyond. According to a senior US administration official, Oman was removed from its mediation role in negotiations with Iran after the US concluded that Muscat had acted “very duplicitously” during the talks.

Finally, we must approach the prospects of the agreement with caution. It is essential to recognize that this is not a comprehensive peace agreement but rather a transitional framework. The future of the agreement will largely depend on the outcomes of negotiations in the next 60 days. Given that several factions within Iran and Israel are opposed to the agreement, we should not dismiss the possibility of sabotage, particularly from Israel.

Ali Bakir is an assistant professor of international affairs, security, and defense at Qatar University and senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Anadolu

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