Netanyahu, Iran and The ‘Destructive’ Israeli Personality

By Dr Adnan Naeem

The recent escalation between Israel and Iran suggests that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is currently experiencing one of his most complex and perplexing political moments. The man who has long relied on military force as a tool to resolve conflicts and impose realities now finds himself besieged by outcomes that fall short of his stated objectives and the immense cost borne by the entire region.

In Gaza, after months of war, destruction, and continuous military operations by the Israeli army, fundamental questions remain unanswered: Where is the victory promised to the Israelis? Where are the strategic achievements that justified the continuation of the war? The Gaza battle was transformed from a project for a swift resolution into an open-ended war of attrition, with the political, security, and humanitarian costs increasing daily and rapidly.

As for the northern front (Lebanon), Netanyahu has failed to impose the equations he repeatedly wanted to create. Instead of restoring Israel’s image of deterrence, new realities have emerged confirming that the region does not respond to threats, and that the power balance has become far too complex to be determined by the rhetoric of force or displays of military capability.

At the heart of these shifts, Iran has emerged as a model distinct from the many adversaries Israel has traditionally dealt with. Tehran does not merely declare its right to retaliate; it exercises this right whenever it perceives its interests or sovereignty are threatened. The recent regional confrontations demonstrated that a policy of threats is no longer sufficient to subdue or deter adversaries while military calculations have become far more costly and complex than Netanyahu imagined.

It is to be noted while Netanyahu sometimes speaks of opportunities for negotiation or security and political arrangements, he at the same time continues to generate the conditions for escalation. How can peace be built while the circle of confrontation widens? And how can the world be convinced of the seriousness of the political process when the language of force remains the sole instrument for managing the conflict?

He appears like a cunning fox, claiming to be engaged in negotiations for  peace but focusing on security matters rather than the political file. The security file establishes a limited, relative stability, not a lasting one, waiting to reignite conflict in the region, particularly on the Lebanese front.

Netanyahu works on downplaying and delaying the importance of resolving the political issue first. He thus evades political obligations and commitments under international pressure regarding Lebanese rights for instance, most importantly ( is a complete withdrawal, even from the Shebaa Farms, demarcation of borders, including maritime borders, and Lebanese rights to the gas fields off the Lebanese coast – the Karish field).

This contradiction reveals a crisis deeper than a mere disagreement over military tactics; it reflects a personal political predicament facing Netanyahu. He understands – as he approaches the general elections – that a ceasefire could open the door to domestic accountability regarding security and political failures, and could revive questions about his political future, not to mention corruption cases and crises such as his dismantling of the judicial system and the conscription of Haredim. Therefore, it seems the continuation of the tension gives him more room to maneuver than political compromises would.

Within Israel itself, and as the general elections approaches, the gap between Netanyahu and growing segments of society widens. The opposition is gaining strength, protests continue unabated and the families of fallen and wounded soldiers are raising their voices in an unprecedented manner. Meanwhile, criticism is mounting from security and military figures who believe the government lacks a clear vision to resolve the crisis.

Today, Netanyahu’s image resembles that of his missiles: Soaring into the sky, creating a deafening roar, but quickly returning to reality, where difficult questions and stubborn facts await him. Wars may postpone crises, but they do not eliminate them, and escalation may temporarily alter the landscape, but it does not create a lasting victory.

Conversely, the United States appears more inclined toward de-escalation and preventing the region from erupting into a full-blown war. Washington understands its strategic interests require containing the conflict, not expanding it. It prefers pursuing political and security arrangements that reduce the likelihood of a major confrontation. However, this approach clashes with Netanyahu’s desire to keep the region on the brink of conflagration, hoping to alter the facts on the ground or escape the demands of domestic politics.

Between heaven and earth, Netanyahu oscillates between the rhetoric of power and the reality of impotence, between his political ambitions and the limits of what military force can achieve. As for the region, it continues to pay the price for this oscillation, which has so far produced nothing but more tension and instability.

This article, written by Dr Adnan Naeem, an Israeli affairs expert, was published in the Arabic  Maannews website and reprinted in crossfirearabia.com

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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Trump, Netanyahu Rift Hits Rock Bottom: View From Amman

By Saleem Ayoub Quna

The Epic Fury Operation launched by the US against Iran in February 2026, will go down in modern history as the first open military conflict, where a superpower like the United States, has willingly and openly played the role of a war-proxy, on behalf of its smaller ally, Israel.

The difference of attitude between the two close allies, US and Israel, in relation to what they perceived as Iran’s threat, imminent or potential, was a key factor behind the gradual crumbling of the American-Israeli coordinated military and intelligence efforts, to bring down the regime in Tehran.


Israel under Benjamin Netanyahu’s extreme right-wing government, kept saying Iran posed an imminent existential threat to Israel, and therefore it must be brought down by force. While the US position was constrained by its previous international commitments on the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as stipulated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed between Iran and the P5+1 powers, during the administration of President Obama.


Since that moment Netanyahu kept vigorously urging, more likely lecturing the US and the West, on the dangers of the JCOPA agreement. When Donald Trump was elected President in 2017, things took an important and completely different turn. In the following year, he took the United States out of that internationally-backed deal as he had promised to do during his election campaign. He also kept his promises of moving the US Embassy to Occupied Jerusalem and recognize the occupied Syrian Golan Heights as part of Israel.


These symbolic and important gestures, whetted Netanyahu’s appetite for more American concessions to Israeli demands.


Netanyahu’s golden opportunity came when Trump was re-elected to his second term in 2023, the same year when Hamas launched its massive assault on the Israeli settlements in the so-called “Gaza enevlope”. Other militias connected and supported by Iran, including the Houthis in north Yemen, Hezbollah in south Lebanon, Syria under the previous regime and Shia factions in Iraq coordinated their efforts to stand by Hamas during that long and unprecedented confrontation with Israel.

For its part, Iran did not shy from making it clear that it helped create this “chain” of resistance factions to encircle Israel from three directions.

The second turning magical point in the US position on the issue of direct military intervention against Iran came about when Israel succeeded in serving Hezbollah, the severest military blow ever, in the pagers’ operation and the subsequent assassination of Hezbollah’s top leaders, including its charismatic Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on Sept 27, 2024.


Trump was very impressed with all of that Israeli action and Netanyahu gave himself the full credit for this unexpected success.


Accordingly, Netanyahu’s plan to Trump was simple. Based on the Israeli accumulated intelligence and expertise on the Iranian internal scene and emulating its operation against Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon, accompanied by massive American air strikes would provide both allies with the best chance to finish the Ayatollahs in Tehran once and for all!


But as events unfolded, all of Netanyahu’s plans, personally and strongly endorsed by Trump and his military aides, suddenly started crumbling, one after the other. His relations with Trump slipped into stages of deterioration by the day and week as the closure of the Hormuz Strait by Iran, started hurting the world economy led by the US.


Here new red lights went on and the phone calls between the two men became more intense and vulgar. Then Trump decided to pass on the torch to his deputy, JD Vance, who seemed comfortable to tell Netanyahu what Trump avoided to do!


Conclusion: It is tricky to switch roles of allies in wars. A smaller entity can always stay safe as long as its leaders know the limits of their power and leverage. When people like Netanyahu think they have more power and clout than they actually have, versus their stronger ally, then irritation starts to brew, especially in the case of Trump who likes to show he is always in the driving seat. It also means that the leadership on the side of stronger partner has some problems of its own!


Whether it is a wrangle, rift, collision, divorce or worse between Trump and Netanyahu, we will not know for certain, until the negotiators in Switzerland close their files and head back home!

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Will The US-Iran Deal Last?

By Ali Bakir

On June 15, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced via the US social media platform X that a peace deal between the US and Iran had been reached, following over two months of mediation by his country. Sharif expressed gratitude to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye for their significant contributions, stating that the official signing ceremony would take place on June 19 in Switzerland. Following this announcement, a memorandum of understanding was signed electronically by US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance on the US side, and by Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on the Iranian side.

The reported agreement is characterized as a framework peace deal aimed at ending the 2026 Israel/US-Iran war and transitioning the current ceasefire into a broader diplomatic process. Although the text of the agreement has not yet been published, key reported elements include immediate cessation of military operations, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, and a 60-day negotiation period to address unresolved issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, alongside discussions on sanctions relief and access to frozen Iranian assets during follow-up negotiations.

This agreement follows two significant developments. First, Israel conducted military strikes on Iranian targets in western and central Iran around a week ago, marking the first such actions since April. Explosions were reported in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and other cities in response to Iranian missile launches that were highly performative. Second, Trump warned that Iran would “pay the price” for what he described as slow progress in negotiations to end the conflict, indicating that the US could resume strikes against Iranian infrastructure.

5 bullet points on the agreement

Although the agreement does not necessarily mean that the root causes that prompted the war have fully disappeared, a few observations are worth mentioning and analyzing.

First, a lot of narrative spinning is occurring publicly at the moment. While the main parties are trying to sell the agreement as a victory, there are factions within the broader regional camps (such as hardliners in both Iran and Israel) that oppose it. Critics in Iran have labeled the agreement a “humiliating capitulation,” arguing that it involves unjustified concessions. Hardline opponents have publicly criticized the negotiating team, with Iranian MP Mahmoud Nabavian stating that the latest draft is “more damaging” than previous versions. Similarly, Israeli officials emphasized that Israel was not directly involved in negotiating the US–Iran deal and does not necessarily consider itself bound by its provisions. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that Israel would not withdraw from territory seized in Lebanon and would continue to act against threats from Hezbollah and Iran if necessary.

Second, the timing of the agreement suggests that Iran was running out of options. As the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) focused on messaging and performative measures, the gap between their narrative and reality widened, with Iran’s ability to endure further pressure significantly diminishing. Trump’s counter-blockade against Iran’s restriction of the Strait of Hormuz imposed significant economic costs on Iran, leading to the decision to sign the agreement. It is estimated that the blockade could have cost Iran over $24 billion in just two months — almost equal to Iran’s reported total reserves of foreign currency — leaving the regime with little choice but to agree to the terms or face economic collapse.

Third, despite the negative reactions from hardliners in both Iran and Israel, the agreement highlights Trump’s genuine interest in reaching a resolution with Iran, especially following last year’s swift 12-day war between Israel and Iran. However, radical elements in both Iran and Israel seem intent on using procrastination, escalation, or military actions to sabotage meaningful attempts to achieve peace. Given that there is reportedly a 60-day negotiation period following the signing of the agreement, it is likely that these factions will continue to work against a comprehensive resolution.

Fourth, while Pakistan played a significant role in the mediation process, Qatar’s involvement was also crucial, as acknowledged by American, Pakistani, Saudi, and Turkish officials. Notably, neither the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman nor the ministry itself reported any independent measures taken by Qatar, apart from endorsing Pakistan’s mediation efforts. In fact, a Qatari spokesman denied any independent role in the mediation at this stage. Qatar’s involvement appears to have been executed at the request of the United States and had several dimensions.

Primarily, Qatar facilitated technical issues between the US and Iran, such as enabling the transfer of Iranian funds without direct US involvement, thereby avoiding the perception of it being a US initiative or taxpayer-funded. Additionally, Qatar played a role in establishing a communication channel between the United Arab Emirates and Iran, which emerged later in the mediation process. Finally, Qatar aligned itself with Saudi Arabia’s position, providing support for the Pakistani initiative.

Changing actors

Fifth, two awkward positions regarding the agreement can be highlighted. Firstly, the Europeans have been largely inactive in resolving the crisis yet somehow managed to host the official signing ceremony between the Americans and Iranians. Instead of crediting Pakistan, Switzerland offered to host the ceremony, which can be seen as an act of opportunism. Secondly, Oman, historically a favored mediator between the US and Iran, has been notably absent from this current arrangement. Oman’s position during this war was not popular in the Gulf Cooperation Council and beyond. According to a senior US administration official, Oman was removed from its mediation role in negotiations with Iran after the US concluded that Muscat had acted “very duplicitously” during the talks.

Finally, we must approach the prospects of the agreement with caution. It is essential to recognize that this is not a comprehensive peace agreement but rather a transitional framework. The future of the agreement will largely depend on the outcomes of negotiations in the next 60 days. Given that several factions within Iran and Israel are opposed to the agreement, we should not dismiss the possibility of sabotage, particularly from Israel.

Ali Bakir is an assistant professor of international affairs, security, and defense at Qatar University and senior nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Anadolu

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