US-Israel: More Than a Crack in Relations

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The significance of the recent vote in the U.S. House of Representatives does not lie in its immediate outcome. The amendment introduced by Republican Congressman Thomas Massie to suspend roughly $3.3 billion in annual U.S. military aid to Israel was defeated by a comfortable margin, 314 votes to 104. The real surprise, however, was that 103 Democratic lawmakers voted in favor of the proposal, representing more than half of the Democrats who cast either a “yes” or “no” vote. This is difficult to dismiss as a passing protest or as the position of the party’s progressive fringe alone.

The more revealing development is that a number of those lawmakers had, until recently, been considered acceptable allies by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), with several having previously received its endorsement and political support. Yet immediately after the vote, online fundraising for fifteen of those members seeking re-election quietly disappeared from AIPAC’s donation platform. Their names remained listed among “pro-Israel” legislators, but the financial pipeline had effectively been shut off.

Against this backdrop, Vice President J.D. Vance’s recent remarks become particularly significant. Vance did not merely criticize specific Israeli policies. Speaking on Joe Rogan’s podcast, he accused elements within the Israeli government of attempting to derail U.S. negotiations with Iran and prolong the military campaign. He also referred to financial and political influence campaigns aimed at attacking American officials whose priority, in his view, was to place U.S. national interests above all else.

The debate over Israel is therefore evolving from two seemingly opposite directions that ultimately converge on the same question. Progressive Democrats approach the issue through the lens of Gaza, human rights, and the costs of unconditional American support. At the same time, an emerging current within the Republican populist right approaches it through the doctrine of “America First,” skepticism toward endless wars, and growing reluctance to see the United States become the permanent financier and guarantor of conflicts largely shaped by its allies.

This does not mean that either party is suddenly turning against Israel, nor does it suggest that the U.S.-Israel strategic alliance is on the verge of collapse. America’s military, intelligence, and institutional commitments remain deeply entrenched. What is changing, however, is the old bipartisan consensus.

Within the Democratic Party, divisions have become increasingly visible. Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries opposed the amendment, while senior Democratic figures, including Nancy Pelosi and Katherine Clark, voted in favor of it. Even J Street—the liberal pro-Israel organization that opposed the amendment itself—acknowledged that the vote represented a politically significant moment.

Republicans, meanwhile, remain broadly supportive of Israel, particularly within the party’s traditional conservative and evangelical base. For precisely that reason, Vance’s comments provoked unusually fierce criticism from Republican politicians and conservative media, who viewed them as a departure from long-standing party orthodoxy. Yet the very existence of such a dispute suggests that Israel is no longer entirely beyond debate, even within the constituency historically regarded as its strongest American supporter.

Here lies the central paradox of the current moment. Benjamin Netanyahu sought to use the Gaza war to reshape the Middle East while capitalizing on what had become an unprecedentedly close relationship with the Trump administration. Yet Israel’s successive wars—from Gaza to Lebanon and later Iran—have produced an unexpected consequence: they have triggered a broader American conversation about costs rather than strategic necessity.

Increasingly, the central question in Washington is becoming less about Israel’s security and more about America’s own national interest. Why should the United States continue to bear the financial, military, political, and diplomatic costs of these conflicts? And who ultimately determines when America enters a war—or when it leaves one?

Even the personal relationship between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu has not escaped these contradictions. After a period of remarkable military coordination, differences emerged as Trump sought negotiations with Iran and an end to the conflict, while Netanyahu’s government viewed continued military pressure as an opportunity to pursue broader strategic objectives. What had appeared to be an exceptionally close partnership gradually evolved into a more complicated relationship marked by disagreements over ceasefires, Lebanon, and the parameters of any future understanding with Tehran.

Israel thus finds itself confronting a profound strategic paradox. It has reached perhaps the highest level of military integration with the United States in its history, while simultaneously experiencing one of the lowest levels of political acceptance among growing segments of the American public and political establishment.

The first major war fought in such close strategic coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv may well have achieved important military objectives. Yet it also accelerated the erosion of the old bipartisan consensus, reopening fundamental questions about money, influence, and the independence of American decision-making. In that sense, Israel may have won battles on the battlefield while beginning to lose something far more consequential in Washington.

The writer is a Jordan Times columnist

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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‘No Need For Your Crocodile Tears’
  • HebaHeba
  • August 13, 2026

By Ismail Al Sharif

“I’ll say it frankly: We should have exerted more pressure on Israel to adopt a different approach in Gaza” – Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor to ex-President Joe Biden.

A striking phenomenon is recurring in American politics: Some presidents, cabinet members, and senior officials become more outspoken in their stances toward the Israeli occupation entity after leaving office, expressing regret for decisions that contributed to the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people.

This may be due to their liberation from diplomatic and partisan constraints, the pressures of Zionist lobbies, and the influence of tainted money, or perhaps their consciences awaken belatedly as they feel closer to death, realizing the enormity of the injustice they participated in or condoned.

Examples of this are numerous. Among the most prominent is former US President Jimmy Carter, who, after leaving office, shifted from a traditional pro-Zionist rhetoric to criticizing the Israeli occupation and its policies. Then there is Chuck Hagel, former US Secretary of Defense, who held the United States responsible for the Zionists’ continued aggression and described their practices as terrorism— but only after his retirement, of course.

Robert Gates, the former Secretary of Defense, also criticized war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu, calling him ungrateful.

More recently, Jake Sullivan, former National Security Advisor, and Antony Blinken, Biden’s lackluster Secretary of State, joined the ranks of those who have expressed regret. Both men have blood on their hands from the blood of Palestinian children and played a shameful role in supporting the Israeli entity during one of the greatest acts of genocide in modern history.

This was revealed in a lengthy investigation published in The New Yorker magazine last 20th July, titled “How Biden Enabled Israel’s Aggression Against Gaza – and Iran,” with the subtitle: “Top officials from the previous Administration now express regret over their failure to rein in Netanyahu.”

However, this regret will not absolve them for they knew full well that the Zionists were committing genocide in Gaza. On 5 March, 2024, five months after the start of the genocide, Mirjana Spoljarić, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), sent a confidential letter to President Biden. The ICRC, in addition to its humanitarian mission, is obligated under the Geneva Conventions to provide states with information and advice to help them avoid committing war crimes.

In her letter, Spoljarić reminded President Biden that the organization had condemned the “horrific” massacre perpetrated by Hamas against Israelis on 7 October 2023 and that it had continued to press the movement “tirelessly” for the release of the “hostages” it was holding.

However, this time she appealed to Biden with “grave concern,” warning that Israel, which had continued to bombard Gaza with heavy munitions since that October, was ignoring the ICRC in an unprecedented manner.

In her letter, she wrote: “The way Israel conducts hostilities is inconsistent with the laws of armed conflict, particularly the obligations to protect civilians, to distinguish between military objectives on the one hand and civilians and civilian infrastructure on the other, to ensure the humane treatment of detainees and the dead, to protect medical facilities and personnel, and to provide and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.”

Despite these clear warnings, the United States remained a key partner in the genocide, providing weapons, money, and political and international cover to Israel. And now some of its officials come to shed crocodile tears for the children of Gaza!

I say to them: You have no right to repent now, after all these martyrs, after all these tragedies, to say: “We are sorry, we made a mistake.” You knew, and you had the power to pressure and prevent, but you chose to support, arm, and cover up. You bear the burden of what happened, and the blood of the children of Gaza will haunt you and pursue your names to the dustbin of history.

This piece by Ismail Al Sharif was originally published in the Arabic Addustour daily and reprinted in English in Crossfirearabia.com.

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Is There a New Regional Order Emerging?

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The trilateral Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement, signed in Mecca last Friday and already being referred to as the “Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement,” should not be seen as just another diplomatic event in the region’s long history of security arrangements. What took place at Al-Safa Palace—where Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif agreed that an armed attack against any one of their countries would be considered an attack against all three—may signal the beginning of a new phase in Middle Eastern politics: one that could reshape regional alliances and, more importantly, the region’s relationship with the major powers.

The immediate context is clear. The agreement comes amid renewed US-Iranian tensions and escalating Houthi threats. But interpreting it simply as an attempt to “protect Saudi Arabia from Iran” misses the larger strategic picture. What is emerging goes beyond the immediate Iranian question. It points toward an effort to construct a regional order that is less dependent on the binary that has dominated Middle Eastern geopolitics for years: the US-Israeli axis on one side and Iran and its network of allies on the other.

There is another important dimension. The agreement effectively redraws the geopolitical boundaries of the Middle East by bringing Pakistan more directly into its security architecture while consolidating Turkey’s role as a central regional actor. This represents a departure from the conventional understanding of the regional system as primarily comprising the Arab states, Iran, Israel and Turkey. It comes, moreover, at a moment of profound transformation following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the weakening of the old division between the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” and the traditional Arab “moderate camp.

In practical terms, the new arrangement offers a different model—one that could provide regional powers with greater strategic and security autonomy. In that sense, it differs fundamentally from the regional vision advanced by President Donald Trump through the Abraham Accords, in which Israel occupies a central position in a US-backed regional security architecture. After the Gaza war, that model increasingly raises another question: whether integration with Israel means accepting not only normalization, but also an Israeli claim to military primacy in the region.

Seen from this perspective, the trilateral alliance may be less about confronting Iran than about challenging the underlying logic of the Abraham Accords.This may also explain Benjamin Netanyahu’s warnings several months ago about the emergence of what he described as a “radical Sunni axis.” Israel, meanwhile, has been pursuing its own countervailing network of partnerships. India—Pakistan’s historic rival—has become increasingly important in this calculus, alongside Israel’s strategic relationships with Greece and Cyprus and, more recently, Argentina. These relationships serve strategic purposes of their own, but they also help Israel counter the growing perception of regional isolation in the aftermath of the Gaza war.

Nor should the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani framework necessarily be viewed as a closed alliance. It has the potential to evolve into a broader regional umbrella centred on the Middle East’s increasingly influential middle powers. Other Arab states could eventually find a place within such a framework, including Jordan, Qatar and Egypt, and perhaps even Syria, which now faces Israeli military encroachment and the occupation of additional territory in its south following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Barry Buzan’s theory of regional security complexes provides a useful lens through which to understand the significance of this development. From this perspective, the emerging alignment represents change on three interconnected levels.

First, it expands the geopolitical boundaries of the Middle Eastern regional security complex, particularly by integrating Pakistan more directly into its strategic calculations. Second, it intensifies competition over the hierarchy of regional power: which states will emerge as the principal poles of influence within this enlarged security system? And third, it forces a reconsideration of the familiar categories of alliance, rivalry and cooperation that have shaped our understanding of Middle Eastern politics for decades.

The significance of the Mecca Agreement, therefore, lies not only in what the three countries have formally committed themselves to, but in what the agreement potentially represents: the search for a regional security architecture that is neither entirely dependent on Washington nor organized around Israel, while at the same time avoiding subordination to an Iranian-led regional order.

Yet this is precisely where the real questions begin. The agreement faces three major tests. The first is whether it can move beyond political declarations towards credible institutional and military mechanisms. The second is whether Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan can develop a sufficiently coherent strategic agenda despite their different interests, alliances and regional priorities. The third—and ultimately decisive—test will come when one of the three countries faces an actual security crisis and collective commitments collide with the national calculations of the other two.

The Mecca Agreement may indeed mark an important turning point in the architecture of Middle Eastern security. But regional orders are not created by communiqués alone. Between declaring an alliance and proving that it exists lies the most difficult test of all: what its members are prepared to do when their commitments carry a real political and strategic cost.

By Mohammad Abu Rumman is a columnist in The Jordan Times

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