Putting The Cart Before The Horse

With the approach of the Cairo Summit to discuss the Palestinian issue and the reconstruction of Gaza, Arab leaders find themselves facing three main scenarios to make decisive decisions that determine the future of Gaza and the fate of the Palestinians the day after the cessation of the war. The dilemma is no longer limited to reconstruction only but also includes the political and administrative arrangements that ensure the stability of the sector and prevent the recurrence of the devastating conflict.

From the American side, it seems that the Trump administration is adopting a more stringent approach, as it recently stated the necessity of displacing Palestinians from Gaza as a “solution” to ensure regional security, which reflects its traditional position biased towards Israel and complicates any Arab efforts to find an independent solution for the sector.

 This American position raises great concerns in Arab and international circles, given the disastrous consequences it carries for the Palestinians and the entire region, especially in light of the widespread international rejection of forced displacement policies.

The first scenario involves adopting a comprehensive regional solution led by Arabs, aiming to place Gaza under temporary Arab administration, which may include Egypt and perhaps some Gulf states, in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. In this scenario, a transitional body would be established to administer the Strip, which would undertake reconstruction operations, organize basic services, and reorganize the security situation in a way that prevents the recurrence of the conflict. 

This body could also work to pave the way for comprehensive Palestinian elections to be held later, so that Gaza would be part of a unified Palestinian entity. 

This temporary administration would work to restructure institutions within the Strip, ensure the regular provision of health and education services, and rehabilitate infrastructure damaged by the war. It would also undertake the tasks of securing the crossings and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, while imposing strict control to prevent the infiltration of any elements that might contribute to destabilization. 

It is expected that the contributing Arab states would have different roles, as Egypt could handle security aspects, while the Gulf states would contribute to financing and reconstruction. This option requires Arab and international consensus, as well as internal Palestinian acceptance, which may be difficult in light of the differences between the factions. 

Israel may not view this scenario favorably, as it strengthens the Arab role in Gaza and limits its influence there. In addition, the success of this scenario depends on the Arabs’ ability to impose a unified vision and work to reduce external interventions that may hinder this solution. Ultimately, this scenario remains a realistic option, but it is fraught with challenges that require active diplomacy and strong political will.

As for the second scenario, it is to support the restructuring of the Palestinian Authority and grant it full control over Gaza after reaching internal understandings with the various factions, including Hamas. In this framework, the security services are integrated into a unified framework under the supervision of the Authority, and the administrative institutions are unified, with an Arab and international commitment to provide financial and logistical support to ensure the success of this transition.

One of the main pillars of this scenario is rebuilding trust between the various Palestinian factions, which requires intensive efforts from regional and international mediators, especially Egypt and the United Nations. This proposal also requires providing guarantees that the faction leaders will not be targeted or excluded from the political scene, which necessitates establishing a joint governance mechanism for a transitional period.

This scenario depends primarily on the ability of the Palestinian Authority to impose its effective control over the Strip, which is doubtful, especially in light of the deep differences between the West Bank and Gaza, and the lack of trust between the Palestinian parties. 

In addition, Hamas’s acceptance of this proposal may be conditional on effective participation in governance, which may not be acceptable to Israel or some regional powers. Moreover, this solution faces obstacles related to the extent of the international community’s ability to commit to funding reconstruction, and to ensuring that Israel does not obstruct any efforts aimed at strengthening the Palestinian Authority’s control over the Strip.

The third scenario, which may be the most complex, is to impose an international solution under the auspices of the United Nations, whereby international peacekeeping forces are deployed to oversee the administration of Gaza for a transitional period, during which the Strip is rebuilt, and the political conditions are prepared to find a comprehensive Palestinian settlement. 

In this scenario, the infrastructure is rehabilitated, security guarantees are provided to prevent the outbreak of new confrontations, while the way is opened for an internal Palestinian dialogue under international auspices to reach an agreement on the future of governance in Gaza. 

This scenario also includes international supervision of the rehabilitation of civilian institutions in Gaza, ensuring the distribution of aid, and preventing the use of resources in any military activities that may lead to a renewal of the conflict. 

It could also contribute to reactivating the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis through an international mechanism that ensures the implementation of any understandings reached. 

However, this option faces several obstacles, most notably the rejection by some Palestinian forces of any direct international intervention in Palestinian affairs, and Israel may refuse to deploy international forces near its borders, preferring to keep Gaza under siege or in a state of instability that keeps it weak and unable to pose a security threat. 

Moreover, any international intervention will require consensus among the major powers, which may be difficult to achieve in light of global political tensions. Each of these scenarios carries its own challenges, and the optimal choice remains linked to the extent of the Arabs’ ability to unify their positions and make bold decisions that go beyond narrow political calculations. 

The main challenge lies in reaching a solution that spares Gaza further destruction, establishes a new phase of stability and development, and ensures that the Palestinian issue is not exploited in regional conflicts. The question remains: Will the Cairo Summit be able to overcome Arab differences and present a unified vision to save Gaza and its future?

Hasan Dajah is professor of Strategic Studies at Al-Hussein Bin Talal University

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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The US General Who Swallowed His Own Truth

By Jassem Al-Azzawi

General Dan Kaine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered a confidential warning to President Trump with the utmost candor—the kind of candor that democracies rely on and empires routinely ignore. He said: “We don’t have enough ammunition to win this war. It’s not going to be pretty.” This warning wasn’t born of cowardice; it was the last vestige of institutional integrity that still flickers within the halls of American military power.

Trump’s response was that of a circus clown, not a commander-in-chief. Through his “Truth Social” platform—that distorted mirror of American political life—he dismissed the warning with the arrogance of a street vendor, saying: “Oh, no, no, no. If we do it, we’ll win easily.” Thus, a sober assessment became mere publicity, and caution a lie.

But the biggest lie came later. When Kaine’s warning leaked, Trump not only rejected it but completely reversed it. With the confidence of a man who has never been held accountable for anything, he told the American public the general had said the exact opposite—that the United States had plenty of missiles, munitions, and everything else. “That’s not what he said at all,” Trump declared, putting words of false victory in the mouth of a man who had offered only warnings.

And General Cain remained silent

This silence is not just a footnote in this story; it is the story itself. By remaining silent, Cain allowed the American public to absorb the falsehood as truth. He did not say: “No, Mr. President, that’s not what I said.” He did not invoke his oath, nor the soldiers who would pay with their lives for the gap between political rhetoric and logistical reality. He chose the safety of silence over the danger of truth, and in doing so, he betrayed not only himself but the Republic. This is the rot at the heart of American militarism.

As historian Andrew Bacevich has long warned, the professional military has become more of an instrument of imperial ambition than a defender of democratic values, with senior officers more concerned with their next post than with the Constitution they swore to uphold. Kaine’s silence was not a mere slip of the tongue; it was a symptom of a deeper malaise.

The logistical picture Kaine described in private was not theoretical; the calculations were unforgiving.

Current stockpiles of interceptor missiles and precision munitions could not sustain a prolonged air campaign against a country three times the size of Iraq. The Wall Street Journal documented a “worrying gap” in U.S. missile stockpiles, noting that reserves were “far below” the requirements of intensive and sustained operations. Pentagon contractors were instructed to “double or even quadruple” production of Patriot, SM-6, and precision-strike missiles—a tacit admission that the arsenal built for Cold War scenarios is inadequate for the war being fought today.

Consider Gaza: Israel, the most heavily armed military power in the Middle East, with complete air and naval dominance, has turned a tiny coastal strip into a moon-like landscape of devastation over two and a half years, yet it has not broken Hamas. Gaza is only 37 kilometers long. Iran, on the other hand, is a nation of 90 million people, with mountainous terrain, strategic depth, fortified infrastructure, and a combat-hardened Revolutionary Guard. The idea that it will collapse under a few weeks of American airstrikes is not strategy; it is wishful thinking. “God help us if this continues, if it gets to four weeks,” Colonel Daniel Davis warned on the Deep Dive podcast. He was speaking in military terms, and the same prayer applies. Politically.

When Trump now raises the prospect of sending ground troops, he is not escalating from a position of strength, but rather improvising from a position of denial. Admitting that air power and missiles alone cannot achieve the political objective is an admission that the original objective was never honestly assessed. This is the pattern of American wars at the end of an empire: Glittering promises, disastrous calculations, and then a grim and horrific reckoning paid in blood by those who had no seat at the table where the lies were told.


The costs are already piling up—not just in the currency of munitions and riches, but in the currency that empires always ultimately spend and regret most: credibility. America’s word, already devalued by two decades of contrived justifications for war, is getting cheaper by the day.

Democracies can tolerate miscalculations, and they can tolerate bad presidents, but what they cannot long tolerate is the institutionalization of a culture where the truth is whispered behind closed doors and swallowed whole in front of cameras. When the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff allows his words to be weaponized for propaganda — when the man in charge of counting missiles refuses to correct a president who pretends they are plentiful — something far greater than military credibility collapses.

What is crumbling is the social contract between the governed and those who send them to their deaths.

Caine’s silence was not cautious; it was complicity. And in an imperial machine suffering from a shortage of ammunition and a shortage of truth, complicity is the only resource that seems inexhaustible, because when the missiles finally run out, slogans won’t replace them.

Reality will.

Al-Azzawi is an Iraqi writer who contributed this piece to Al Rai Al Youm which was translated and appeared in crossfire.com

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‘They Don’t Know Iran’s Military Lexicon’: First Six Days of The Aggression

By Abdul Bari Atwan


They truly don’t know Iran. By this, I mean the Israelis and the US, and even some Arab leaders, none of whom dared to condemn the aggression. But the aggression entered its sixth day without the regime falling, and/or the new interim leadership rushing to the nearest negotiating table to surrender. The following factors need to be considered.

The battlefields:

First: The downing of an advanced American fighter jet, the F-15, by Iranian missiles in the west of Iran, a firstever development. This suggests the Iranian military leadership may have developed new missiles capable of achieving this feat, or they acquired them from their Chinese and Russian allies, or both, particularly the Russian S-400 and S-500 missile systems.

Second: The entry of Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles into the arena, striking deep inside Israel, specifically Tel Aviv and Haifa, for the first time after 15 months of restraint and the rebuilding of its military arsenal, and/or what was destroyed during the Israeli aggression. This means that no area in the Zionist entity will be safe.

Third: The fiery speech delivered by Sheikh Naim Qassem, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, containing strong unprecedented tone statements most notably: “We will not surrender and we will defend our land, no matter the sacrifices and despite the disparity in capabilities. We will not surrender.”

Fourth: The introduction of the fastest “infiltrating” drone into the Iranian Air Force for the first time. Named “Hadid 110,” it has a speed of 517 km/h and, according to Western military experts, is considered more efficient than its sister drone, “Shahed,” which performed well deep inside Israel. Its production costs only $35,000, while shooting it down costs $4 million.

Fifth: Every day of resistance by the Iranian army and people costs the occupying state approximately $1 billion. As for America, the costs of the war has already nearly spiralled to $160 billion in the first six days. These preliminary estimates are likely to rise, especially after the bombing of aircraft carriers and the destruction of warships, the increasing number of dead and wounded, the largest military buildup since the Iraq War, and the rise in energy prices.

Sixth: The fulfillment of the promise to close the Strait of Hormuz, which means delivering two fatal blows. The first is to the Western economy because oil and gas prices would likely reach record-breaking figures, and the second, for the Arab states who host the US military bases. Closing the Strait means preventing their oil and gas exports from reaching global markets, and the losses will increase while oil and gas revenues decrease depending on the war’s duration and developments.

The Iranians wanted from the outset a regional war of attrition with no end in sight in direct opposite to the new American warefare military doctrine, which aims for short, swift, and clean wars (without American casualties). The Iranians resolved to bomb all those cooperating with the aggression in the region. This new Iranian theory was best and most clearly expressed by Sheikh Naim Qassem when he called on the Israeli army to prepare for many days of fighting with all available means.

Defeat, surrender, and raising the white flag, individually or collectively, have no place in the Iranian military and political lexicon. In the first six days, the Iranian army launched 500 hypersonic missiles with multiple cluster warheads and more than 2,000 drones, resulting in the displacement of more than 7 million settlers to shelters and tunnels, and the destruction of large parts of Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Neither the 47-year-long starvation siege, nor three Israeli-American aggressions within a few years, nor the incitement of popular protests and the planting of spies among the protesters, nor the deployment of aircraft carriers and warships, nor inflation and the collapse of the national currency, succeeded in defeating the mighty and unwavering Iranian will, and consequently, in toppling or changing the regime.

Our proof is they baffled the Americans in negotiations that lasted more than two years in Vienna and in several other Arab and European capitals, and they never conceded. They rejected all American conditions, starting with halting enrichment and handing over 460 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, and even refusing to allow the inclusion of the Iranian missile industry or severing ties with resistance factions on the negotiating table.

Yes, arrogance, conceit, and the unfortunate complicity of some Arabs blinded them to the true nature of Iran, and they will pay a very heavy price, the most prominent feature of which will be the destruction of all Israeli gas infrastructure. In the Mediterranean, water and electricity stations, and the lack of distinction between settler and soldier, many assumptions have changed after the massacre of the children’s school in southern Iran… and time will tell.

This opinion was written in Arabic by the chief editor of Alrai Al Youm Abdul Bari Atwan and translated for crossfirearabia.com

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