Netanyahu Leaves Washington Empty-Handed

By Mohammad Al-Kassim

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned from Washington without the outcome he had clearly hoped for, or the outcome he had led his domestic audience to expect in the days before the trip.

The visit, hastily moved up by a week and framed by Netanyahu as urgent and decisive, ended with a brief, anodyne statement from his office. There was no joint appearance, no press conference, and no public declaration of alignment with President Donald Trump on Iran. 

When Netanyahu met with Trump at the White House on Wednesday, Iran was top of the Israeli PM’s agenda. And on his way back to Israel, Netanyahu said he had made his feelings clear – “not hide my general scepticism about the possibility of reaching any agreement with Iran”. 

For a leader who typically amplifies diplomatic achievements and personal rapport with American presidents — from his 2015 address to Congress opposing the Obama administration’s Iran deal to his close partnership with Trump during the Abraham Accords — the restraint was striking.

President Trump, for his part, said “nothing definitive” had been decided. 

The White House made clear that negotiations with Iran remain ongoing following the first exploratory round of US–Iran talks aimed at testing parameters for a possible new nuclear framework. 

That, in itself, was the headline Netanyahu had hoped to prevent.

Meeting defined by what didn’t happen

Netanyahu arrived in Washington, saying he would present Israel’s “guiding principles” for negotiations with Iran. 

But there was nothing fundamentally new in those principles — nor in the message he delivered.

For more than three decades, Netanyahu has framed Iran as an existential threat to Israel, warning of its nuclear ambitions in international forums, including at the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, where he famously drew a red line on a cartoon bomb.

His objectives have been consistent: weaken Iran by any means available; prefer regime change if possible; and, failing that, ensure Iran is permanently deprived of nuclear capabilities and long-range missiles.

After last year’s direct, unprovoked Israeli attack on Iran, missile capabilities have become even more central to Israel’s demands.

In Washington, Netanyahu pushed a maximalist position:

  • no uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, a demand that goes beyond previous US negotiating frameworks, including the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which permitted limited enrichment under strict monitoring;
  • strict limits — ideally elimination — of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, a core pillar of Tehran’s deterrence strategy and long considered non-negotiable by Iranian leadership;
  • constraints on Iran’s regional allies and proxy networks, and
  • Israeli freedom of action to strike Iran, even under any future agreement.

He also opposes any ‘sunset clause’ seeking permanent restrictions that would entrench Israel’s strategic dominance in the region.

None of this aligns with the trajectory of US–Iran diplomacy. 

While the Trump administration has yet to spell out the precise parameters of a potential agreement, early signals from Washington point to a more limited objective than Israel has been demanding. 

The focus appears to be on extending Iran’s nuclear breakout timeline and preventing weaponisation — rather than eliminating uranium enrichment altogether or dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

In effect, the White House seems to be testing whether an imperfect but enforceable deal is achievable before turning to escalation. 

That approach reflects a calculation that containing Iran’s nuclear advances, even partially, may be preferable to the risks of confrontation or military action.

At the same time, President Trump has sharpened his rhetoric. 

He reiterated his commitment to negotiations but paired it with a stark warning: if Iran fails to reach a nuclear deal with Washington, the outcome would be, in his words, “very traumatic”. 

For the first time, Trump also attached a timeframe to that ultimatum, suggesting that diplomacy has a limited window — roughly the next month — before consequences follow.

The message from Washington is deliberate ambiguity: diplomacy remains the preferred path, but the clock is now publicly ticking.

The timing of Netanyahu’s trip is critical. Netanyahu advanced the visit shortly after the first round of US–Iran talks, signalling urgency — and concern. 

Israeli officials feared momentum: that negotiations might move ahead before Israel could shape their parameters.

That fear appears well-founded. While Trump continues to issue rhetorical threats toward Iran, his actions suggest a preference for testing diplomacy before escalating militarily. 

Domestic pressures and political stakes

Netanyahu’s urgency is also driven by domestic considerations. 

His governing coalition faces mounting pressures, including disputes over military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox parties, budget constraints linked to prolonged wartime expenditures, and ongoing public dissatisfaction following the October 7 attacks and subsequent regional escalation. 

A dramatic confrontation with Iran — or even the perception that he is leading one — would be politically transformative.

Iran remains one of the few issues in Israel that still commands near-consensus across coalition and opposition lines. 

Netanyahu knows that. He has long positioned himself as the indispensable guardian against Tehran, and he needs to show Israeli voters that Washington remains closely aligned with him.

That explains the repeated emphasis, aimed at domestic audiences, on “coordination” with the US — even when public evidence of such coordination is thin.

According to Israeli assessments, Netanyahu brought intelligence to Washington intended to cast doubt on Iran’s intentions, including claims that Tehran is stalling negotiations, continuing executions, and refusing to engage seriously on missiles.

But if this intelligence was meant to derail diplomacy, it appears not to have succeeded.

Trump’s team — including Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Marco Rubio, and others — listened. 

But the White House has not embraced Israel’s conclusion that negotiations are futile. 

Instead, it appears determined to test whether a deal is possible, even if imperfect. That leaves Israel preparing for an alternative outcome.

The prevailing assessment in Israel is that talks may ultimately fail — either because Iranian demands prove incompatible with US red lines, or because Israel’s demands make an agreement politically or technically impossible. 

That is precisely why Netanyahu insists on keeping the military option alive.

Behind closed doors, the three-hour meeting likely went beyond negotiating positions to contingency planning: what happens if talks collapse, how far Israel can act independently, and what level of US support or tolerance it might expect.

Israel’s core demand remains unchanged: freedom of action.

Despite public expressions of unity, Netanyahu and Trump are approaching Iran from different strategic premises. 

Trump appears to value flexibility and leverage, using the prospect of force to extract concessions while keeping diplomatic channels open. 

Netanyahu seeks permanence: structural constraints that prevent Iran from re-emerging as a threshold nuclear power under any future political configuration.

What binds them — at least for now — is political self-interest. Both prefer to avoid public confrontation. Both face domestic calculations. And both understand the risks of escalation.

For Netanyahu, however, the Washington visit underscored an uncomfortable reality: Israel can influence US policy, but it does not control it.

Diplomacy is moving forward — whether Israel likes it or not. – TRTWorld

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Nuclear Politics: US-Iran and The ‘Illusive Deal’

Dr Marwan Asmar

Despite the seeming sidedness and intransigence between Iran and the US, their fifth round of nuclear talks with Oman as mediator, is expected to be held in Rome on Friday.

Both US and Iranian delegates have been “public” in their approach. The Americans, led by US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff wants Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons and end its uranium enrichment, a process that would allow it to develop an atom bomb.

The American delegates say this is a “redline” they will not budge away from. However, the Iranians led by the country’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi insist that they must be allowed to enrich because this is part of their sovereignty and national interest.

On the face of it, both positions appear to be diametrically-opposed. The Americans insist on one thing while the Iranians on another with US president Donald Trump’s team believing it would be extremely dangerous for the world to allow Iran access to nuclear weapons.

However, the first round of US-Iran talks started on 12 April in the Omani capital of Muscat and since then three other round of talks were held, including one in the Oman Embassy in Rome. They were described as “positive” and with the exception of the fourth round, they were seen as introductory.

This time around the talks are in Muscat again, on 22 May, 2025 with the full teams taking part at the behest of the Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi as mediating between the two sides who are in two separate rooms and not directly talking to each other.

Despite all difficulties and intractable positions, the new republican administration in the White House is determined to iron-out a new nuclear deal with Tehran after the Trump took out the US out of the deal, officially termed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed in 2015 under the auspices of the UN with the backing of Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany in 2015.

Trump forced the US to exit out of the deal in 2018 and many argue this move allowed Iran to continue to enrich its uranium at 60 percent, much shorter to the 90-percent-mark for a nuclear weapon. The 2015 deal, and for the first time, capped Iran’s enrichment facilities at 6.7 percent, and since 2018 it moved freely in its ability to obtain weapons-grade material whilst wasting months, years and even decades of negotiations.

Back to the present. Outwardly, the Trump administration wants “nuclear-dismantellment” and zero-enrichment. But the fact that the Americans held five meetings with Iranian delegates mean they recognize what Iran is saying about its nuclear program, that it is there for “peaceful” energy reasons and have consequently stressed that if Tehran wants enriched uranium for such purposes it can import from different world countries.

The US administration believes this would check Iranian nuclear capability and prevent them from obtaining the nuclear bomb. But one point stands out and is being downplayed and that is the fact Iran is well-advanced in its nuclear program with at least five nuclear facilities across the country that are well known and inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency which is a UN watchdog.

The fact that the two sides are meeting on a regular basis sends positive signals despite the recent comments made by Iran’s top spiritual leader Ali Khamenei who is pessimistic about a deal being hammered out, if the United States doesn’t adopt a more flexible and less stringent approach on the Iranian nuclear file, enrichment issue and the removal of sanctions on the country reimposed by Trump when he got the US out of the deal in his first tenure as president in the White House.

These are the hurdles both sides are facing, points the make Iranian decision-makers not at all optimistic. But Trump has so far been using a “carrot-and-stick” approach. He has warned the Iranians that he would be prepared to attack Iran, if it doesn’t sign a deal soon and put the onus on  Israel for the attack that would probably be a joint one with the US.

Netanyahu unhappy!

This point made Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu very happy in the month or so prior to 12 April. Then Netanyahu geared himself up for an impending attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and was therefore in great shock to hear that Iranian-US talks were in the pipeline and mediated by Oman.

He was in double-shock because the presumably US-Israeli strike was being pushed back in favor of international diplomacy. It is here as well, the cracks between Trump and Netanyahu begun to show still because the US president had already started to portray himself as a man of peace, not a warmonger and wanted to end the war in Ukraine and Gaza and was talking to Hamas, an arch-enemy of the Israeli prime minister with an eye on the Nobel peace prize.

To Netanyahu talking to the Iranians was just one more spike in the Israeli heart because it meant US-Israeli interests were diverging as underpinned by the current talks with Iran and its erstwhile allies like the Houthis which the US planes bombed to no success in a military campaign that started in March, April and stopped on 6 May because it achieved little success and was exorbitantly expensive.

Even if they don’t achieve immediate breakthroughs, the Iran-US talks are likely to continue for a while because it lies within the tenets of new American foreign policy as espoused by Trump. He is unlikely now to drop the diplomatic towel and go for a series of strikes because he knows of the military capabilities Iranian has. Also, Trump is likely to force Netanyhu’s hand and prevent him for striking that country because of the unforeseen consequences it would generate for the region and the US itself.

This analysis is written by Dr Marwan Asmar, chief editor of the crossfirearabia.com website. 

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