Yemen Archives - CrossFireArarbia

Crisis in Yemen: I in 3 Women Die in Childbirth

CrossFireArabia
June 14, 2026

Yemen remains gripped by one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with 22 million – out of a population of 35 million – requiring assistance. Women and girls account for half of those in need, and two-thirds of them are of childbearing age, placing reproductive health at the heart of the emergency.

The UN agency supporting women and girls in the field (UNFPA) is working across the country to meet urgent reproductive needs. It warns that a combination of malnutrition, limited healthcare and rising protection risks is putting lives in jeopardy.

‘Malnutrition is on the rise’

One of the most immediate concerns is food insecurity. “Unfortunately, malnutrition is on the rise,” says Francesco Galtieri, the agency’s senior official in Yemen.

The consequences are particularly severe for pregnant women – when they lack adequate nutrition during pregnancy, the risks to their babies’ development and health increase significantly.

Healthcare access, especially in rural and remote areas, is another critical challenge.

The country has the highest maternal mortality rate in the Arab region, and three women die every day due to pregnancy complications or during childbirth. Around two-thirds of these deaths could be prevented if they had access to a midwife or doctor.

Beyond health, protection from violence is a pressing concern. Conflict and economic hardship have heightened risks for women and girls, who often bear the brunt.

Funding cuts result in death

Safe spaces supported by UNFPA offer women refuge and a path to recovery, providing psychosocial support, vocational training and economic empowerment initiatives designed to help survivors rebuild their lives.

The agency also provides legal assistance to those seeking justice through Yemen’s legal system.

Despite these achievements, funding cuts are putting the programmes under severe strain. Mr. Galtieri told UN News that around 40 per cent of UNFPA’s humanitarian funding was cut last year, forcing the agency to suspend or halt support for roughly one third of its services.

In a country with high maternal mortality, reduced services mean that a woman experiencing complications may be unable to access lifesaving care, often resulting in the death of both mother and child.

Protection services have also been affected. This year, UNFPA-supported shelters have been unable to accept new survivors of gender-based violence, and the cuts can lead to lasting effects on children affected by malnutrition and trauma.

A truck loaded with WHO-branded boxes unloads supplies at the Al-Thawra Hospital in Yemen, with a crowd of people gathered nearby. — Photo: WHO/ Abdullah Al-Halabi The World Health Organization (WHO) has provided the Al-Thawra Hospital in Hudaydah, Yemen, with 30 medical beds, 5 infant radiant warmers and 1 trauma kit.

Healthy debate?

Mr Galtieri is currently in New York attending meetings of UNFPA’s Executive Board, where representatives from conflict-affected areas are engaging with Member States.

Discussions have highlighted renewed debate around sexual and reproductive health and rights, an issue he says has not been under such scrutiny in decades.

“I always wonder why, when a society enters into a phase of tension and confrontation, women and girls become the focus of that political confrontation,” he says.

Appealing directly to decision-makers, Mr. Galtieri urges greater investment in essential services such as midwifery, arguing that prioritising lifesaving care over other expenditures should not be controversial.

Funding decisions often favour other priorities, despite the clear human cost. In Yemen, he warns, that cost is measured in the lives of women and girls who might otherwise have survived. UN News

Analyses

Iran: ‘Strategic Patience’ to ‘Sustained Confrontation’

marwan
June 7, 2026

By Najih Mohammad Ali

In a clear and direct language, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) affirmed that regional “peace and stability will not be achieved unless there is withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories.” This stance followed Hezbollah’s Secretary-General’s rejection of the Washington talks, emphasizing his refusal to separate the arenas and the “Dahieh for the North” equation.

This statement expresses a coherent strategic vision that considers regional stability inextricably linked to ending occupations and aggressions. It places the defense of Lebanon, Syria, and the region among Iran’s political and military priorities.

This shift to a strategy of “eternal war”—or continuous confrontation—and reflects a pragmatic and principled decision made by Tehran after decades of pressure and aggression. Iran did not abandon the idea of a settlement in vain; rather, it realized that relying on partial agreements with Washington, which imposes unilateral conditions and disregards the rights of peoples, is no longer a viable option.

The cowardly assassination of Martyr Qassem Soleimani, followed by direct strikes targeting high-ranking Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, proved that relying solely on “strategic patience” is mistaken for weakness. Therefore, Iran has shifted to a doctrine of active deterrence based on the entire axis of resistance, making any aggression costly for its adversaries.

This transformation was not the result of the absolute dominance of a hardline faction, as Zionist-American narratives and their Arab proxies (and, of course, the Iranian opposition abroad) claim. Rather, it is a natural evolution of the Iranian elite that stood united in the face of external aggression.

After significant losses, the priority of maintaining national and revolutionary cohesion emerged. Defending revolutionary principles—exporting the spirit of resistance and confronting arrogance—has become an essential part of the regime’s identity that has become a source of strength to prevent internal collapse whilst uniting the people behind the leadership in the face of sanctions. Pragmatists and hardliners alike now agree that continued confrontation better protects national interests than concessions that could lead to disintegration.

The leaders of the Iranian regime believe—and I think they are right—that continuing the confrontation will yield greater strategic gains than any fragile peace agreement. History proves that America understands only the language of force and attrition. From Vietnam to Afghanistan, wars of attrition forced Washington to withdraw.

Today, the “Axis of Resistance” is cleverly applying this equation: Linking the arenas to prevent separate deals that would weaken Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen, and imposes a heavy price on its adversaries. Iranian diplomacy has been transformed into the diplomacy of the field, as General Soleimani envisioned, and is now a flexible tool that buys time and exposes the contradictions of the other side, while maintaining full military readiness.

The American-Israeli strikes have already altered Tehran’s calculations in favor of adopting an offensive-defensive posture. Instead of settling for limited responses, Iran is developing comprehensive deterrent capabilities through its natural allies, who represent the will of the region’s peoples in the face of occupation.

This is a calculated escalation, a precise strategic calculation based on resilience and strategic depth. Within the elite, a balance prevails between caution, fearing losses, and resolve, which sees resistance as the only path to dignity and independence.

Compared to the previous “strategic patience,” the strategy of sustained confrontation has proven effective in preserving battlefield gains and preventing the regional collapse of the resistance axis. It has succeeded in exhausting the enemy and strengthening internal unity, despite economic challenges primarily attributed to unjust sanctions, not Iranian policy.

The most serious risk facing this strategy lies in the possibility of miscalculation by adversaries and their attempts to impose a full-scale war, but Iran has repeatedly demonstrated an exceptional capacity for resilience and adaptation.

We are indeed facing a “simmering cold war,” where there is no false peace imposed by force, nor a total war that destroys everyone. This situation serves Iran and its axis because it maintains the strategic balance, prevents surrender, and opens the door to a comprehensive and just settlement based on withdrawal from occupied territories and respect for the sovereignty of states.

In conclusion, this “perpetual war” relies on the long-term vision of the Iranian character. It is not a whim, but an existential choice imposed by the ongoing aggression against Iran and the peoples of the region.

Iran is defending itself and the dignity of the nation, and affirms that true stability begins with ending aggression, occupation, and foreign interference. This path, despite its difficulties, reinforces Tehran’s position as an indispensable regional power and paves the way for a new balance of power that respects the rights of peoples. The region needs such firm stances to achieve an honorable peace, not surrender.

The author is a researcher in Iranian and regional affairs and this article is reproduced from the Arabic Al Rai Al Youm website and reprinted in crossfirearabia.com.

Analyses

Trump’s War Drums ‘Dampen’

CrossFireArabia
February 2, 2026

EDITOR’S NOTE: This editorial is written by Abdul Bari Atwan, chief editor of the Arabic Al Rai Al Youm website, on 2 February 2026, on the eve of increasing US military presence sorrounding Iran.

The fact that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ali Khamenei appeared three times in open and public meetings, chatting to ordinary Iranians recently, sends a shocking message to US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It shows Khamenei still has the first and final word in Iran, and is not hiding in an underground bunker for fear of assassination; he has not relinquished his leadership and spiritual powers, as some Arab and Western media outlets have promoted in deliberate leaks part of the psychological warfare against Iran, coinciding with the US military buildup in the region.

In contrast top Israeli politicians and military officials are rushing to Washington fearing that President Trump will back down from his aggression threats and replace the military option for a peaceful, negotiated one and reaching an accord that does not include Israeli demands and conditions. Israeli Chief of Staff General Eyal Zamir made a surprise visit to Washington recently and met with senior US military leaders, accompanied by his own top military commanders, including the Israeli Air Force Commander.

Frankly however Trump may have already lost this war, just as he lost face and credibility by failing to follow up on his threats and translate them into aggressive actions on Iranian soil as he has resorted to sending mediators, with the latest being his friend, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to reopen negotiations with Iran after realizing his naval buildup and aircraft carrier deployments is not yielding results, nor are they intimidating the Iranian leadership into surrendering. Thus, he may be defeated either way, whether he goes to war or resorts to a political and diplomatic solution to the cri

The key to understanding this confusion and perhaps American retreat, and the postponement of military strikes, lies in the threatening message sent by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Trump during his meetings with the numerous Iranians on the anniversary of the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. The most prominent point was his assertion that “Iran does not initiate wars, but if it is subjected to aggression, it will confront it with all its might and inflict devastating blows on the enemy.” More importantly, he stated “this war will be a broad regional conflict, it will not be swift, decisive, or short-lived,” nor “clean”— meaning, free of casualties.

A “regional war” means all countries, movements, and military factions aligned with the “axis of resistance” will participate, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen. American bases in the region, particularly on the Arabian side of the Gulf, will be legitimate targets, as will all the American soldiers stationed there and whose numbers exceed 70,000.

What terrifies Israel most is not only Trump’s failure to proceed with his aggression against Iran, but also the possibility of reaching an agreement that contradicts all three of Israel’s objectives:

First: Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, halting all Iranian uranium enrichment at high levels, and surrendering all its existing stockpile (480 kilograms) to a neutral country. Second: Halting the development and launch of Iranian missiles, and dismantling all long-range missiles, whether hypersonic or multiple-warhead, capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory, particularly Haifa and Tel Aviv, as demonstrated in the 12-day war last June.

Third: Completely ceasing all financial and missile support for resistance movements, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon and its Iraqi counterpart, factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces such as Harakat al-Nujaba, and Ansar Allah in Yemen.

A Reminder

Everyone should be reminded the return of 5,000 American soldiers in coffins to Washington, killed by the Iraqi resistance after the 2003 invasion, forced the then-President Barack Obama to acknowledge defeat and withdraw 160,000 American troops from Iraq in November 2011. This was made to minimize losses. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that any aggression against Iran today would result in four times that number of American casualties, if not more, in the initial days of the attack. This is due to Iran’s resolve, advanced missiles and drones, and other secret weapons that might be the biggest surprises of this war, should it start.

Perhaps the decline in oil prices, the collapse of gold and silver prices, and the dollar’s shocking depreciation in global financial markets are among the most prominent indicators confirming what was stated above: The diminishing likelihood of war, Trump’s reluctant inclination towards diplomatic solutions and negotiations, and his initial admission of his failure to achieve a military victory to avoid losses and the protracted regional war threatened by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Time will tell.

Analyses

Donald’s War Bells

Dr Khairi Janbek
February 2, 2026

By Dr Khairi Janbek

When talking about the stand off between the US and Iran, in fact, anything can happen on the kaleidoscope of endless talks to an endless war. Usually it is possible to predict the reaction of one collective or another with some knowledge, but impossible to predict the reaction of an individual no matter what knowledge is available.

This is especially the case if this individual is Donald Trump. He makes it his business to be unpredictable and depending who tells him what and whether he likes it or not; but at least we can attempt to drive some inference from the situation, a situation which finds the current American president who heavily criticized his predecessors for dragging the United States into protracted wars with dubious results.

In this sense, the operative term is a short and decisive war, which is unclear in terms of what duration in order to be decisive about what? From the term, short and decisive, President Trump seems to know what he wants, which we can pontificate on in a myriad of possibilities, however, and for all intents and purposes, it can only mean a campaign of targeting the current leadership, civilian, military and security, coupled with targeting Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities.

Alternatively, for a leader obsessed with reality show image, he wishes to drag Iran to the negotiations table, which is not supposed to appear as a negotiations table, rather a table which will show a supposedly humiliated Iran, accepting the terms of the Washington administration: Those terms being a peaceful nuclear programme under close international supervision, no missile development programme, and stopping its support to its current regional proxies.

But the snag in all those plans,seems to be based on the reports indicating that the president has been told, that in order for the war to be decisive, it’s not likely to be a short one, which puts Trump in the conundrum of dragging the US into a protracted war on many other fronts, ranging from Iran to Iraq to Yemen. One is not saying at all that the US military cannot handle it, rather how costly will be the confrontation with Iran and its proxies be to achieve a decisive objective, which Trump desires to achieve in a short war?

In effect, if he does go to war at this point the objective has to change, and the meaning of decisive has also to change, meaning it would have to be regime change, knowing only too well, that there is no viable political alternative to the Mullahs except the Shah of Iran, which Trump doesn’t seem to be too keen on, and no one else in the region; for they are not much qualified to deal with day of regime change in Iran.

Also from an economic point of view: How long can a standing navy fleet stay on alert for war. The matter is not only psychological, but rather financial, as the moving of such a sizable war machine costs millions of dollars, now, if there are sponsors for this big operation and whom are willing to pay the expenses, then the US navy, similar to its Venezuelan operations, can encircle Iran and confiscate its oil shipments in the high seas , but if the US is paying for this big operation, then it won’t be long before we hear about a war breaking out.

Analyses

Gaza: Changing The Middle East Face

CrossFireArabia
October 8, 2025

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation marked a turning point in the modern political history of the Middle East. Its repercussions have gone far beyond the Palestinian and regional arenas, extending to the international system and reshaping the foreign policies of global powers toward the region.

The timing of the operation was particularly significant: it came at a transitional moment in the regional order, in the absence of consensus among international and regional actors on the rules of the game. While a fragile balance of deterrence existed between the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—led by Iran (alongside the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad)—and Israel, the latter was in the midst of a new phase of regional integration through the Abraham Accords.

Several Arab capitals had already normalized relations, and others were on their way, creating an unprecedented political landscape. This shift coincided with the declining influence of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and the rising centrality of the Gulf states. Many analysts began describing this new configuration as a “New Middle East”: wealthy, economically driven, and detached from historical conflicts—unlike the “Old Middle East,” where entrenched crises defined politics.

Turkey, meanwhile, had entered its own phase of recalibration. Once a champion of the Arab Spring and regional Islamist movements, Ankara sought reconciliation with Arab states, even attempting to restore ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime (though rebuffed by Damascus), while focusing more narrowly on national security and northern Syria.

On the Palestinian front, Israel had grown complacent toward Gaza, convinced Hamas had no incentive to disrupt the status quo. Tensions, however, were mounting in the West Bank, with small armed groups emerging in places like Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. Within Israeli and Western policy circles, talk was spreading about the prospect of a “mini-state in Gaza” as a substitute for a Palestinian state.

At the international level, President Joe Biden’s administration lacked enthusiasm for either the Abraham Accords or Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” yet it effectively followed the same trajectory: pursuing “regional peace” by integrating Israel into a new economic order and reducing the Palestinian question to daily livelihood concerns—employment, services, and economic relief in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than a political resolution.

The Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent two-year genocidal war in Gaza shattered these calculations and fundamentally restructured strategic assumptions. Whether the outcome will ultimately benefit or harm the Palestinian cause remains too complex to assess in simple terms, but what is clear is that the pre-October 7 regional order no longer exists.

From a Palestinian perspective, the conflict has restored international attention to the cause, leading to a renewed recognition of its centrality. In the Gulf, the previously dominant security paradigm—which cast Iran as the chief threat while framing Israel as a potential partner—collapsed entirely. A new consensus has emerged: Gulf security is inseparable from the Palestinian issue, and the notion of Israel as a “strategic friend” has been critically reassessed.

Skeptics may argue that these shifts have not altered the balance of power on the ground, and they are partially correct. Yet the strategic narrative has changed. Before October 7, the trajectory was toward the erasure of the Palestinian cause (closing UNRWA, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, normalization, and de facto annexation of the West Bank). Today, there is growing recognition—regionally and internationally—that Israeli policies themselves are the root of instability, not Iran or other regional actors. As Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla put it on X (September 25): “When weighing who poses a greater threat to Gulf security and regional stability—Iran or Israel—the evidence points clearly to Israel. Israel’s brutal behavior has made it more dangerous than an exhausted Iran. The Gulf needs a new defensive and geopolitical strategy for the Middle East beyond Iran.”

Israel, however, now perceives a surplus of power and is pressing for a new political and security order that extends beyond the occupied territories. With the partial unraveling of the Iranian alliance and the breakdown of the “Syrian corridor” that once linked Tehran to the Mediterranean, Israel has set its sights on even more ambitious goals, including the proposed “David Corridor” and establishing buffer zones around its borders in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

In response, a tentative regional coalition has begun to take shape, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, with notable support from Turkey and Pakistan. The latter signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia following Israel’s strike on Qatar and has since become more engaged in regional diplomacy. While fragile and constrained, this alignment presents a rare historic opportunity to rebuild a regional balance of power and establish a new deterrence framework.

Another striking development is the shift in Europe’s stance toward Israel. For the first time, Israel has lost significant ground in Western public opinion and media narratives, particularly among younger generations and in universities. This has pushed Israel closer to isolation—a position from which former U.S. President Donald Trump had tried to rescue it through his proposed Gaza peace plan, which was largely about securing U.S. and Israeli interests, without offering real guarantees for Palestinian statehood or ending the occupation.

In conclusion, it is still too early to judge the full strategic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the war in Gaza. Scenarios remain open, and outcomes uncertain. Yet one thing is indisputable: the region today is no longer what it was before October 7.

Abu Rumman is an Academic Advisor of the Politics and Society Institute and Professor of Political Science in The University of Jordan and published this article in The Jordan Times.