A Middle East Whirlpool! View From Amman

By Saleem Ayoub Quna

Unlike the grey terrain of the Middle East, known for its harsh aridity and barren landscapes, the region’s still-unsettled, multi-front conflicts that erupted after the 7 October, 2023 surprise Palestinian assault on Israeli settlements around Gaza Strip, almost literally, become associated in the public imagination with the colour blue: The sea, its waves, its vessels and its strategic waterways.

The Palestinians called that watershed event Al-Aqsa Flood. Israel described 7 October as a second Holocaust. If the Palestinians deliberately chose the word flood for its religious and symbolic connotations, the Israeli way of describing it, indicated how serious and tough their losses and injuries were.

What followed was a succession of milestones and unprecedented developments across the Middle East. They continue to unfold dramatically, resembling the abrupt and unpredictable movements of hurricanes and tempests on the high seas.

Yet the side-conflicts and mini-wars that followed 7 October have neither followed a single pattern nor obeyed the same rules. Instead, events have moved in different, sometimes opposing directions — unlike the orderly circular motion of an actual whirlpool. It is almost as though every confrontation has chosen a course of its own: The predictable alongside the unpredictable, the rational alongside the seemingly illogical.

It therefore takes more than intelligent guesswork or clever political analysis to determine which direction these events will ultimately take, and which may prove more dangerous — not only to the region and its inhabitants, but also to the many international powers with interests at stake.

If we were to capture the current Middle Eastern scene in a single frame, we might portray it as an extraordinary, almost unbelievable collision of man-made tides, currents and sub-currents, all moving simultaneously through one increasingly turbulent sea.

Because the first shots fired on 7th October around Gaza strip, from a Palestinian point of view, came as a last desperate call and reminder of the injustice they are suffering, they soon found their echoes in the four corners surrounding it: In south Lebanon, Yemen to the south and Iraq and Iran to the east. Even to the west, there were international sailors who belonged to the Peace Flotilla, trying to bring medicine and food to the starving children of Gaza!

One of the most significant currents emerged on Israel’s northern front.

What initially appeared to be a relatively “controlled” confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah steadily intensified until September 2024, when Israel killed the party’s leader Hassan Nasrallah. Only a few months later came another geopolitical earthquake: The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Damascus in December 2024.

Each development sent another powerful current through the already boiling waters of the wider Middle Eastern whirlpool.

Then came an even larger artificial wave.

In June 2025, the United States launched Operation Midnight Hammer, striking Iran’s three principal nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan while diplomatic efforts surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme were still underway.

Washington described the operation as an attempt to inflict decisive damage on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Tehran responded with retaliatory action against American military interests in the Gulf.

But that was not the end of the storm.

On 28 February, 2026, the world witnessed another major escalation when the United States and Israel launched coordinated, large-scale attacks against Iran. The two allies acted jointly but gave their military campaigns different names: Washington called its operation Epic Fury, while Israel called its campaign Roaring Lion.

The strikes hit Iranian military infrastructure and senior leadership and inflicted substantial damage. Yet they failed to produce one of the most far-reaching political outcomes sought by US-Israeli advocates of the military campaign: The toppling of the Iranian regime.

And so the whirlpool continued.

Iran responded not simply through missiles and military retaliation, but by shifting the struggle towards one of the most strategically sensitive waterways on earth: The Strait of Hormuz.

Through restrictions on shipping, attacks on vessels and increasingly assertive claims over the waterway, Tehran transformed Hormuz into another major front in the confrontation. The strait — through which a substantial share of the world’s energy supplies traditionally passes — became yet another current dragging regional powers and the wider international community deeper into the turbulence.

Here, the metaphor of the whirlpool becomes more than literary.

Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Iraq, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz are no longer easily separable theatres. Each produces currents that flow into the others. A military strike in one location generates political pressure somewhere else; an assassination changes the balance of power hundreds of kilometres away; a blocked shipping lane reverberates through global markets thousands of kilometres beyond the Middle East.

And all the while, new currents are being created faster than old ones can disappear.

Conclusion: As long as the waters surrounding the Middle East remain crowded with warships, missiles, blockades, retaliatory strikes and the debris of foreign intervention, the region’s old whirlpool will continue to spin.

What begins on the shores of Gaza does not remain in Gaza. What happens in Beirut, Damascus, Tehran or the Strait of Hormuz does not remain there either.

The Middle Eastern whirlpool has become too wide, too violent and too interconnected to contain its turbulence within the region itself.

And as it keeps spinning, its waves will continue to splash far beyond the shores of the Middle East — reaching, sooner or later, virtually every corner of the globe.

CrossFireArabia

CrossFireArabia

Dr. Marwan Asmar holds a PhD from Leeds University and is a freelance writer specializing on the Middle East. He has worked as a journalist since the early 1990s in Jordan and the Gulf countries, and been widely published, including at Albawaba, Gulf News, Al Ghad, World Press Review and others.

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‘No Need For Your Crocodile Tears’
  • HebaHeba
  • August 13, 2026

By Ismail Al Sharif

“I’ll say it frankly: We should have exerted more pressure on Israel to adopt a different approach in Gaza” – Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor to ex-President Joe Biden.

A striking phenomenon is recurring in American politics: Some presidents, cabinet members, and senior officials become more outspoken in their stances toward the Israeli occupation entity after leaving office, expressing regret for decisions that contributed to the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people.

This may be due to their liberation from diplomatic and partisan constraints, the pressures of Zionist lobbies, and the influence of tainted money, or perhaps their consciences awaken belatedly as they feel closer to death, realizing the enormity of the injustice they participated in or condoned.

Examples of this are numerous. Among the most prominent is former US President Jimmy Carter, who, after leaving office, shifted from a traditional pro-Zionist rhetoric to criticizing the Israeli occupation and its policies. Then there is Chuck Hagel, former US Secretary of Defense, who held the United States responsible for the Zionists’ continued aggression and described their practices as terrorism— but only after his retirement, of course.

Robert Gates, the former Secretary of Defense, also criticized war criminal Benjamin Netanyahu, calling him ungrateful.

More recently, Jake Sullivan, former National Security Advisor, and Antony Blinken, Biden’s lackluster Secretary of State, joined the ranks of those who have expressed regret. Both men have blood on their hands from the blood of Palestinian children and played a shameful role in supporting the Israeli entity during one of the greatest acts of genocide in modern history.

This was revealed in a lengthy investigation published in The New Yorker magazine last 20th July, titled “How Biden Enabled Israel’s Aggression Against Gaza – and Iran,” with the subtitle: “Top officials from the previous Administration now express regret over their failure to rein in Netanyahu.”

However, this regret will not absolve them for they knew full well that the Zionists were committing genocide in Gaza. On 5 March, 2024, five months after the start of the genocide, Mirjana Spoljarić, president of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), sent a confidential letter to President Biden. The ICRC, in addition to its humanitarian mission, is obligated under the Geneva Conventions to provide states with information and advice to help them avoid committing war crimes.

In her letter, Spoljarić reminded President Biden that the organization had condemned the “horrific” massacre perpetrated by Hamas against Israelis on 7 October 2023 and that it had continued to press the movement “tirelessly” for the release of the “hostages” it was holding.

However, this time she appealed to Biden with “grave concern,” warning that Israel, which had continued to bombard Gaza with heavy munitions since that October, was ignoring the ICRC in an unprecedented manner.

In her letter, she wrote: “The way Israel conducts hostilities is inconsistent with the laws of armed conflict, particularly the obligations to protect civilians, to distinguish between military objectives on the one hand and civilians and civilian infrastructure on the other, to ensure the humane treatment of detainees and the dead, to protect medical facilities and personnel, and to provide and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.”

Despite these clear warnings, the United States remained a key partner in the genocide, providing weapons, money, and political and international cover to Israel. And now some of its officials come to shed crocodile tears for the children of Gaza!

I say to them: You have no right to repent now, after all these martyrs, after all these tragedies, to say: “We are sorry, we made a mistake.” You knew, and you had the power to pressure and prevent, but you chose to support, arm, and cover up. You bear the burden of what happened, and the blood of the children of Gaza will haunt you and pursue your names to the dustbin of history.

This piece by Ismail Al Sharif was originally published in the Arabic Addustour daily and reprinted in English in Crossfirearabia.com.

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Is There a New Regional Order Emerging?

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The trilateral Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement, signed in Mecca last Friday and already being referred to as the “Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement,” should not be seen as just another diplomatic event in the region’s long history of security arrangements. What took place at Al-Safa Palace—where Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif agreed that an armed attack against any one of their countries would be considered an attack against all three—may signal the beginning of a new phase in Middle Eastern politics: one that could reshape regional alliances and, more importantly, the region’s relationship with the major powers.

The immediate context is clear. The agreement comes amid renewed US-Iranian tensions and escalating Houthi threats. But interpreting it simply as an attempt to “protect Saudi Arabia from Iran” misses the larger strategic picture. What is emerging goes beyond the immediate Iranian question. It points toward an effort to construct a regional order that is less dependent on the binary that has dominated Middle Eastern geopolitics for years: the US-Israeli axis on one side and Iran and its network of allies on the other.

There is another important dimension. The agreement effectively redraws the geopolitical boundaries of the Middle East by bringing Pakistan more directly into its security architecture while consolidating Turkey’s role as a central regional actor. This represents a departure from the conventional understanding of the regional system as primarily comprising the Arab states, Iran, Israel and Turkey. It comes, moreover, at a moment of profound transformation following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the weakening of the old division between the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” and the traditional Arab “moderate camp.

In practical terms, the new arrangement offers a different model—one that could provide regional powers with greater strategic and security autonomy. In that sense, it differs fundamentally from the regional vision advanced by President Donald Trump through the Abraham Accords, in which Israel occupies a central position in a US-backed regional security architecture. After the Gaza war, that model increasingly raises another question: whether integration with Israel means accepting not only normalization, but also an Israeli claim to military primacy in the region.

Seen from this perspective, the trilateral alliance may be less about confronting Iran than about challenging the underlying logic of the Abraham Accords.This may also explain Benjamin Netanyahu’s warnings several months ago about the emergence of what he described as a “radical Sunni axis.” Israel, meanwhile, has been pursuing its own countervailing network of partnerships. India—Pakistan’s historic rival—has become increasingly important in this calculus, alongside Israel’s strategic relationships with Greece and Cyprus and, more recently, Argentina. These relationships serve strategic purposes of their own, but they also help Israel counter the growing perception of regional isolation in the aftermath of the Gaza war.

Nor should the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani framework necessarily be viewed as a closed alliance. It has the potential to evolve into a broader regional umbrella centred on the Middle East’s increasingly influential middle powers. Other Arab states could eventually find a place within such a framework, including Jordan, Qatar and Egypt, and perhaps even Syria, which now faces Israeli military encroachment and the occupation of additional territory in its south following the collapse of the Assad regime.

Barry Buzan’s theory of regional security complexes provides a useful lens through which to understand the significance of this development. From this perspective, the emerging alignment represents change on three interconnected levels.

First, it expands the geopolitical boundaries of the Middle Eastern regional security complex, particularly by integrating Pakistan more directly into its strategic calculations. Second, it intensifies competition over the hierarchy of regional power: which states will emerge as the principal poles of influence within this enlarged security system? And third, it forces a reconsideration of the familiar categories of alliance, rivalry and cooperation that have shaped our understanding of Middle Eastern politics for decades.

The significance of the Mecca Agreement, therefore, lies not only in what the three countries have formally committed themselves to, but in what the agreement potentially represents: the search for a regional security architecture that is neither entirely dependent on Washington nor organized around Israel, while at the same time avoiding subordination to an Iranian-led regional order.

Yet this is precisely where the real questions begin. The agreement faces three major tests. The first is whether it can move beyond political declarations towards credible institutional and military mechanisms. The second is whether Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan can develop a sufficiently coherent strategic agenda despite their different interests, alliances and regional priorities. The third—and ultimately decisive—test will come when one of the three countries faces an actual security crisis and collective commitments collide with the national calculations of the other two.

The Mecca Agreement may indeed mark an important turning point in the architecture of Middle Eastern security. But regional orders are not created by communiqués alone. Between declaring an alliance and proving that it exists lies the most difficult test of all: what its members are prepared to do when their commitments carry a real political and strategic cost.

By Mohammad Abu Rumman is a columnist in The Jordan Times

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