Hezbollah Archives - Page 5 of 27

Gaza: Changing The Middle East Face

CrossFireArabia
October 8, 2025

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation marked a turning point in the modern political history of the Middle East. Its repercussions have gone far beyond the Palestinian and regional arenas, extending to the international system and reshaping the foreign policies of global powers toward the region.

The timing of the operation was particularly significant: it came at a transitional moment in the regional order, in the absence of consensus among international and regional actors on the rules of the game. While a fragile balance of deterrence existed between the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—led by Iran (alongside the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad)—and Israel, the latter was in the midst of a new phase of regional integration through the Abraham Accords.

Several Arab capitals had already normalized relations, and others were on their way, creating an unprecedented political landscape. This shift coincided with the declining influence of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and the rising centrality of the Gulf states. Many analysts began describing this new configuration as a “New Middle East”: wealthy, economically driven, and detached from historical conflicts—unlike the “Old Middle East,” where entrenched crises defined politics.

Turkey, meanwhile, had entered its own phase of recalibration. Once a champion of the Arab Spring and regional Islamist movements, Ankara sought reconciliation with Arab states, even attempting to restore ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime (though rebuffed by Damascus), while focusing more narrowly on national security and northern Syria.

On the Palestinian front, Israel had grown complacent toward Gaza, convinced Hamas had no incentive to disrupt the status quo. Tensions, however, were mounting in the West Bank, with small armed groups emerging in places like Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. Within Israeli and Western policy circles, talk was spreading about the prospect of a “mini-state in Gaza” as a substitute for a Palestinian state.

At the international level, President Joe Biden’s administration lacked enthusiasm for either the Abraham Accords or Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” yet it effectively followed the same trajectory: pursuing “regional peace” by integrating Israel into a new economic order and reducing the Palestinian question to daily livelihood concerns—employment, services, and economic relief in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than a political resolution.

The Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent two-year genocidal war in Gaza shattered these calculations and fundamentally restructured strategic assumptions. Whether the outcome will ultimately benefit or harm the Palestinian cause remains too complex to assess in simple terms, but what is clear is that the pre-October 7 regional order no longer exists.

From a Palestinian perspective, the conflict has restored international attention to the cause, leading to a renewed recognition of its centrality. In the Gulf, the previously dominant security paradigm—which cast Iran as the chief threat while framing Israel as a potential partner—collapsed entirely. A new consensus has emerged: Gulf security is inseparable from the Palestinian issue, and the notion of Israel as a “strategic friend” has been critically reassessed.

Skeptics may argue that these shifts have not altered the balance of power on the ground, and they are partially correct. Yet the strategic narrative has changed. Before October 7, the trajectory was toward the erasure of the Palestinian cause (closing UNRWA, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, normalization, and de facto annexation of the West Bank). Today, there is growing recognition—regionally and internationally—that Israeli policies themselves are the root of instability, not Iran or other regional actors. As Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla put it on X (September 25): “When weighing who poses a greater threat to Gulf security and regional stability—Iran or Israel—the evidence points clearly to Israel. Israel’s brutal behavior has made it more dangerous than an exhausted Iran. The Gulf needs a new defensive and geopolitical strategy for the Middle East beyond Iran.”

Israel, however, now perceives a surplus of power and is pressing for a new political and security order that extends beyond the occupied territories. With the partial unraveling of the Iranian alliance and the breakdown of the “Syrian corridor” that once linked Tehran to the Mediterranean, Israel has set its sights on even more ambitious goals, including the proposed “David Corridor” and establishing buffer zones around its borders in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

In response, a tentative regional coalition has begun to take shape, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, with notable support from Turkey and Pakistan. The latter signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia following Israel’s strike on Qatar and has since become more engaged in regional diplomacy. While fragile and constrained, this alignment presents a rare historic opportunity to rebuild a regional balance of power and establish a new deterrence framework.

Another striking development is the shift in Europe’s stance toward Israel. For the first time, Israel has lost significant ground in Western public opinion and media narratives, particularly among younger generations and in universities. This has pushed Israel closer to isolation—a position from which former U.S. President Donald Trump had tried to rescue it through his proposed Gaza peace plan, which was largely about securing U.S. and Israeli interests, without offering real guarantees for Palestinian statehood or ending the occupation.

In conclusion, it is still too early to judge the full strategic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the war in Gaza. Scenarios remain open, and outcomes uncertain. Yet one thing is indisputable: the region today is no longer what it was before October 7.

Abu Rumman is an Academic Advisor of the Politics and Society Institute and Professor of Political Science in The University of Jordan and published this article in The Jordan Times.

Opinion

Hamas, Trump and The Gaza Gamble

Dr Khairi Janbek
October 4, 2025

By Dr Khairi Janbek

One can only have a distant view of the current developments regarding the war on Gaza, and consequently in all honesty, a bird’s eye view of the situation. For all intense and purposes, one assumes the Hamas acceptance of plan presented by US president Donald Trump would represent extremely high-stakes gamble for them.

On the one hand it offers a pathway to end the bloodshed and set the road for reconstruction of the bludgeoned Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the plan demands existential concessions, loss of armaments, leverage, and an an end to the movement’s future. If Hamas accepts with sincerity, and the plan is implemented faithfully, it could mark a turning point towards stabilization, but also with risks of breakdown, backlash, internal splits, and which carry the warnings of a precarious road ahead.

It is important in the meantime to advise against the search for victors and/or the vanquished, because in this time and age, wars do not seem to be launched in order to be decisive, and the view of the Gaza war is no different. Essentially it is to be believed and cardinal to the Trump administration, the issue of arms pertaining to Hamas and Hezbullah are seen as obstacles to peace and to Israel’s normalization with the Arab world. Therefore, the objective, one imagines, is to eliminate those arms to the American administration which has wider objectives in this crucial region of the world.

Here, as well, one has to be careful with words. Is Hamas supposed to surrender all of its weapons, or will there be an accommodating plan for the Islamic movement to keep some of its weapons, so long as it is not seen to constitute any future threat?

On the other side of the equation, are we really at the juncture of seeing the total end of Hamas as an organisation? In other words, are we about to see an amnesty for the Hamas fighters, especially those who surrender their weapons and are willing to partake in the future plans for Gaza away from those who wish to leave and to be provided with a safe passage outside the Gaza enclave?

Or is there a plan within the plan. if indeed, the Trump plan is not in essence a diktat, will there be long and tedious negotiations that will accept a form of political participation for a future-transformed Hamas into less than a political organization and more than an NGO?

Then what about the role of the Arab and Islamic countries, whose leaders met with Trump during the last UN General Assembly and who subsequently welcomed Hamas acceptance of the Trump plan? After all, there is the supposition that Arab and Islamic countries will provide, if not brain, then money and brawn. Essentially, without Arab and to a lesser extent Islamic involvement, no plan will have a leg to stand on. But to what extent the Arabs are willing to get involved still remains to be seen.

Dr Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris.

Opinion

Syria – The New Battleground?

CrossFireArabia
July 21, 2025

By Dr Amer Al Sabaileh

Southern Syria has returned to the center of regional attention with the recent outbreak of violent clashes. These developments, while not surprising, reflect the ongoing fragility of Syria’s political and security landscape. Since the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria has remained in a state of uncertainty, with internal power balances eroded and the rise of the Shar-Joulani administration in the absence of a viable and inclusive governance framework.

Over the past seven months, the country has witnessed massacres and targeted attacks against Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians—clear signs of deep and worsening instability. This internal collapse is being exploited by external actors, particularly Israel, which views southwestern Syria as critical to establishing a demilitarized buffer zone along the Golan Heights. Despite the complexity of Syria’s internal landscape, Israeli strategic calculations in southwestern Syria remain a pivotal factor in shaping the region’s future.

While Israel initially entered the scene under the banner of “protecting the Druze,” this intervention risks inflaming sectarian tensions and sparking a prolonged conflict. At the same time, it has begun to impose a new reality on the ground—one that cannot be addressed without genuine understanding amongst key Syrian groups such as the Druze and Kurds, as well as broader arrangements with Israel itself. The latter has already sent unmistakable signals to Damascus through symbolic military strikes, indicating that future operations could escalate to directly undermine or even topple the current regime.

The ongoing clashes in Sweida and Damascus are likely to persist, especially in the absence of a clear military map for southern Syria. This suggests that Israeli strikes on military infrastructure in Damascus and beyond may continue. Furthermore, sectarian instability is set to deepen amid mutual distrust between the Druze, Bedouin tribes, and the central government—raising the probability of renewed violence. The recent developments have provided Druze militias with significant de facto autonomy, potentially opening the door for direct regional support, as they increasingly emerge as independent actors on the ground.

In parallel, this fragmentation heightens the risk of southern Syria becoming a multi-front proxy battlefield. Hezbollah—under internal pressure in Lebanon—alongside Iranian militias, may seek to open a new front against Israel, exploiting Syria’s geography to mount a tangible threat and divert Israeli focus away from Tehran.

These developments expose the deep institutional fragility of the Syrian state. The new transitional government remains unable to assert control or establish legitimacy in contested provinces, which paves the way for militias to expand their influence and for chaos to deepen. With the resurgence of extremist groups, the implications for long-term stability and reconstruction in Syria are deeply alarming.

Israel is moving forward with plans to establish a demilitarized buffer zone along its border with Syria, administered by friendly or at least non-hostile forces. The areas of Sweida and southern Daraa are of particular strategic importance, as Israel aims to prevent the advance of forces loyal to the new Syrian administration or the infiltration of Iranian proxies and Hezbollah operatives.

This unprecedented weakening of the Syrian administration may leave it increasingly prone to align with Israeli interests or offer major concessions simply to survive—an opportunity Israel will likely exploit to reshape not just Syria’s security geography, but its broader political map in accordance with long-term Israeli strategic goals.

From the Jordanian perspective, this evolving reality on Syria’s southern border presents a real and growing threat to national security. The concern goes beyond the spectre of chaos or fighting spilling across the border. It’s about a broader attempt to reshape the geopolitical landscape of the entire region—a transformation that will inevitably affect Jordan. Rising security threats are likely to be accompanied by political ones, as the drivers and dynamics of the Syrian conflict may cross borders. This makes it imperative for Jordan to adopt a proactive approach that prevents the spread of this new reality—both in its security and societal dimensions—into its own territory.

The author is a writer for The Jordan Times

Analyses

Iran-Israel War: Cost And Opportunities!

CrossFireArabia
June 17, 2025

By Mohammad Abu-Rumman

Benjamin Netanyahu has placed the Iranian regime, the Wilayat al-Faqih system, before a fateful challenge through a harsh pre-emptive strike. While extremely risky, the strike was not decisive enough to settle the confrontation. Netanyahu himself did not expect that an ideological-nationalist regime like Iran’s would surrender and offer immediate concessions following the strike, without launching a retaliatory blow against Israel.

Despite Iran’s unprecedented powerful strikes on Tel Aviv, the reformist current in Iran, represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, has also demonstrated its continued commitment to “the negotiating table” and to finding a way out of this war. Iran has deliberately avoided using its full missile capabilities against Israel to prevent the battle from reaching the point of no return.

Current indicators suggest that this war will likely not last long, nor will it expand geographically, because the destruction costs—for both sides—are immense. For Iran, this includes damage to its oil facilities, which are the backbone of its economy, as well as the protection of what remains of its nuclear program and infrastructure. For Israel, the fact that Iran managed to breach the Iron Dome and cause major direct damage in the heart of Tel Aviv and Haifa presents a reality that Israelis cannot endure.

In this light, there will likely come a tipping point at which both parties will be willing to end the conflict. The timing of that moment will be decided by the U.S. administration, which will step in to halt the military escalation. But when will this moment arrive? It will come when both sides realise that they can no longer achieve significant additional objectives, and that the cost of continuing the conflict far outweighs the cost of stopping it, especially given that a so-called “knockout blow” is impossible in such existential wars.

On the Israeli side, there are two major areas of superiority: First, Israel’s air force has successfully destroyed much of Iran’s air defense systems, allowing it to operate freely over Tehran and strike targets at will. Second, intelligence penetration, which could lead to further surprises that may force the Iranians to retreat or make subsequent concessions. However, Israel’s major vulnerability lies in its inability to withstand sustained, large-scale missile attacks, especially after a prolonged multi-front military conflict.

As for Iran, it has two primary objectives in the current military confrontation: To preserve the political legitimacy of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime, which is built on religious ideology and propaganda. Failing to respond or retreating now would reflect poorly internally and could erode the regime’s very source of legitimacy. To protect Iran’s deterrence capacity and prevent its regional standing from deteriorating—especially after losing the bulk of its regional influence in the aftermath of “Flood of al-Aqsa” (the Gaza war).

American intervention, whether military or diplomatic, will be decisive in ending this conflict. It is evident that President Donald Trump prefers a negotiated path, aiming for political, military, and economic gains. Netanyahu, however, is betting that a major military defeat for the Iranian regime will lead not only to concessions on its nuclear program (the primary stated objective) but potentially to changing or collapsing the regime itself, thereby neutralizing it within the regional power structure. This would constitute a strategic shift in the regional security equation in Israel’s favour.

Direct US military involvement remains unlikely, except in two scenarios: If Israel were to request assistance after a massive and successful missile strike against its territory. If the U.S. concludes that Iran will not back down unless there is a more dramatic shift in the military balance of power that compels it to return to the negotiating table and offer substantial concessions.

This equation was not the same two years ago. Back then, Iran had greater geopolitical space and extensive tools of influence in the region. However, what has occurred with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s corridor (the Syrian axis), and the diminished power of Hezbollah and Hamas, has cost Iran critical advantages in the regional balance of power. After this war, there will be significant consequences even for Iran’s remaining influence in Iraq, which may become the final outpost lost by Tehran, ending a twenty-year effort (since the 2003 invasion of Iraq) to weave its intricate carpet of regional influence.

Mohammad Abu Rumman is the Academic Advisor of Politics and Society Institute in Amman and has contributed this article to The Jordan Times.

Opinion

Haaretz: US Finally Independent From Israel

CrossFireArabia
May 12, 2025

An article in Haaretz reports that Israel has suffered several blows in recent days in its historical relations with the United States. And that US President Donald Trump no longer requires Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Tel Aviv for Washington’s nuclear cooperation with Riyadh.

Adding insult to injury to the Israel occupying state, Trump has reached an agreement with the Houthis Ansar Allah group to end US military strikes on Yemen. This is plus the fact the US has began negotiations with Iran without the blessing of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Further to that a US official in the Trump administration also held direct contact with the Hamas.

However, Odeh Basharat in his Haaretz article argues that the most painful blow Israel has ever suffered was Trump’s dismissal of his National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, due to a discussion he had with Netanyahu, behind Trump’s back, about launching a military attack on Iran.

Basharat said the United States has finally begun to wake up and free itself from the shackles of Israel, and act as an independent state, not a “banana republic.” Basharat, a journalist from the Arab world, expressed his astonishment at these developments and wondered whether what was happening before his eyes was real or merely an illusion.

The writer believes that a seismic clash is taking place between the two countries and the two men, and that all the reasons are now converging. “America is gaining its independence 250 years after the beginning of its First Revolutionary War,” referring to the war that took place between 1765 and 1783, when 13 British colonies in North America rejected British colonial rule and gained their independence.

Basharat describes this emancipation as the Great American Rebellion, and attributes its causes to the fact that the world—and the United States as part of it—felt deeply concerned by what the writer, with biting sarcasm, called “Israel’s diplomatic acrobatics,” its “enlightened occupation” of the Palestinian territories, and its “closure (of the Gaza Strip) that allows only air in.”

According to the article, as soon as Israel reaches an agreement on a particular issue, it adds new conditions the next day. Although the Arab states that signed peace agreements with Israel were not required to recognize it as a Jewish and democratic state, only the Palestinians are required to do so, which, as Basharat argues, permanently relegates Israeli Arabs to second-class citizens.

According to the article, it has become clear that Netanyahu is deceiving everyone: Arabs, Jews, and Americans, not just Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, as he previously boasted to Israeli police investigators that he misled and deceived them, then bombed them.

Since the time of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, the state’s policy has been based on force. In contrast, Trump seems to believe in a policy of carrots and sticks—meaning diplomacy and force combined—according to the article.

The author claims that the US president thinks differently, as demonstrated by his actions toward the Houthis, Iran, and the tariffs. Once he realized he had failed, he took a step back.

As for Israel, its problem does not lie solely with Netanyahu, as Basharat argues, but rather with the fact that it has not offered an alternative to force. Only three of its former prime ministers, according to the article, have taken a different path: Moshe Sharett, whom Ben-Gurion was keen to overthrow; Yitzhak Rabin, who paid for it with his life; and Ehud Olmert, who was ousted before even presenting his plan.

Furthermore, Israel has long treated the White House as a branch of its prime minister’s office, intervening in the wording of every sentence in documents issued by Washington regarding Israel, according to the Haaretz article as reported in Al Jazeera.