Abraham Accords Archives - CrossFireArarbia

‘Insulting Phone Call’, Beirut, Iran and Changing Dynamics

CrossFireArabia
June 3, 2026

By Abdul Bari Atwan

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrated his ability to effectively redraw the maps and borders of the Middle East when he backed down from striking Beirut’s southern suburb to completely destroying it. He succumbed to the threats and pressure from US President Donald Trump. In this respect here, Iran can be considered to have become a regional superpower not only in the Middle East, the West and Central Asia, but globally.

Trump, who previously threatened to wipe Iran off the map and unleash hell upon it, destroying all its energy and electricity infrastructure, scurried like a frightened rabbit to the phone to call Netanyahu in a “call of insults,” ordering him to immediately halt all plans to bomb Beirut’s southern suburb and withdraw his troops and warplanes en route to the area, just hours before the bombings and destructions where to begin.

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In a Washington Post interview, Trump completely changed his threatening tone and began pleading for peace with Iran, after extending the unilateral ceasefire by 60 days. More importantly, he expressed his desire for a summit with Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei as soon as an agreement is reached, and confirmed that Mojtaba, whom he had previously claimed was no longer alive, is now involved in the decision-making process regarding war and peace in the current conflict.

The new and effective ‘password’ in the Middle East, reflecting Iran’s “power shift,” is embodied in its thunderous response to the Israeli threat to destroy the southern suburb of Beirut, western Bekaa Valley, and Nabatieh. Iran launched hundreds of missiles and drones to strike deep into occupied Israel, sending a clear message: “Greater Tel Aviv in exchange for the southern suburb.”

The Iranian leadership, backed by a solid popular base, a highly advanced missile and drone industry, a naval fleet, and over 460 kilograms of uranium enriched above 60%—enriched to produce 10 nuclear bombs in a few days—says what it means and acts accordingly. It will not tolerate injustice and is prepared for all eventualities.

There is ample evidence to support this assertion, as demonstrated early Wednesday morning when Iranian missiles and drones struck US military bases in Kuwait and Bahrain in retaliation for attacks on an Iranian oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz and a communications tower on Qeshm Island, both launched from these bases.

The American-Israeli alliance has, since the October War of 1973, grown accustomed to a deeply ingrained official Arab subservience, a failure to respond to any Israeli aggression, and a refusal to reject any American dictates. Most Arab leaders turn the other cheek to Israeli and American slaps, becoming indifferent to the situation. But now, someone has emerged to uproot this system of surrender and usher in a new, truly Islamic era—an era of resistance, where the response is not merely in kind, but in a stronger and more significant way.

Mohsen Rezaei, advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, summarized this new military, political, and moral upheaval in a statement saying, “America and its president, Trump, should expect a barrage of missiles (hypersonic and cluster warheads) and drones should they renew their aggression against Iran.”

Netanyahu, who craved the limelight and the humiliation of Arabs, and who rubbed his hands with glee at the long line of Arab leaders queuing before his office seeking normalization and the signing of the Abraham Accords, has fallen silent and disappeared from the public eye. He no longer dares to threaten to destroy Iran alone, without America’s participation in the aggression.

The dictates Trump issued just days ago, the shifting balance of power on the ground, and Iran’s threat of retaliation for any aggression against Lebanon have evaporated. The American president, as a New York Times editorial acknowledged, has failed miserably in all his wars since arriving at the White House a year and a half ago—in Iran, Ukraine, and the Gaza Strip—and has not achieved his objectives and has become a laughingstock.

As for the Gulf states – those that normalized relations and/or those that were eager to join the “Abraham Accords” to avoid angering Trump and rejecting his demands – they reached a firm conviction that America is incapable of protecting itself, its bases, and its ships.

The most prominent evidence of this is the destruction of American military bases in their countries, including the US Navy base in Bahrain, and the closure of these bases and Saudi airspace to planes and drones, whilst preventing them from launching attacks on Iran from their territory. They saved the Hajj season, just as they saved themselves and their people from the consequences of the mirage of American power.

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In conclusion, we sympathize with our Kuwaiti brothers who were injured as a result of an Iranian missile attack on the passenger terminal at Kuwait Airport, whether by mistake or deliberately. However, the blame lies entirely with those who allowed America to use Kuwaiti territory as a launching pad for aggression against Islamic Iran. America possesses three aircraft carriers and more than 300 warships in the Arabian Sea, so why didn’t it use them in this aggression? And why does it insist on using its bases in the Gulf states, thereby endangering millions of their citizens?

Abdul Bari Atwan is the Chief Editor of the Arabic Al Rai Al Youm and his piece has appeared in the English crossfirearabia.com English website.

Opinion

Netanyahu Leaves Washington Empty-Handed

CrossFireArabia
February 13, 2026

By Mohammad Al-Kassim

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned from Washington without the outcome he had clearly hoped for, or the outcome he had led his domestic audience to expect in the days before the trip.

The visit, hastily moved up by a week and framed by Netanyahu as urgent and decisive, ended with a brief, anodyne statement from his office. There was no joint appearance, no press conference, and no public declaration of alignment with President Donald Trump on Iran.

When Netanyahu met with Trump at the White House on Wednesday, Iran was top of the Israeli PM’s agenda. And on his way back to Israel, Netanyahu said he had made his feelings clear – “not hide my general scepticism about the possibility of reaching any agreement with Iran”.

For a leader who typically amplifies diplomatic achievements and personal rapport with American presidents — from his 2015 address to Congress opposing the Obama administration’s Iran deal to his close partnership with Trump during the Abraham Accords — the restraint was striking.

President Trump, for his part, said “nothing definitive” had been decided.

The White House made clear that negotiations with Iran remain ongoing following the first exploratory round of US–Iran talks aimed at testing parameters for a possible new nuclear framework.

That, in itself, was the headline Netanyahu had hoped to prevent.

Meeting defined by what didn’t happen

Netanyahu arrived in Washington, saying he would present Israel’s “guiding principles” for negotiations with Iran.

But there was nothing fundamentally new in those principles — nor in the message he delivered.

For more than three decades, Netanyahu has framed Iran as an existential threat to Israel, warning of its nuclear ambitions in international forums, including at the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, where he famously drew a red line on a cartoon bomb.

His objectives have been consistent: weaken Iran by any means available; prefer regime change if possible; and, failing that, ensure Iran is permanently deprived of nuclear capabilities and long-range missiles.

After last year’s direct, unprovoked Israeli attack on Iran, missile capabilities have become even more central to Israel’s demands.

In Washington, Netanyahu pushed a maximalist position:

no uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, a demand that goes beyond previous US negotiating frameworks, including the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which permitted limited enrichment under strict monitoring;
strict limits — ideally elimination — of Iran’s ballistic missile programme, a core pillar of Tehran’s deterrence strategy and long considered non-negotiable by Iranian leadership;
constraints on Iran’s regional allies and proxy networks, and
Israeli freedom of action to strike Iran, even under any future agreement.

He also opposes any ‘sunset clause’ seeking permanent restrictions that would entrench Israel’s strategic dominance in the region.

None of this aligns with the trajectory of US–Iran diplomacy.

While the Trump administration has yet to spell out the precise parameters of a potential agreement, early signals from Washington point to a more limited objective than Israel has been demanding.

The focus appears to be on extending Iran’s nuclear breakout timeline and preventing weaponisation — rather than eliminating uranium enrichment altogether or dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

In effect, the White House seems to be testing whether an imperfect but enforceable deal is achievable before turning to escalation.

That approach reflects a calculation that containing Iran’s nuclear advances, even partially, may be preferable to the risks of confrontation or military action.

At the same time, President Trump has sharpened his rhetoric.

He reiterated his commitment to negotiations but paired it with a stark warning: if Iran fails to reach a nuclear deal with Washington, the outcome would be, in his words, “very traumatic”.

For the first time, Trump also attached a timeframe to that ultimatum, suggesting that diplomacy has a limited window — roughly the next month — before consequences follow.

The message from Washington is deliberate ambiguity: diplomacy remains the preferred path, but the clock is now publicly ticking.

The timing of Netanyahu’s trip is critical. Netanyahu advanced the visit shortly after the first round of US–Iran talks, signalling urgency — and concern.

Israeli officials feared momentum: that negotiations might move ahead before Israel could shape their parameters.

That fear appears well-founded. While Trump continues to issue rhetorical threats toward Iran, his actions suggest a preference for testing diplomacy before escalating militarily.

Domestic pressures and political stakes

Netanyahu’s urgency is also driven by domestic considerations.

His governing coalition faces mounting pressures, including disputes over military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox parties, budget constraints linked to prolonged wartime expenditures, and ongoing public dissatisfaction following the October 7 attacks and subsequent regional escalation.

A dramatic confrontation with Iran — or even the perception that he is leading one — would be politically transformative.

Iran remains one of the few issues in Israel that still commands near-consensus across coalition and opposition lines.

Netanyahu knows that. He has long positioned himself as the indispensable guardian against Tehran, and he needs to show Israeli voters that Washington remains closely aligned with him.

That explains the repeated emphasis, aimed at domestic audiences, on “coordination” with the US — even when public evidence of such coordination is thin.

According to Israeli assessments, Netanyahu brought intelligence to Washington intended to cast doubt on Iran’s intentions, including claims that Tehran is stalling negotiations, continuing executions, and refusing to engage seriously on missiles.

But if this intelligence was meant to derail diplomacy, it appears not to have succeeded.

Trump’s team — including Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Marco Rubio, and others — listened.

But the White House has not embraced Israel’s conclusion that negotiations are futile.

Instead, it appears determined to test whether a deal is possible, even if imperfect. That leaves Israel preparing for an alternative outcome.

The prevailing assessment in Israel is that talks may ultimately fail — either because Iranian demands prove incompatible with US red lines, or because Israel’s demands make an agreement politically or technically impossible.

That is precisely why Netanyahu insists on keeping the military option alive.

Behind closed doors, the three-hour meeting likely went beyond negotiating positions to contingency planning: what happens if talks collapse, how far Israel can act independently, and what level of US support or tolerance it might expect.

Israel’s core demand remains unchanged: freedom of action.

Despite public expressions of unity, Netanyahu and Trump are approaching Iran from different strategic premises.

Trump appears to value flexibility and leverage, using the prospect of force to extract concessions while keeping diplomatic channels open.

Netanyahu seeks permanence: structural constraints that prevent Iran from re-emerging as a threshold nuclear power under any future political configuration.

What binds them — at least for now — is political self-interest. Both prefer to avoid public confrontation. Both face domestic calculations. And both understand the risks of escalation.

For Netanyahu, however, the Washington visit underscored an uncomfortable reality: Israel can influence US policy, but it does not control it.

Diplomacy is moving forward — whether Israel likes it or not. – TRTWorld

Opinion

Trump, Maduro and Diminished Values

CrossFireArabia
January 6, 2026

By Dr Khairi Janbek

The late British historian Eric Hobsbawm had an interesting theory that of long centuries and short centuries. In the first, no big transformations happens, consequently these centuries are counted them in terms of numerics, like 100 years, for instance.

In the second case however, so many big transformations occur, and so these centuries are counted not numerically, but by their effect on human life, progress and development.

To this one wishes to add, that throughout history, people moved habitually into the new century with old ideas passing through and tipping over. Consequently, the grasping of the new developments is always difficult, and our current situation in the 21st century is, in fact, no different.

We have entered this century with the values inherited from the past 100 years with examples being the truth, legality, international law, human rights, sovereignty, and many other norms. Now, this is not to say in any way the values of the past century were ideal, but at least there were norms that could be appealed to not necessarily punish transgressors, but to embarrass them.

However today, and with the latest debacles, we have now entered an age in which you can easily add the word “post-” to all the aforementioned values. In fact we are in the age of post human values, in which the logic of pure force, and the law of the jungle prevails and used with no compunction.

With the latest action on Venezuela, the US administration is providing a new paradigm to the world: That of the policy of the backyard to illustrate the point and as used by British prime minister Neville Chamberlain prior to World War II and in which he wrote after the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Adolf Hitler, as being the dictator’s new backyard.

What he meant of course is that any entity with enough strength is permitted to go into countries which it considers to be its own backyard. Flipping back, today this is how America sees its new role, acting to prevent harm to US interests but also is willing to negotiate on other issues important for the interests of America.

As the situation stands, Washington through the Trump administration, is clearly moving to revive the Monroe Doctrine and use it unashamedly and in accordance with the backyard theory.

And as for the international outlook, the current US strategy is to push for extreme right-wing governments to run Europe, seeing the continent as an economically powerful block but without military swing and/or political clout and willing to negotiate to end the war in Ukraine to Russia’s advantage.

Meanwhile, Washington wants also to push the Abraham Accords in the Middle East and get Arab governments, especially the Saudis, to negotiate with Israel to liquidate the Palestinian problem once and for all. In this paradigm, the fate of Taiwan remains to be seen, whether it becomes the sacrificial lamb for US-China Accords or not. This is how one sees the balance.

However having said all that, and in this formula, the allies of the US can be hurt in as much way as the detractors of America.

Dr Janbek is a Jordanian historian living in Paris.

Opinion

Trump’s Nightmare Triangle

Dr Khairi Janbek
October 26, 2025

By Dr Khairi Janbek

For all intents and purposes, US President Donald Trump is presenting himself as the arbiter of Arab-Israeli relations, and/or Arab-Israeli conflict and showing his presence as the patron for the time being, of the Gaza agreement. Therefore, no one, including Israel will be allowed to make him look bad in this multi-phased accord.

Most likely, his intention to reign in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and rejecting the Israeli rejection of the West Bank, boils down to keeping the Arabs on board in terms of money and influence for the success of his Gaza plan, as well as keeping his hopes alive for the Abrahamic Accords especially the red apple, Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Indeed Trump’s ambiguous stand of rejecting a Palestinian state while at the same time, rejecting Israeli annexation, either means giving the positive nod to Tel Aviv to create facts on the ground and create de facto annexation without the fanfare, and start the gradual population transfer, if we take Gaza as a precedence for his words, to Jordan and probably also to the wider Arab world, or, it could also be, that the future of the West Bank is intended to be united to the East Bank of River Jordan.

In the mean time, the world press talks about the continuous shuttle diplomacy of high-ranking Washington officials to Israel, and Trump’s warnings to Netanyahu, veiled as well explicit not to attempt to jeopardize the Gaza peace, to the extent of saying that Israel would lose all US support.

But what about the other side of this presumed potential rift? Netanyahu after two years of war, has nothing to show for it to the Israelis except barbarism, murder and destruction, in addition to gaining the status of becoming a fullyfledged international war criminal.

The war which he declared to finish off Hamas is increasingly controlled by the American plans, now, face a big failure with him reluctantly having to put up with. However it does not necessarily mean there are no other parties in his government, whose messianic fervour does not override the risk of losing American support, which indeed means, Netanyahu is now stuck between the rock and the hard place.

Indeed one cannot predict his longevity as the prime minister for Israel, but all what can be said is that, the alternative to him, is neither likely to be more peace loving, or more liberal in political outlook.

Dr Janbek is a Jordanian writer based in Paris, France

Analyses

Gaza: Changing The Middle East Face

CrossFireArabia
October 8, 2025

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation marked a turning point in the modern political history of the Middle East. Its repercussions have gone far beyond the Palestinian and regional arenas, extending to the international system and reshaping the foreign policies of global powers toward the region.

The timing of the operation was particularly significant: it came at a transitional moment in the regional order, in the absence of consensus among international and regional actors on the rules of the game. While a fragile balance of deterrence existed between the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—led by Iran (alongside the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad)—and Israel, the latter was in the midst of a new phase of regional integration through the Abraham Accords.

Several Arab capitals had already normalized relations, and others were on their way, creating an unprecedented political landscape. This shift coincided with the declining influence of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and the rising centrality of the Gulf states. Many analysts began describing this new configuration as a “New Middle East”: wealthy, economically driven, and detached from historical conflicts—unlike the “Old Middle East,” where entrenched crises defined politics.

Turkey, meanwhile, had entered its own phase of recalibration. Once a champion of the Arab Spring and regional Islamist movements, Ankara sought reconciliation with Arab states, even attempting to restore ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime (though rebuffed by Damascus), while focusing more narrowly on national security and northern Syria.

On the Palestinian front, Israel had grown complacent toward Gaza, convinced Hamas had no incentive to disrupt the status quo. Tensions, however, were mounting in the West Bank, with small armed groups emerging in places like Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. Within Israeli and Western policy circles, talk was spreading about the prospect of a “mini-state in Gaza” as a substitute for a Palestinian state.

At the international level, President Joe Biden’s administration lacked enthusiasm for either the Abraham Accords or Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” yet it effectively followed the same trajectory: pursuing “regional peace” by integrating Israel into a new economic order and reducing the Palestinian question to daily livelihood concerns—employment, services, and economic relief in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than a political resolution.

The Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent two-year genocidal war in Gaza shattered these calculations and fundamentally restructured strategic assumptions. Whether the outcome will ultimately benefit or harm the Palestinian cause remains too complex to assess in simple terms, but what is clear is that the pre-October 7 regional order no longer exists.

From a Palestinian perspective, the conflict has restored international attention to the cause, leading to a renewed recognition of its centrality. In the Gulf, the previously dominant security paradigm—which cast Iran as the chief threat while framing Israel as a potential partner—collapsed entirely. A new consensus has emerged: Gulf security is inseparable from the Palestinian issue, and the notion of Israel as a “strategic friend” has been critically reassessed.

Skeptics may argue that these shifts have not altered the balance of power on the ground, and they are partially correct. Yet the strategic narrative has changed. Before October 7, the trajectory was toward the erasure of the Palestinian cause (closing UNRWA, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, normalization, and de facto annexation of the West Bank). Today, there is growing recognition—regionally and internationally—that Israeli policies themselves are the root of instability, not Iran or other regional actors. As Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla put it on X (September 25): “When weighing who poses a greater threat to Gulf security and regional stability—Iran or Israel—the evidence points clearly to Israel. Israel’s brutal behavior has made it more dangerous than an exhausted Iran. The Gulf needs a new defensive and geopolitical strategy for the Middle East beyond Iran.”

Israel, however, now perceives a surplus of power and is pressing for a new political and security order that extends beyond the occupied territories. With the partial unraveling of the Iranian alliance and the breakdown of the “Syrian corridor” that once linked Tehran to the Mediterranean, Israel has set its sights on even more ambitious goals, including the proposed “David Corridor” and establishing buffer zones around its borders in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

In response, a tentative regional coalition has begun to take shape, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, with notable support from Turkey and Pakistan. The latter signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia following Israel’s strike on Qatar and has since become more engaged in regional diplomacy. While fragile and constrained, this alignment presents a rare historic opportunity to rebuild a regional balance of power and establish a new deterrence framework.

Another striking development is the shift in Europe’s stance toward Israel. For the first time, Israel has lost significant ground in Western public opinion and media narratives, particularly among younger generations and in universities. This has pushed Israel closer to isolation—a position from which former U.S. President Donald Trump had tried to rescue it through his proposed Gaza peace plan, which was largely about securing U.S. and Israeli interests, without offering real guarantees for Palestinian statehood or ending the occupation.

In conclusion, it is still too early to judge the full strategic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the war in Gaza. Scenarios remain open, and outcomes uncertain. Yet one thing is indisputable: the region today is no longer what it was before October 7.

Abu Rumman is an Academic Advisor of the Politics and Society Institute and Professor of Political Science in The University of Jordan and published this article in The Jordan Times.