Jordan 2007! Elections and Hiccups: Looking Backwards

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article was written more than 18 years again in October 2007 for the 7iber.com online portal and is reprinted her

Its election time! As a good non-totalitarian democrat I love the elections, when they happen that is. What I really love about the elections is the time leading up to their finale when voters go up to the polling stations and vote. Although I’ve never voted in my life, I’ve always carefully watched election campaigns, right from start to finish. They are exciting days, of banners hoisted, constituency meets, mini-rallies and all the rest of it.

Prospective candidates, some running for the very first time and of which we are expected to know and vote for, hoist their banners across streets and roundabouts, screaming at the electorate to vote for them because they are the best candidates.

This is the 15th elections for the 15th Lower House, and parliament in Jordan has consistently been in session since 1989, after a long absence of parliamentary life in the country. I am proud to say I covered the 1993 elections, the 1997 ones, and just about missed the 2003 elections because of being away from Jordan.

In all these years, the excitement never faded. Islamic Action Front candidates continuously stood under the IAF banner, but this was never the case with the other political parties, such as the nationalists, the leftists, the middle-of-the-roaders and the tribalists. Although a lot of parties came on the scene after 1993, like Al Ahad, Al Yaqatha and Al Risala and still many others, for some reason or another, many of their candidates preferred to stand as independents arguing they are known for their own independent political personalities rather than as representatives of their parties.

Is this a wrong attitude? Well, maybe. However, once some of them were elected to the Lower House of Parliament, they revealed their true political colors and supposedly argued on party-political lines. Ironically, most of the electorate never knew what those lines were when the MP was just a candidate running for a seat. Many of these parliamentarians argued that they stood a better chance of getting into parliament as individuals rather than under the banner of their political parties. This is due to the belief that such organizations were still seen as relatively new and unknown, despite the fact that many, including leftists, Arab nationalists and Baathists parties, had existed in the 1960s and 1970s, but many of which were effectively banned.

They may of course have been right in their assumptions as political parties were just made legal in the early 1990s, and have thus needed time to be nurtured. As independents, the negative connotations of belonging to political parties would wither away among the electorates who needed to get used to voting for candidates on party political platforms. But the problem with running on independent tickets is that it actually perpetuated individualism, parochialism and depended on the appeal to family, kinship and tribal relations. In past Jordanian parliamentary elections, and even today, the tribal bloc vote has been very important in deciding who wins and who loses.

The effect of this frustrates the process of developing political parties, which, except for the Islamic Action Front, remains weak, ineffective and are no more than talking shop. They have even been used by established politicians to further their own individual political ends and causes. This stands contrary to the need for building modern, strong political parties designed to make democracy and the democratic experiment effective.

Realizing that there is a lot to say about the tribal vote, sometimes political candidates, even Islamists, have been known to appeal to kinship and family relationships as a means of getting into parliament. Once they do, they start the usual game of political party meandering under the parliamentary dome.

That may also be why election banners and slogans on roads are no more than hackneyed, clichéd phrases emptied from their political content. They are read for what they are: brief formulaic statements, lacking the resonance of strong, vibrant agendas and political manifestos that promise change and development, as is the case with elections in more mature democracies around the world.

Political parties in Europe, for instance, are big machines with national and local clout. Everyone, especially the main personalities, know who they are, what they stand for, and what they hope to do once they form the government, or become the party in the majority. In this part of the world, the political culture, machinations and value systems are different and have to be treated differently.

However, in the final analysis, a political party is a political party in which ever part of the world it belongs to; sharing little differences with its counterparts. That’s why such parties have to be strong, come out of their closed shops and enclosures, and appeal to the masses; become broad-based with clout in order to be listened to by decision-makers.

In all fairness however, we have to be gentle with our political parties by understanding the history and the context of where they came from. It took political parties in the western world, centuries to develop and become the national institutions they are today.
They emerged through political struggles and a great deal of pushing and shoving.

But does that mean we have to take that long? Not necessarily, the element of transition from one era to another can take place quickly, but it has to be supported by the state and government. There has to be a political will for democracy, where parties are nurtured rather than left alone.

Jordan is doing well despite different hiccups, but the Arab world in general has to pull itself by the bootstraps if it is to enter into a meaningful political era where representation, democracy and political pluralism is seen as healthy for a society. Our problem now is to move faster in order to catch up with the rest of the world, and develop politically.

In the meantime, let’s for a minute stop and enjoy the political actions of the electoral campaign.

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Hormuz: Mines, Strategy or Business?

By Ismail Al Sharif

The US thought that assassinating senior Iranian leaders would bring down the regime, but this did not happen.

Iran’s inability to match American military and technological superiority led it to adopt a number of strategies, most notably what is known in the military literature as the Mosaic Defense Doctrine. This doctrine is based on dismantling its military central command into small, independent units, each operating autonomously and making its own decisions without consulting the higher command.

From Day 1 of the war, Iran adopted this approach. However, the lack of coordination and the disintegration of the military hierarchy led to chaos and confusion which affected the management of its operations. The situation became contradictory; the politicians were declaring one thing and military commanders acting in a completely different manner and direction.

This was reflected on the ground through extremely dangerous behavior. Military units, using small boats, indiscriminately laid naval mines to deter enemy ships. However, the lack of coordination here backfired resulting in the Iranian navy officers losing their ability to pinpoint the coordinates of the mines they planted in the Hormuz Strait with no accurate maps or reliable records. Some of these mines may have been completely displaced by the currents of the sea. This was further complicated by the fact that these mines were not primitive but far from it; they were sophisticated and able to detect sound and pressure, and thus able to track the passage of large ships and submarines, and detonate automatically upon approach.

However, mine removal is not easy task, as history shows. Even today, news reports continue to surface of mines in various parts of the Kingdom, half a century after the last war. Indeed, mines from World War II are still being discovered on land and at sea.

Even with Britain’s pledge to remove mines after the war, and despite possessing the latest specialized technologies in this field, the task remains arduous, protracted, and uncertain. The specter of a sudden explosion looms, reminding us that the danger of mines is not easily eliminated.

But the decisive factor in weakening navigation in the Hormuz Strait is not primarily military, but rather material. Commercial ships are massive investments, with some vessels valued at around $150 million and their cargoes potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Therefore, a single mine explosion can cause catastrophic losses to both the ship and its cargo. Consequently, no ship sails without insurance; ports, banks, and shipping companies refuse to deal with uninsured vessels, and without insurance, global shipping grinds to a halt.

Herein lies the real surprise: the fate of the Strait is no longer dependent on Iran’s pronouncements regarding its opening or closure, but has effectively fallen into the hands of insurance companies. With the escalating risks, insurance costs have skyrocketed; “war risk” premiums have jumped from approximately 0.25% of the ship’s value to nearly 1% or more, exceeding a massive $1 million per voyage. And it doesnt stop there; seven major insurance companies announced their complete withdrawal, issuing notices of coverage cancellation just within just 72 hours.

And here comes the decisive turning point: Once the insurance coverage is lost, maritime traffic ground to a halt. During this 39-war, ships have effectively ceased sailing with the number of vessels transiting the Strait plummeting by more than 80%. Around 150 oil tankers remain anchored offshore, and major shipping companies suspended their operations, as if this vital artery of global trade had been frozen by a financial, rather than a military decision.

The US government attempted to provide alternative insurance coverage, but this effort failed and US President Trump’s pronouncements regarding mine removal were inconsistent with the reality.

The issue of reopening the Strait has once again become a prominent topic, but the deeper truth is that its fate is no longer determined by political statements or military actions, but rather by the decisions of insurance experts. Even if the war were to end immediately, ships would not resume sailing right away. Insurance companies need time to reassess the level of risk, and they base their decisions not on political logic, but on cold, hard numbers and rigorous data.

This article was originally published in Arabic in Addustour daily newspaper and republished in English in crossfirearabia.com.

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Analysis: Israel Seeks “Most” Out of Ceasefire

Military-strategic expert retired Major-General Mamoun Abu Nuwar states the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip remains extremely fragile as Israel continues to control the ground, security corridors and the buffer zone east of the enclave.

Abu Nuwar told Jordan 24 the current situation on the so-called “yellow line”—with its construction, improvements, and the creation of earthen fortifications—clearly shows Israel wants to make this line a permanent reality and has no intention of withdrawing from east of Gaza and will continue to carry out airstrikes and artillery shelling under the pretext of “thwarting imminent terrorist attacks.”

He added Israel seeks to establish a new reality on the ground and reinforce its security presence in the eastern areas, while simultaneously continuing to bombard the western areas of the Strip. This, he clarified, threatens the continuation of the truce and reduces it to a mere shadow.

Retired Major-General Mamoun Abu Nuwar

Regarding the formation of an international stabilization force in Gaza, Abu Nuwar explained it would be “a key element in the transitional phase,” but its success hinges on several crucial factors, notably a clear UN and Security Council.

He pointed out that any international force wouldn’t succeed without first of all coordinating it with and agreement of Hamas. He said without this, such a force would be seen as an occupation force exposing it to armed confrontation with the other resistance factions.

He stressed such force must have specific and clear tasks limited to maintaining security and assisting in the reconstruction of Gaza, along with establishing rules of engagement and a unified command structure to prevent a slide into open conflict.

Abu Nuwar indicated disarming Hamas is going to be one of the most “significant obstacles” to a settlement, as Israel insists on making it a precondition for any reconstruction or withdrawal. This is while Hamas states it would only disarm if a just political settlement leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state is reached.

He added Hamas agreed in principle to the formation of a technocratic administrative committee to take over the administration of Gaza and to allow the deployment of a new Palestinian force currently being trained in Jordan and Egypt, as part of an international plan to manage the next phase. However, Israel rejects the presence of Turkish forces in any potential mission and prefers the participation of countries such as Azerbaijan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Abu Nuwar believes Israel will not withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip and will seek to maintain its security and military control over the border crossings and areas. He pointed out the continuation of this situation could lead to new waves of displacement of Palestinians, given the catastrophic humanitarian conditions in the south, particularly in Rafah and Khan Younis.

He indicated any attempts to rebuild or develop new areas in Rafah will fail unless the siege is lifted and full Palestinian control is restored. He noted the continued ambiguity surrounding the “yellow line” drawn by Israel east of the Gaza Strip suggests there is an attempt to impose a new geographical and political division in the enclave

Abu Nuwar concluded by saying that the road to a political solution or a comprehensive peaceful settlement is still long and arduous, especially with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s lack of interest in the political process due to his internal electoral calculations. He stressed that the continuation of the current situation will make the ceasefire merely a cover for a new occupation reality, and will open the door to repeated clashes and numerous difficulties in implementing any peace plan or genuine reconstruction.

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Palestinian Omar Yaghi Gets Chemistry Nobel Prize

Palestinian refugee in Jordan, chemist Omar Yaghi won the 2025 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on metal–organic frameworks (MOFs). He shares the award with Richard Robson of the University of Melbourne and Susumu Kitagawa of Kyoto University.

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences praised the trio for “creating molecular constructions with large spaces through which gases and other chemicals can flow.” MOFs can store, filter, and transform molecules, with applications in clean energy, carbon capture, and water harvesting.

Yaghi, originally from Al-Masmiyya al-Kabira Village, which was depopulated by zionist militias in 1948, was born in Amman in 1965 to a family of Palestinian refugees. He spent his childhood in modest conditions and later moved to the United States to pursue his education. He studied at Hudson Valley Community College and earned a BSc in Chemistry cum laude in 1985. He completed his PhD at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1990 according to the Quds News Network.

Yaghi held postdoctoral and faculty positions at Harvard, Arizona State University, University of Michigan, and UCLA before joining UC Berkeley in 2012. He leads research programs that promote global scientific collaboration, including the Berkeley Global Science Institute, which has research centers in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

In his first remarks after receiving the Nobel Prize, Yaghi described science as an “equalising force” that allows anyone, anywhere, to contribute to humanity. “Science levels the playing field,” he said.

His work on MOFs has helped develop materials that can capture carbon dioxide, store hydrogen and methane, and extract drinking water from arid air. Yaghi’s research bridges organic and inorganic chemistry and has influenced clean energy and sustainability efforts worldwide.

Yaghi is a member of multiple scientific academies, including the US National Academy of Sciences and the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina. He has received numerous awards, such as the 2024 Tang Prize in Sustainable Development, the 2018 Wolf Prize in Chemistry, and the 2025 Von Hippel Award.

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Palestinian State and The Poker Game

By Dr Khairi Janbek

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a politician above all else. He is dogmatist in rejecting a Palestinian state, and a pragmatist when he talks about it, but all that depends on the position taken by the United States. 

Ever since one can remember from the days of the Oslo Agreements, a Palestinian state, as a term swung between two conceptions: A future project on the ground, and a slogan up-in-the-air to pander on, and as many from my generation remember the rather acerbic comment: Gaza-Jericho First of 1993 which came to be the first and the last.

The Israeli government of that time, believed that it would bring the Palestinians to independenance as interlocutors in determining the occupied West Bank of Jordan that came about by discussing the issue through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

However, the little that was agreed upon started to be eroded by the first Netanyahu government, which at times implicitly and at times explicitly acted in the way so as to negate the Oslo agreements with impunity.

One would like to say that since then plenty of water has passed under the bridge, but when it comes to the Palestinian issue, it’s always the same water and the same bridge.

At this point one must say that everywhere in the media there are supposedly leaks and plans about the day after with regards to the Gaza Strip. However, the only consensus between the international community at large and officialdom of the Arab world, is that Hamas should surrender its weapons. But really what happens next?

Silence in the Arab world rules the scene which is in a way saying what cannot be said, which is in other words don’t involve us directly but we shall try to do what we can. This is habitually the Arab position in always being reactive rather than active.

And now on the international scene is the big drive to recognize a Palestinian state, which is for the time being affirming a point of principle, and towards which Israel is actually debating the annexation of the West Bank, as if to say, if the West Bank is reoccupied by Israel, where is this Palestine you want to recognize?

And adding insult to injury, the Washington administration has refused entry to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the PNA leadership to attend the UN General Assembly meetings. This indicates that it does not recognize that there is a leadership of the Palestinians.

However, and despite saying this, one wishes to be able to say that we might be jumping the proverbial gun, in the sense that, the issue is just a matter of tit-for-tat telling states: You recognize Palestine we take measures to counter that, but alas the Israeli annexation was contemplated long before the international recognition of a Palestinian state.

Now, what will it mean if Israel does go ahead and annexes the West Bank and cancels the Palestinian authority? Well, once again the international community, to the exclusion of the USA, will have to consider the West Bank as and Israeli occupied territory, and once again, the world will have to go back to the Security Council for an attempt to resolve the issue.

Dr Khairi Janbek is a Jordanian columnist living in Paris, France.

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