No official announcement was made following the Riyadh Summit, which was considered fraternal, friendly, and consultative rather than formal. The summit, held a few days ago, was attended by the Gulf states, along with Jordan and Egypt, in anticipation of the Cairo Summit scheduled for March 4. The Cairo Summit is expected to approve and announce a new Arab plan for rebuilding Gaza as an alternative to Trump’s plan. However, more importantly, the Arab plan presents a comprehensive political approach linking the Gaza issue to the establishment of a Palestinian state and a peaceful resolution in the region. This approach counters Israel’s new policies, which are based on political hegemony—not only in Palestine by eliminating the two-state solution but also by expanding Israel’s security boundaries to include parts of Syria and Lebanon and inciting the U.S. into a confrontation with Iran.
The Egyptian-Arab approach is still in its final stages of preparation. It takes into account a combination of financial, technical, political, and security aspects concerning Gaza. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa has proposed modifications to the plan originally put forward by the World Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union, which estimated the cost of rebuilding Gaza at over $50 billion in a rapid and preliminary needs and damage assessment report (IRDNA). Instead, Mustafa proposed a more realistic and feasible plan costing no more than $20 billion, to be implemented in three phases. The Egyptians have incorporated this into their reconstruction plan, which includes dividing Gaza into three safe zones, using temporary housing (caravans) and tents, and developing a technical vision for redesigning the sector’s infrastructure through specialized Egyptian companies.
The Arab approach links the reconstruction plan to several key elements. The first is the technical, logistical, and financial aspect of rebuilding. The second is reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA) to counter Israeli claims of its incompetence, with reform measures covering political and security aspects. The third element concerns the administration of Gaza in the post-occupation phase. A significant development has occurred with the Palestinians agreeing on a temporary administrative committee responsible for technocratic affairs. Hamas has accepted this arrangement, and President Mahmoud Abbas has reluctantly agreed to it, as it implicitly means that the PA will not return to Gaza.
The most challenging aspect of the Arab plan lies in the security arrangements during the reconstruction phase. Arab states refuse to deploy security forces or enter Gaza without a clear vision for ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. As Arab diplomats emphasize, what is needed is not just a roadmap for resolving the Palestinian issue, but rather an agreement on final-status issues and recognition of a Palestinian state—followed by a roadmap for implementation, not the other way around.
The most contentious issue in the Arab approach is Hamas’s weapons. Israel, along with the United States, will not accept Hamas retaining its weapons in Gaza. Israel has made it clear that it links the second phase of the process to this condition, and the U.S. has accepted this demand. On the other hand, the Arab side ties the issue of disarming non-state actors to the establishment of a Palestinian state that would have the exclusive right to possess weapons. The key question remains: Who would disarm Hamas? The only legitimate entity that could do so is a recognized Palestinian state, which remains the missing piece in U.S. policies that align with Benjamin Netanyahu’s vision.
The Arabs hope that this approach will establish a new framework for relations with the United States and offer alternative strategic options. They even believe it could persuade President Donald Trump to secure several achievements—perhaps even earning him a Nobel Peace Prize in the end.
This is undoubtedly a highly optimistic approach, but it represents a new Arab attempt to present a united position and alternative strategic options. However, the biggest challenge this vision overlooks lies in the details. As the saying goes, “the devil is in the details.” What kind of Palestinian state is actually possible under the current circumstances? What was previously proposed by Trump himself? Is there a single Palestinian—any Palestinian—who could accept a state comprising only 30% of the West Bank, without East Jerusalem, and without control over borders? How could Hamas and its supporters—or even the majority of Palestinian refugees—be convinced of such a proposal, even if there were Israeli and American acceptance of the new Arab approach?
Mohammad Abu Rumman is a columnist in The Jordan Times.
CrossFireArabia
