How Do You Deal With a ‘Political Earthquake’?

The Middle East has long been accustomed to dramatic events and repeated surprises. However, it is undeniable that what came before October 7 is fundamentally different from what followed.

This shift is not only due to the ongoing wars that have spread beyond Gaza to other fronts, nor solely because of the consequences these conflicts have triggered across the region. More significantly, it has exposed the harsh realities the region faces, from the collapse of the concept of the state and its implications to the erosion of national identities and the emergence of new ethnic, sectarian, and geographical standards reshaping political maps.

Over the past years, the failure of the nation-state model, coupled with its reduction to authoritarian concepts, has played a pivotal role in deepening the psychological division in many countries, a division that, in many cases, precedes geographical fragmentation.

In the current geopolitical landscape, Gaza is no longer the Gaza we once knew. With the absence of a viable Arab-led solution, the US administration, despite its often-contradictory diplomatic statements, still keeps the depopulation of Gaza on the table as a practical resolution. Meanwhile, the West Bank is experiencing Israeli operations aimed at bringing about a radical transformation, one that all parties may soon have to accept as a new reality.

Syria, too, has entered a state of turmoil that makes it increasingly difficult to revert to its former political and territorial structure. Whether through shifts in internal power dynamics or anticipated geographical and political changes, Syria is on a path of transformation.

These unprecedented changes, which directly impact Jordan, impose urgent requirements for adaptation and strategic engagement with new realities. This new era demands a shift in priorities, making “Jordanian-focused thinking” a fundamental approach to navigating the geopolitical and security challenges unfolding across the region.

This strategic recalibration must take place on three levels. The first involves managing relations with the current U.S. administration, which has been in the White House for only a few weeks yet has already triggered a geopolitical earthquake on the global stage. For Jordan to remain a key regional player, it must employ new tools and diplomatic tactics that emphasize effectiveness and tangible results, especially considering that this administration is highly focused on reassessing the utility of aid provided to its allies.

The second is the regional shift, where several key issues stand out. The evolving relationship with Israel, which is shifting dramatically and deteriorating from bad to worse, requires a reconsidered strategy for future engagement. The relationship with Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, demands greater attention, not only because Saudi Arabia remains the only pillar of stability in the region but also due to its economic and political influence, which could prove crucial for Jordan in the coming phase. In this context, the concept of “political and economic integration” should be the foundation for shaping and strengthening ties between the two countries.

Perhaps the most pressing regional challenge is Jordan’s approach to Syria. Changes are already unfolding in the areas adjacent to Jordan’s northern border, creating a new reality that Jordan must navigate carefully. It is imperative to formulate a strategy that not only secures borders but also leverages new political and economic configurations to serve Jordan’s long-term interests.

The third is the domestic, and most important recalibration, how does Jordan adapt to these external shifts and their internal repercussions? This phase demands a new political discourse and a fresh approach to managing internal affairs. Shielding Jordan from external shocks, narratives of fragmentation, sectarian polarization, and social discord requires a two-pronged strategic response: strengthening the bureaucratic system and reinforcing national identity.

This necessitates a well-crafted national narrative, a reinvigoration of collective national consciousness, and tangible policy actions that signal the beginning of a new phase of resilience and transformation, one that will be the defining test of the coming period.

Dr Amer Al Sabaileh is a columnist in the Jordan Times

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The A, B, C to Rebuilding Gaza

By Dr Raad Mahmoud Al-Tal

According to the Gaza reconstruction plan report from the temporary Arab Summit in Cairo, Gaza’s economy shrank by 83 per cent in 2024. Unemployment rose to 80%, and inflation reached 309.4 per cent in October 2024 due to severe supply shortages. On the humanitarian side, 91 per cent of Gaza’s population faces food insecurity, and this number is expected to rise to 1.95 million by April 2025. The healthcare system is collapsing, with 64 per cent of primary health centers out of service, and 25 per cent of the injured require long-term rehabilitation. Education is also in crisis, with 745,000 children out of school because schools were either destroyed or used as shelters. Over a million children need psychological and social support, and there are between 17,000 and 18,000 unaccompanied children, which makes child care even more difficult.

The damage in Gaza is divided into three categories: areas completely destroyed, which need the rubble cleared and infrastructure rebuilt from scratch; semi-destroyed areas, which need repairs to restore basic services; and lightly damaged areas, which require limited work to restore services and ensure ongoing reconstruction. The damage is assessed by comparing the current situation to how things were before the crisis, and the affected assets are classified into three levels: fully destroyed, partially damaged, and lightly damaged.

The reconstruction plan has two phases. The first phase, early recovery, will take 6 months and cost $3 billion. This phase includes clearing rubble, repairing main roads, providing 200,000 temporary housing units, and restoring 60,000 damaged homes. The second phase, which is the main reconstruction phase, will take 5 years and cost $50 billion. It is split into two parts: The first part, lasting 2 years at a cost of $20 billion, involves finishing the rubble removal, building 200,000 homes, repairing 20,000 acres of farmland, and setting up water desalination plants and sewage treatment facilities. The second part, lasting 2.5 years at a cost of $30 billion, involves building 200,000 more homes, developing ports, creating an industrial zone, and building a coastal road.

Housing has been the hardest-hit sector, with 15,000 homes completely destroyed. The plan aims to build 150,000 new homes and provide 100,000 temporary homes, costing $15 billion. About 30 per cent of Gaza’s farmland was also destroyed, requiring the rehabilitation of 10,000 hectares at a cost of $5.6 billion. The water and electricity sectors also need significant investment to keep providing essential services to the people. The total cost of reconstruction is estimated at $53 billion over 10 years. The funds for this will come from international donors, humanitarian organizations, and local investments. Around $4.5 billion will be for development projects, and $18 billion will go toward infrastructure.

For the reconstruction plan to succeed, it is important to get enough financial resources to fix the huge damage in Gaza. This will help restore normal life and improve the economic and social situation, leading to long-term sustainable development. To ensure the plan works, it is crucial to have different sources of funding. These could include the United Nations, international financial organizations, donor countries, investment funds, government agencies, development banks, and civil society groups.

An international trust fund will be set up to manage the funds efficiently, ensuring transparency and proper oversight. The Egyptian government will also hold a high-level conference in Cairo, in partnership with the Palestinian Authority and the United Nations, to gather the necessary support for the reconstruction plan. This conference will bring together donor countries, international and regional financial institutions, the Palestinian and international private sectors, and civil society organizations. It will be a key event to secure financial resources and suggest investment projects that can be implemented with the help of supporting organizations.

The writer is head of the Economics Department – University of Jordan – [email protected]

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US-Hamas Talks: Netanyahu’s Double-Wound

The current talks between US officials and Hamas leaders in Qatar is certainly a deep wound for the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who had long promised that he would finish off the Islamic organization in Gaza for good.

Indeed, it’s a double-wound for Netanyahu and his extremist government who had been under an illusion, perhaps a strong word to use, that US President Donald Trump would long share the Israeli extremist objectives of taking over Gaza, getting rid of its people en masse, and end Hamas rule in the 364-kilometer enclave.

Trump, especially over the past few weeks, had certainly given the Israelis that impression, especially when he blurted out at a devastating press conference with Netanyahu in the White House in early February 2025, that what he wants is to create a Middle East Riviera in Gaza that would include ‘voluntarily’ displacement of the 2.2 million Palestinians living there and swiftly end Hamas-rule. The president added what he wants to do is for the United States to take over Gaza and make it a top property front-beach development.

The whys, ifs, and hows didn’t matter whilst the details were left to be ironed out for later, while the focus zoomed on what Trump was saying which literally seemed to be straight off the top of his head as unrehearsed “blabber” non – certainly not members of the new administration – knew about as the new man in the White House dictated his shallow views and hearsay. 

To Netanyahu it was music to his ears and he couldn’t believe what he was hearing. He just stood, smiled, glared and looked into the cameras pleased with his friend. To say the least however, he was gob-smacked and taken off-guard.

Trump’s bombshell announcement created an almost mass hysteria among the Palestinians, Arab world and internationally with people aghast, not knowing what to say, what to do and how to respond. Trump had then just announced the trampling on decades of international law – behest through the United Nations resolutions condemning Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza and its heinous and vile military rule.

Enters Hamas in US thinking

However, Netanyahu’s smirk was soon wiped off when it became clear that Trump was offering him Dutch-courage support while directly talking to Hamas officials at the same time. The Israelis become livid, especially when they got to know about the on-going meetings through third parties and leaked sources.

Today, Netanyahu is in a state of a quandary. For the first time he is finding that the political strings and threads are no longer in his court anymore as was the case with the former administration and despite the fact Trump just unfroze the MK-84 2000-pound bombs to Israel which Joe Biden slammed on Israel in May 2024 and adding that the security of Israel remains his top priority.

But today Netanyahu has become deeply-troubled with what is being regarded as double-talk and double-dealing! The bombs supply were to be a palliative to what is being “cooked” behind closed doors.

In Trump, and through his team led by Steve Witkoff and Adam Boehler, Netanyahu is finding out that the new republican president in the White House is not an easy man and despite the strong Israeli lobby in Washington he doesn’t necessarily mean what he says and he is always looking out for America as the No. 1 interest. It is high politics trickery designed to get things done.

For the first time in this 16-month war on Gaza which Israeli started after 7 October, 2023, Netanyahu is finding himself in a corner, no longer able to pay just lip-service to the multitude of talks held in Doha and Cairo over the months of 2024 and which led to nowhere but increased the destruction of Gaza and the killing of its people.

Although Trump maybe a very good friend to Israel – a claim registered in his earlier administration when he moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem, a first-ever move by a US president and openly-backed the continued occupation of the Golan Heights, the businessman-politician is not interested in wars and has moved immediately to stop the three-year-old Ukraine war with Russia and now is dilly-dallying with Gaza.

The current talks in Doha are aimed to extend the ceasefire to be executed in three stages reached on 19 January, just one day before Trump officially entered the White House.  While stage I has just ended, the Netanyahu government is foot-dragging, not wanting to move onto the second and third stage mainly because of ideological, domestic political reasons and his eminent threat of going to prison on corruption charges.

Netanyahu fears continuing the ceasefire deal would mean the end of his government that is controlled by extremists who want the war on Gaza to continue and have stated time and again that they would bring the government down if Netanyahu makes a deal that is less than re-occupying Gaza and stamping out Hamas which continues to be a fanciful dream.

Present talks

But the present US talks in Gaza with the Islamist organization that ruled the enclave since 2007, and under a tight Israeli siege that continues today, is creating a flurry of muted tense relations between Tel Aviv and Washington occasionally coming out in-the-open as was the case through a leaked phone call between Boehler, a new man in charge of the hostages file in the US administration and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, a close Netanyahu ally.

His protest was made recently by refusing to go with his Israeli team to join the latest bout of negotiations in Doha to kick-start the second stage of the ceasefire and release more hostages at their current number of 60  including one US-Israeli soldier and four American bodies that have been killed by Israeli bombardment and kept during Israel’s war on the enclave in the last months.

At the present time four meetings were held between American and Hamas officials with the last headed by chief of the movement Khalil al-Hayya. To say the least, Israel is irritated, angry, and dumbfounded and what is happening. Netanyahu is simply flabbergasted at Trump which he always regarded as a deep personal friend of him and Israel. He  and Dermer had impressed on the US administration not to take Hamas directly but it is clear the latter has not and is not heeding to the suggestion and going their own separate way.

Through different media sources and to the annoyance of the Israelis Boehler has stressed that talks so far has been “very helpful” and indicated that a resolution of the freeing of the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza would be finalized in the next few weeks.

 The world is watching to see how this intricate situation will unfold. The Trump administration is trying to play down their meetings with the Hamas leaders, but this is not working, especially as  Boehler keeps talking to the media about how constructive the talks are going and the fact that these Hamas leaders are “pretty nice guys,” and these “guys are just like us,” as he recently told CNN.

The next few weeks will show more. When he came to office, Trump said that if Hamas doesn’t surrender, he would turn Gaza into hell. Judging from what is happening on the ground today such a comment is merely rhetorical.  

The above-analysis is written by Dr Marwan Asmar, chief editor of the crossfirearabia.com website.

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