Gaza: Changing The Middle East Face
CrossFireArabia- October 8, 2025
The Al-Aqsa Flood operation marked a turning point in the modern political history of the Middle East. Its repercussions have gone far beyond the Palestinian and regional arenas, extending to the international system and reshaping the foreign policies of global powers toward the region.
The timing of the operation was particularly significant: it came at a transitional moment in the regional order, in the absence of consensus among international and regional actors on the rules of the game. While a fragile balance of deterrence existed between the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—led by Iran (alongside the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad)—and Israel, the latter was in the midst of a new phase of regional integration through the Abraham Accords.
Several Arab capitals had already normalized relations, and others were on their way, creating an unprecedented political landscape. This shift coincided with the declining influence of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and the rising centrality of the Gulf states. Many analysts began describing this new configuration as a “New Middle East”: wealthy, economically driven, and detached from historical conflicts—unlike the “Old Middle East,” where entrenched crises defined politics.
Turkey, meanwhile, had entered its own phase of recalibration. Once a champion of the Arab Spring and regional Islamist movements, Ankara sought reconciliation with Arab states, even attempting to restore ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime (though rebuffed by Damascus), while focusing more narrowly on national security and northern Syria.
On the Palestinian front, Israel had grown complacent toward Gaza, convinced Hamas had no incentive to disrupt the status quo. Tensions, however, were mounting in the West Bank, with small armed groups emerging in places like Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. Within Israeli and Western policy circles, talk was spreading about the prospect of a “mini-state in Gaza” as a substitute for a Palestinian state.
At the international level, President Joe Biden’s administration lacked enthusiasm for either the Abraham Accords or Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” yet it effectively followed the same trajectory: pursuing “regional peace” by integrating Israel into a new economic order and reducing the Palestinian question to daily livelihood concerns—employment, services, and economic relief in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than a political resolution.
The Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent two-year genocidal war in Gaza shattered these calculations and fundamentally restructured strategic assumptions. Whether the outcome will ultimately benefit or harm the Palestinian cause remains too complex to assess in simple terms, but what is clear is that the pre-October 7 regional order no longer exists.
From a Palestinian perspective, the conflict has restored international attention to the cause, leading to a renewed recognition of its centrality. In the Gulf, the previously dominant security paradigm—which cast Iran as the chief threat while framing Israel as a potential partner—collapsed entirely. A new consensus has emerged: Gulf security is inseparable from the Palestinian issue, and the notion of Israel as a “strategic friend” has been critically reassessed.
Skeptics may argue that these shifts have not altered the balance of power on the ground, and they are partially correct. Yet the strategic narrative has changed. Before October 7, the trajectory was toward the erasure of the Palestinian cause (closing UNRWA, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, normalization, and de facto annexation of the West Bank). Today, there is growing recognition—regionally and internationally—that Israeli policies themselves are the root of instability, not Iran or other regional actors. As Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla put it on X (September 25): “When weighing who poses a greater threat to Gulf security and regional stability—Iran or Israel—the evidence points clearly to Israel. Israel’s brutal behavior has made it more dangerous than an exhausted Iran. The Gulf needs a new defensive and geopolitical strategy for the Middle East beyond Iran.”
Israel, however, now perceives a surplus of power and is pressing for a new political and security order that extends beyond the occupied territories. With the partial unraveling of the Iranian alliance and the breakdown of the “Syrian corridor” that once linked Tehran to the Mediterranean, Israel has set its sights on even more ambitious goals, including the proposed “David Corridor” and establishing buffer zones around its borders in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.
In response, a tentative regional coalition has begun to take shape, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, with notable support from Turkey and Pakistan. The latter signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia following Israel’s strike on Qatar and has since become more engaged in regional diplomacy. While fragile and constrained, this alignment presents a rare historic opportunity to rebuild a regional balance of power and establish a new deterrence framework.
Another striking development is the shift in Europe’s stance toward Israel. For the first time, Israel has lost significant ground in Western public opinion and media narratives, particularly among younger generations and in universities. This has pushed Israel closer to isolation—a position from which former U.S. President Donald Trump had tried to rescue it through his proposed Gaza peace plan, which was largely about securing U.S. and Israeli interests, without offering real guarantees for Palestinian statehood or ending the occupation.
In conclusion, it is still too early to judge the full strategic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the war in Gaza. Scenarios remain open, and outcomes uncertain. Yet one thing is indisputable: the region today is no longer what it was before October 7.
Abu Rumman is an Academic Advisor of the Politics and Society Institute and Professor of Political Science in The University of Jordan and published this article in The Jordan Times.
Dr Khairi Janbek
