Lebanon Archives - Page 3 of 27

Iranian Missiles Destroy 1000 Flats in Tel Aviv

CrossFireArabia
April 19, 2026

CROSSFIREARABIA – Mayor of Tel Aviv Ron Huldai, said Sunday, that 1000 apartments in the Greater Tel Aviv areas, which covers around 1500 kilometers have been left uninhabitable because of the recent US-Israel war on Iran.

His statement is reverberating in the Hebrew media, being picked up internationally, and repeated on the social media.

“More than 1000 apartments in Tel Aviv are no longer fit for living,” he told the Israeli Channel 12.

The destruction is caused by the 39-day war that resulted in Iranian missiles and debris falling on different parts of the sprawling city.

This war, started through a US-Israeli alliance on Iran on 28 February, was precedented in its destruction across the Middle East region with Lebanon, the Gulf and Israel, as well as Iran itself taking a major battering.

Israel has been particularly hit on a daily basis through ballistic missiles, ordinary missiles and drones with Tel Aviv and its surrounding cities like Ramat Gan and Bnei Brak at the receiving end of theses projectiles.

Some of these missiles weighed up to one and two tons, similar to those Israel used on the people of Gaza, in its two-year genocide starting soon after 7 October, 2023.

Iran fired 650 missiles on Israel according to the Times of Israel. Sources say many, 92 percent of these were intercepted. However, 77 missiles landed on different parts of Israel.

But the extent of the damage increases when it is realized that the debris from those that were intercepted represent significant fall down on different Israeli towns, cities, military bases and infrastructure.

For Israel this war came at a great cost. The Israeli Ministry of Finance estimates that the war on Iran and Lebanon has cost its treasury $17.5 billion. Added to this, and that is yet to be included, is the cost of the destruction, like the 1000 apartments and other destroyed infrastructure.

Israeli media sources report that 30,000 Israelis have filed for compensation from the Israeli Tax Authority because of direct damages to their apartments and buildings, machinery and cars. The filing for the latter stood 6617.

The amount of compensation is aggregated to stand at $2.2 billion, a far higher figure than June 12-day war in 2025 were insurance companies forked out $1 billion in compensation.

Marwan Asmar is a writer from Amman and blogs for crossfirearabia.com

Analyses

Bint Jbeil: Town of Heroic Resistance

CrossFireArabia
April 16, 2026

By Mohammad Jaradat

Weaker than a spider’s web. This is a slogan used by the late martyr Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, from here in Bint Jbeil that represents the crucible of southern Lebanese geography intertwined with a history of resistance from the last century against the French occupation, and the crown jewel of northern Palestine in the face of the British occupation. Here, some of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s men received their training and ammunition for the battlefield.

The Litani River, with its proud craned neck, peering from its geographical depression into the nearby hills, eastward towards Ainata and southward opposite Maroun al-Ras and Ain Ebel peers in fervor. Here, the Israeli occupation army finally declared its encirclement after 50 days of war and nearly a month of intermittent ground incursions by their two fully equipped divisions.

The 98th Division, with over 15,000 soldiers, advanced from the east, and the 162nd Division, with a similar strength, advanced from the west. The spokesperson of this “army” boasted that the sports stadium had been captured. It was here that the complex of “weaker than a spider’s web” took root in the Israeli psyche, beginning in 2000 with the victory speech by Nasrallah, then general secretary of Hezbollah, delivered in this very stadium. This complex solidified in 2006, becoming deeply ingrained in the Israeli psychological and political landscape and surfacing.

Today Bint Jbeil, a southern town with a population of 25,000 and an area exceeding 10 square kilometers, is besieged. The encirclement is now complete, and the Israeli army intends to storm it, as they did in 2006 for four weeks. Then, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch repeatedly announced its capture in three consecutive false claims. Israeli soldiers attempted a takeover 2024, but Bint Jbeil remained defiant against the invaders, even under the cover of the world’s most powerful air force and accompanied by the most advanced and sophisticated tanks.

Bint Jbeil sits peacefully in its low-lying geographical area, just 3 kilometers from the northern Palestinian border. Only Mount Maroun al-Ras separates it from this border, being fraught with tension and pride. This time the Israeli occupation army traversed its roads, advancing towards the outskirts of Bint Jbeil. Channel 14 of the Israeli entity, albeit through circuitous means, circumvented the military censor’s scissors to reveal the hell of war in Bint Jbeil, where the tank of the commander of Battalion 52 had just been blown up by an anti-tank missile.

The Israeli occupation army is pushing towards Bint Jbeil, fully aware of the symbolic and strategic importance of this town. It is the geographical neck that separates the eastern and western branches of the Litani River. Israel cannot claim to have complete control over the southern Litani without Bint Jbeil. However, its past experiences with the town have been bitter. While it may have studied its reality and learned from those experiences, its people and their resistance have surpassed even the lessons learned and the harshness of the confrontation.

The alleys and lanes of Bint Jbeil bear witness to the footsteps of dozens of resistance fighters and commanders who have fallen within its walls in previous battles. Dozens of Israeli soldiers and commanders have also fallen there. Today, in the Battle of Asif al-Ma’kul (Operation Protective Edge), Bint Jbeil opens its arms not to welcome invaders, but to shelter some of them as prisoners, after the promise made by today’s Secretary-General of the Resistance, Sheikh Naim Qassem. He, a man of action rather than oratory, and he would not have made such a vow unless the men of God, under his guidance, had prepared themselves for the present fight. There are resistance prisoners whom the November 2024 agreement left unfulfilled, and the resistance does not abandon its prisoners in prisons.

A picture of victory.

Through this, Benjamin Netanyahu seeks to market his empty slogans here, even at the cost of dozens of the lives of his soldiers. What he failed to achieve in his aggression against Iran, he now aims to accomplish here in Lebanon, even through direct negotiations with a government that represents only a small minority of subservient individuals. He arrogantly insists on negotiations under fire, hence his insistence that his Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, rush to Bint Jbeil, just as Ehud Olmert did previously when he insisted on his Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, and persisted until some officers, according to Olmert’s later admissions, disobeyed orders and withdrew without permission from some of the areas they had seized in Bint Jbeil, leaving in a worse state than when they had entered.

The concentrated targeting of Bint Jbeil, amidst the rush to resolve the battle, even if only by attempting to stage a photo opportunity in some of its neighborhoods, points to several important aspects, most notably:

First: The quagmire of the Israeli army in southern Lebanon is becoming increasingly entrenched, especially as Israeli political ambitions have begun to outweigh its military achievements on the ground. This is due to the composure of the resistance leadership, its effective management, and its mobile control over key areas in southern Lebanon. It is also due to the pressure of Iranian steadfastness and the interconnectedness of the various fronts, which has driven Netanyahu to seek a preemptive escape by jumping into direct negotiations with the Lebanese government lead by Nawaf Salam in Washington.

Second: This serves to cover up the Israeli-American failure on the Iranian front. This failure, on the one hand, is what prompted the Israeli army to commit Wednesday’s massacres against hundreds of civilians. On the other hand, it indicates the frenzied behavior that gripped Netanyahu after the US agreed to the Iranian condition of halting the aggression against Lebanon, just as it halted the aggression against Iran—a condition that remains a thorn in Israel’s side.

Third: Exploiting the official Lebanese rush towards Israel through direct negotiations—negotiations devoid of any real possibility of agreement. The Lebanese government lacks the necessary realities and is negotiating to secure a ceasefire agreement, separate from any Iranian gains, in exchange for Israel’s insistence on disarming Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s weapons are used to bombard Israeli settlements in northern Palestine day and night, and to destroy invading tanks and vehicles with alarming regularity.

Fourth: Attempting to resolve the stalemate on all fronts south of the Litani River through a decisive battle in Bint Jbeil. This battle is seen as capable of dismantling the entire stalemate. Herein lies the Israeli spirit of adventurism, which might sometimes suit the resistance forces. Israel would not lose much if its gamble failed. However, in the approach of conventional armies, such reckless actions break their backs and cause them to lose their overall balance. This is precisely the situation the occupation army might find itself in if its adventurism backfires on it at the gates of Bint Jbeil or within its shadowy environs.

It is no exaggeration to say that the state of enticement that the Israeli occupation army is pursuing in Bint Jbeil may decide the fate of the aggression against Lebanon as a whole, especially with the insistence of Netanyahu and his war minister Israel Katz and their exertions on the army commanders in the field, at which point continuing to run away since October 7, 2023 will not be of any use.

Mohammad Jaradat is a Palestinian researcher who contributed this article to Al Mayadeen and this article is presented in translation form and reprinted in crossfirearabia.com

Opinion

Can Israel Create A Lebanese Buffer Zone?

CrossFireArabia
March 25, 2026

By Imad Rizk

Since last Wednesday, the Israeli army has continued targeting the network of roads and bridges that link Lebanon to its south. In addition to pressuring the Lebanese government to make concessions in Lebanon and possibly beyond, the Israeli army claimed that targeting the Qasmiyeh bridge and other bridges is intended to prevent the transfer of military supplies to southern Lebanon. However, military experts questioned this justification, noting that Israeli aircraft maintain intense air dominance over the routes leading to the south, which undermines the credibility of this claim. Sources believe that targeting infrastructure, especially bridges and roads, aims to isolate the southern region in preparation for occupying it and turning it into a “buffer zone”.

After the 1982 invasion, Israel maintained a buffer zone in southern Lebanon for 15 years. It was meant to prevent attacks but instead created local resistance and required constant military presence, ending with a unilateral Israeli withdrawal in 2000.

Buffer zones as a military solution in the region were tested between 1985 and 2000. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel avoided re-occupying Lebanon, relying instead on air power and UN peacekeepers (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). Now, in 2026, Israel is returning to buffer zone thinking. Current discussions of a 10-15 km buffer zone show that Israel is returning to a doctrine it once abandoned as distancing itself from its enemy is more important than before.

Meanwhile, air raids continue to target the Lebanese capital, Beirut, and its southern suburbs. Residential areas and neighborhoods near Beirut and in the coastal city of Sidon are also being targeted under the pretext of assassinating figures and cadres linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

On the southern front, the Israeli army has been facing major difficulties in advancing and consolidating its positions since March 2. Hezbollah in Lebanon targeted Israeli troops at dozens of locations.

Ground combat tactics against the Israeli ground maneuver

Hezbollah carried out strikes against concentrations of soldiers and vehicles in different border villages. These attacks were carried out using rockets and artillery shells.

Operations extended beyond the border line, where Hezbollah support units targeted military positions and fixed barracks, as well as newly established sites in Jabal al-Bat and Nimer al-Jamal. Strikes also repeatedly hit the Avivim barracks, as well as Ramot Naftali, Branit, Hounin, Nahal Gershom base, and the Meron Air Surveillance Base.

Both Hezbollah and the Israeli army also carried out psychological and media operations associated with the ground maneuver, including threats, intimidation, low-altitude aircraft flights, and air raids conducted at night or at dawn. Settlers were also used in messaging to suggest that failure to negotiate would expose Lebanon to destruction similar to Gaza, or to incite Lebanese public opinion against a particular sectarian group and the environment that supports confrontation with Israel.

Overall assessment

In summary, the ongoing confrontation since March 2 reveals a gap between Israeli rhetoric and action. Despite statements about deploying three full military divisions, these forces rely heavily on air strikes to flush out Hezbollah fighters positioned inside villages and in the surrounding wooded terrain.

Hezbollah initially responded by targeting troop concentrations with rockets from outside the area south of the Litani River in the early days, and also struck D-9 bulldozers from areas far from the front line, while its special units advanced and seized forward positions. There was also discussion of advances along the Khiam-Marjayoun axis, with the understanding that the advance aimed to encircle the city of Nabatieh in the south and push through the Sahmar axis toward an unspecified town to reach Lake Qaraoun, similar to what Israel did on the Syrian front when it took control of the Yarmouk basin.

A notable development was the use of explosive drones similar to tactics used in Ukraine. On Friday, armed drones were used to strike a rear-area position on the Israeli side. This was considered the second major tactical surprise to enter the battlefield after the previous confrontation in 2024 during the “66-day battle.”

Israeli attacks on Iran and the entry of Iranian missiles targeting Israeli troop concentrations and fortifications around the town of Khiam suggest that the linkage of fronts — from southern Lebanon to Iraq and Iran — indicates that the Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters in Iran is directing a confrontation against Israeli destabilization and US military presence across a theater stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf.

The author is the director of the Institute for Strategic and Communication Studies in Lebanon (Isticharia-ISCS). Anadolu

Analyses

Analysis: Why Did Hezbollah Enter This War?

CrossFireArabia
March 5, 2026

Hezbollah’s entry into the war reflects strategic calculations shaped by Israeli escalation, regional alliances, and Lebanon’s fractured politics.

Key Takeaways

Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire in Lebanon through airstrikes, raids, and surveillance operations.
Hezbollah’s response has so far remained limited compared to Israel’s sustained military actions.
Lebanon’s political leadership has failed to present a unified response to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory.
Hezbollah’s intervention reflects strategic concerns about Israel’s long-term plans in Lebanon and the broader war against Iran.
The coordination between Iran, Hezbollah, Ansarallah, and Iraqi factions suggests the Axis of Resistance continues to operate collectively.

A Regional War Expands

Hezbollah’s decision to enter the ongoing regional confrontation did not occur in isolation. The latest escalation began when the United States and Israel launched major strikes against Iran, triggering waves of Iranian retaliation across the region.

The conflict quickly expanded beyond Iran itself. Iranian retaliatory strikes targeted US military assets and positions across the Gulf. The war rapidly assumed the character of a wider regional confrontation involving multiple actors aligned along competing geopolitical blocs.

Within this context, attention turned to Lebanon, where Hezbollah—one of the most powerful non-state actors in the Middle East—began limited military operations against Israeli positions along the border.

The central question quickly emerged: Why did Hezbollah enter the war?

The answer lies in a combination of military, political, and strategic considerations that go far beyond the immediate battlefield.

Did Hezbollah Violate the Ceasefire?

A central claim advanced by Israel and some Western governments – and even anti-Hezbollah factions in Lebanon itself – is that Hezbollah’s actions represent a violation of the ceasefire arrangements that followed previous rounds of conflict along the Lebanese border.

However, the reality on the ground presents a far more complex picture.

For months, Israel has carried out continuous violations of Lebanese sovereignty through airstrikes, drone surveillance, artillery fire, and cross-border incursions.

According to Lebanese government figures and reports by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Israel has committed thousands of violations of Lebanese airspace and territory since the ceasefire arrangements took effect.

Lebanese officials have repeatedly documented Israeli overflights, drone operations, and missile strikes inside the country. UNIFIL has also confirmed frequent violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft.

These actions have not been merely symbolic. Israeli strikes have caused civilian casualties and extensive destruction of homes and infrastructure in southern Lebanon.

Villages near the border have experienced repeated bombardments, forcing families to flee and damaging agricultural land and civilian property.

At the same time, Israeli officials have openly signaled that they have no intention of withdrawing fully from Lebanese territory or halting military operations.

Several Israeli leaders have stated publicly that Israel intends to maintain military pressure on Hezbollah and potentially establish a longer-term security presence along the border.

In this context, Hezbollah’s response—limited strikes against Israeli military positions—cannot easily be framed as the violation of a functioning ceasefire.

Rather, Hezbollah and its allies argue that no real ceasefire existed, given the scale and persistence of Israeli violations.

Did Hezbollah Violate Lebanese Consensus?

Another argument advanced by critics inside Lebanon is that Hezbollah’s intervention undermines national consensus and drags the country into a war it cannot afford.

Lebanon’s government, which maintains close ties with Western governments and the United States, has repeatedly blamed Hezbollah for escalating tensions.

However, the government has struggled to provide a convincing explanation of how it interprets Israel’s continued attacks on Lebanese territory.

While condemning Hezbollah’s actions, Lebanese authorities have largely failed to respond militarily—or even diplomatically in an effective way—to Israeli strikes.

The Lebanese state has not fired a single bullet at Israeli forces despite repeated attacks inside its territory. This has deepened the political divide within Lebanese society.

Lebanon has long been fractured along sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical lines. Some factions align closely with Western and Gulf states, while others view themselves as part of the Axis of Resistance, which includes Iran, Hezbollah, Ansarallah in Yemen, Palestinian resistance factons and several Iraqi factions.

Within this divided political landscape, there has never been a unified national consensus regarding confrontation with Israel.

For many Lebanese—particularly in communities that have historically borne the brunt of Israeli attacks—Hezbollah’s military posture is viewed as a form of deterrence rather than escalation.

So Why Did Hezbollah Enter the War?

Hezbollah’s decision to join the conflict appears to reflect a broader strategic calculation.

From Hezbollah’s perspective, the Israeli war was likely to expand regardless of its immediate actions.

Israeli leaders have repeatedly declared their intention to reshape the regional balance of power and weaken Iran and its allies.

For Hezbollah, the prospect of Iran being significantly weakened carries profound implications.

If Iran’s position in the region were severely damaged, Hezbollah could find itself facing Israel largely alone—while simultaneously confronting pressure from the United States, Western governments, and regional Arab powers aligned with Washington.

In such a scenario, Hezbollah could be isolated militarily and politically.

Entering the war now, while Iran remains actively engaged and regional allies are mobilized, allows Hezbollah to operate within a broader coalition rather than as an isolated actor.

It also ensures that Hezbollah retains influence over the eventual diplomatic outcome of the conflict.

Wars in the Middle East often conclude not with decisive military victories but through negotiated exits once the architects of war decide to pursue a political strategy.

By participating in the conflict, Hezbollah guarantees that it will have a seat at the negotiating table when such an exit strategy eventually emerges.

Does This Mean the Axis of Resistance Has Been Reborn?

Some analysts have framed the current coordination between Iran, Hezbollah, Ansarallah, and Iraqi factions as the “rebirth” of the Axis of Resistance.

But the reality may be more nuanced.

The Axis of Resistance was never destroyed. Instead, each actor within it has often had to adapt to its own domestic political realities.

Hezbollah operates within Lebanon’s complex sectarian political system. Iraqi factions must navigate Baghdad’s fragile state institutions. Ansarallah governs large parts of Yemen under conditions of war and blockade. Hamas remains focused on defeating the Israeli-US scheme aimed at disarming resistance and ethnically cleansing Palestinians from Gaza,

These differing political contexts often limit how openly each actor can coordinate with the others. Yet recent developments suggest that the axis is functioning in a coordinated manner.

Iranian strikes across the region, Ansarallah’s operations in the Red Sea, and Hezbollah’s engagement along the Lebanese border indicate a level of strategic alignment.

The current conflict has therefore revealed not the rebirth of the axis but its continued operational existence.

Our Strategic Analysis

Hezbollah’s intervention reflects a calculated strategic move rather than an impulsive escalation.

Israel’s continued military pressure on Lebanon, combined with the wider war against Iran, created conditions in which Hezbollah perceived long-term risks in remaining passive.

By entering the conflict in a limited but coordinated manner, Hezbollah seeks to shape the strategic environment before the war reaches a stage where diplomatic negotiations become inevitable.

In doing so, Hezbollah is signaling that the future of Lebanon—and the broader regional balance of power—cannot be determined without its participation.

Palestine Chronicle

News

Hezbollah Targets Central Israel

CrossFireArabia
March 4, 2026

The Lebanese group Hezbollah said Wednesday it carried out several drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli military sites and command headquarters in central and northern Israel.

In a statement, Hezbollah said it targeted with a missile the Dado base, the headquarters of the Israeli army’s Northern Command, northeast of the city of Safed in northern Israel.

The group said its fighters also targeted the Giv’a drone control base east of Safed with a precision-guided missile.

A swarm of attack drones also hit the headquarters of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) in central Israel, it added.

Earlier Wednesday, the Lebanese group said it targeted a gathering of Israeli army forces at the Metula site in northern Israel with a rocket barrage.

Hezbollah said the attacks came “in response to the criminal Israeli aggression that targeted dozens of Lebanese cities and towns, including Beirut’s southern suburbs.”

The situation escalated in Lebanon on Monday after Hezbollah targeted a military site in northern Israel with rockets and drones in response to ongoing Israeli airstrikes and the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in ongoing US-Israeli attacks on Iran.

The Israeli army launched a series of airstrikes in response, killing at least 40 people and injuring nearly 250 others. The military also launched a ground incursion into southern Lebanon.

Israel imposes strict censorship on reporting casualties caused by missiles launched by Iran and Hezbollah or intercepted by its defenses and also prohibits the circulation of related footage.

Israel has killed more than 4,000 people and wounded about 17,000 others during its assault on Lebanon that began in October 2023 and expanded into a full-scale war in September 2024. Anadolu