We often use George Orwell’s 1984 novel as a metaphor for similar circumstances which we feel we are living in contemporary times. In fairness, many a time, the novel provides an apt description of these circumstances. But a novel which is forgotten or overlooked, is the trilogy of Isaac Asimov – the Foundation – written in the early 1960s. Now, if he meant it to be a prophetic prediction of the future, one is likely to say he has come close to describing our epoch and circumstances.
In Asimov’s trilogy, and in a scientific fictitious world, a mathematical genius creates a world based on laws, order, and controlled emotions, in a sense, a world built on rationality. But suddenly, a mutant emerges, gathering a large following and support, and bent on destroying the existing norms, abolishing order, and breaking all laws. The author, calls it the mutant: The mule. Of course, one is talking here science fiction.
However, if we extrapolate from science fiction into real life, US President Donald Trump can be understood only by shedding the veil of absurdity that surrounds him, as, for all intents and purposes purposes, he is here here to break all the existing norms and order to the extent of firing even those whom have elected him.
As he projects his image on the domestic and international scenes, he comes out not as a president of a reality show but rather as a president of a “parallel” reality show. And what does that essentially mean? To the discerning observer it means that Trump is flip flopping between the two realities.
It was always known that president Trump dislikes multilateral and/or rather negotiations with blocs, whilst maintaining a preference for bilateral negotiations. So in carrying out his style of negotiations, he tends to pick the strongest or the wealthiest potential partners in any bloc to negotiate with. After all he is the one whom coined the dictum, if your rich and powerful then you must be right, but if you are rich but poor and weak, well, it’s your fault.
Consequently, this style of presidency, throws his allies and detractors into total confusion, and even close observers are finding it difficult to grapple with the US presidency bent on striking deals than reaching agreements.
He has no qualms about trying to reach a deal with Iran regarding its nuclear project, when in effect he was the one who tore up the nuclear agreement in the first place, but take note, it was an agreement not a deal.
He came out to negotiate directly with Hamas, though what’s the deal he is proposing, is not really known, but he doesn’t seem to have any qualms about breaking taboos and norms here.
So where does this leave his friends and allies? No man’s land really, in which you just go half way with him.
Dr Janbek is Jordanian writer based in Paris, France.
President Donald Trump said Friday that “interesting days” lie ahead for the US and Iran as he seeks to either negotiate a new nuclear deal with Tehran, or pursue “the other option,” a likely allusion to military action.
Trump told reporters in the Oval Office that the “next thing you’ll be talking about is Iran,” vowing “there’ll be some interesting days ahead.”
The comments came just hours after Trump said in an interview with Fox Business Network that he sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urging nuclear talks according to Anadolu.
“We’re down to final strokes with Iran. That’s going to be an interesting time, and we’ll see what happens. But we’re down to the final moments. Final moments. Can’t let them have a nuclear weapon,” Trump said in the Oval Office.
“We have a situation with Iran, that something’s going to happen very soon, very, very soon, you’ll be talking about that pretty soon, I guess, and hopefully we can have a peace deal. I’m not speaking out of strength or weakness. I’m just saying I’d rather see a peace deal than the other, but the other will solve the problem,” he added.
Iran’s Permanent Mission to the UN in New York responded to a question about Trump’s statement that he sent a letter to Khamenei, saying they have not received such a letter so far, according to Iranian media reports.
Khamenei had earlier banned negotiations with the Trump administration, which he described as “untrustworthy.”
Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi, have frequently said they will not negotiate with the US under pressure and threats.
“As long as the US policy of maximum pressure and threats continues, we will not enter into direct negotiations with the US,” Aragchi said in an interview in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on Friday.
In 2007, Russia’s President Putin gave a now-infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), announcing Russia’s new posture of hostility towards the US and Europe. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, many looked back at Putin’s 2007 Munich speech as a revealing moment of his intentions.
This year’s MSC could be a similar watershed. This time, the warning bells ring from across the Atlantic. US Vice President JD Vance delivered one of the most hostile speeches by a US official to Europe in decades. Rather than addressing the Russian or Chinese threats, Vance argued that Europe faced a “threat from within,” accusing the EU and national governments of censorship and ignoring popular demands on issues like illegal migration.
Meanwhile, away from Munich, US President Donald Trump held a phone call with Putin, setting the stage for negotiations between the US and Russia for a peace agreement in Ukraine – without involving European counterparts in the discussions. The day before, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth announced some of the US expectations from this deal: Ukraine should drop its NATO membership bid, European countries would need to provide the forces to enforce the agreement, and these forces would not be covered by NATO’s Article 5 guarantees.
The transatlantic picture in which the MSC took place was even bleaker. Since Trump’s inauguration one month ago, the new president had promised (and now imposed) tariffs against countries across the world, including Europe. He has threatened to annex the territory of allies like Canada and Denmark.
Normally, the MSC is an opportunity for the United States to reaffirm its commitment to Europe and the Atlantic alliance. This year, it could be remembered as the time when the US started the process of abandoning Europe – or even going aggressively after it.
An attack on Europe
Vance’s speech and the reactions to it have dominated the discussions at the MSC. Although the conference theme was “multilateralization”, the real topic on everyone’s mind was: how would Trump’s second administration approach Europe?
As the pre-conference report argued: “Donald Trump’s presidential victory has buried the US post–Cold War foreign policy consensus that a grand strategy of liberal internationalism would best serve US interests.” That this consensus was gone was clearly visible in the conference. Despite perfunctory references to shared values, Vance’s speech did not talk about the alliance between Europe and North America, nor about the common threats and how to face them.
And he has voiced support for anti-EU parties. Vance pronounced his speech in Germany, just weeks before federal elections, and argued that there should not be “firewalls” in government – a clear reference to the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) which has so far been kept out of governing coalitions. After the speech, Vance met with the AfD leader.
Additionally, Vance criticized Romania for canceling its 2024 elections and accused the EU of censoring free speech. But Vance failed to acknowledge that the very election that brought Trump and him to power in November was the subject of major foreign interference by Russia, China, and Iran. Rather than sitting idly by, US agencies took active measures to counter these malign actions and prevent disruptions – like raising awareness, coordinating with the media, and keeping politics out of the fight. With his speech, Vance seems to be arguing for the exact opposite approach.
All these issues did not touch on security and defense, the core of the MSC’s discussions. But they did lure in the background of Vance’s speech. A few months ago, Vance argued that the EU should not regulate tech companies owned by Elon Musk. If the Europeans did so, he argued, the US should reduce its security commitments to NATO. Hence, American assurances could become bargaining chips to resolve other issues.
How will the EU respond?
Vance’s Munich speech marks a new era in US relations with Europe. While the themes are not new – Trump has never been a fan of NATO, and enjoys courting Europe’s far-right – the extent of the rhetorical change cannot be understated. Ukraine’s President Zelensky, speaking in Munich the day after Vance, spelled out the challenge in clear terms: “We can’t rule out the possibility that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that threaten it.”
The reaction from European leaders has been strong so far. EU Commission President Von der Leyen called for an emergency clause in the EU treaties to allow member states to boost defense spending [8]. French President Macron called for a summit of European leaders in Paris on Monday, February 17 – to sketch out a common position on the upcoming negotiations over Ukraine, and on making up for US security guarantees from Europe.
The greatest challenge, however, will be transforming outrage into meaningful action. Europeans have long ignored calls to take charge of their own security. Domestic constraints over spending, divisions and the continued belief that Uncle Sam will have their back have stood in the way of ambitious choices. Will this time be different?
This opinion was written by Giuseppe Spatafora for the Anadolu news website.
Immediately upon his return to the White House for a second stint, a hawkish Donald Trump has put Iran on notice.
In the first week of February, the US President signed a presidential decree reinstating the maximum pressure policy on Iran, saying that though he was not pleased with the decision, he had no choice but to adopt a firm stance.
A few days later, Trump claimed that a very “frightened” Iran was ready for a deal with the US over the Shia-majority nation’s nuclear programme.
The moot point of his assertion was that he would also prefer a deal rather than Israel carrying its threat of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. “I’d much rather do a deal that’s not going to hurt them.”
Since Trump assumed office, Iranian officials have consistently voiced their support for dialogue and expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations with the new administration.
On January 14, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reaffirmed this position in an interview with NBC, emphasising Iran’s openness to talks.
However, any potential for a dialogue appeared to have been decisively shut down following a February 7 statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Addressing members of the Iranian military, Khamenei declared that engaging in negotiations with the US was neither a prudent nor an honourable course of action, unequivocally rejecting the prospect of talks between the two countries.
Some analysts have interpreted Trump’s January approval of the sale of 4,700 additional MK-84 bunker-buster bombs to Israel as part of a broader Iran strategy.
This begs the question: How would Iran-US relations evolve under Trump, and how significant is the threat posed by Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities?
Trump’s re-election marks a critical turning point for Iran. Even during his first presidency, Trump’s policy of maximum pressure had led to significant economic, political, and military challenges for Tehran.
It was during the first Trump administration that some seismic events – such as the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, the re-imposition of economic sanctions, and the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani—intensified the pressure on Iran.
With Trump’s re-election, the Iranian leadership is concerned about the prospect of further escalation of previous policies.
Recent developments in the region indicate that Iran’s deterrence capabilities have reached a critical low.
An analysis of Iran’s national security and defence doctrine reveals that it rests on three principal strategic pillars: the establishment of a forward defence line via non-state actors under the Quds Force, an extensive missile programme, and efforts to achieve nuclear threshold status.
However, Israel’s attacks in 2023 and 2024 have significantly weakened these pillars. Indeed, the elimination of Hezbollah leaders, the destruction of its command structures, and successful Israeli airstrikes against Iranian territory have complicated Iran’s ability to leverage these elements as an effective deterrent.
Moreover, although Iran’s missile programme is still impressive in terms of variety and quantity, its effectiveness was found to be limited during the April and October 2024 attacks. The majority of Iran’s missiles either missed their targets or proved ineffective.
The Israeli strikes on October 26 severely damaged Iran’s missile engine production facilities and solid fuel production capabilities.
In particular, the strikes on the Shahroud missile complex have significantly constrained Iran’s ability to develop long-range missiles. As a result of these strikes, Iran’s most advanced air defence systems (S-300 PMU2) were rendered inoperable.
The remaining systems are limited both in range and capability, thereby increasing Iran’s vulnerability to external attacks. These vulnerabilities have prompted Tehran to reconsider the option of developing nuclear weapons.
While Iran has the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium within a week, integrating a nuclear warhead into a missile system is regarded as a time-consuming process.
Iran’s nuclear programme and rising concerns
Trump’s threats and the continuing tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme represent a critical juncture for the country.
Rather than initiating the production of nuclear weapons, Tehran could adopt the more cautious yet effective step of announcing its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Such a move would underscore Iran’s seriousness while seeking to extract more concessions at the negotiating table.
A notable example is North Korea, which in 1993 employed a similar strategy by announcing its intention to withdraw from the treaty, subsequently suspending its decision before ultimately carrying it out.
Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT could be perceived by the international community as a shift toward nuclear weapons production. This, in turn, could escalate regional tensions and potentially encourage Israel to deploy US-made bunker-buster bombs against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, known as the Amad Plan, sought to produce five nuclear weapons between 1999 and 2003.
Under this plan, four warheads for Shahab-3 ballistic missiles and one bomb for an underground test were developed.
According to the Iranian nuclear archive captured by Israel in 2018, Iran has made significant advances in critical technologies, including nuclear warhead design, neutron initiators, and detonation focusing systems. This information is regarded as a contributing factor to Iran’s increased capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
Significant similarities exist between China’s first nuclear bomb (codenamed 596) and Iran’s early designs. The findings indicate that Iran is approaching the status of a nuclear threshold state.
Therefore, Trump’s nuclear policy toward Iran is a critical issue, both in terms of differing perspectives within his administration and the broader international context.
Where can the process evolve?
Iran’s nuclear programme remains a priority concern for both Europe and the US.
With the expiration of the UN Security Council (UNSC) snapback sanctions in October 2025, the US-led West risks losing one of its most powerful tools of diplomatic leverage.
In this context, Europe plans to leverage Iran’s vulnerabilities and time constraints to initiate an effective nuclear diplomacy process.
Indeed, a statement by the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – that it is prepared to utilise all diplomatic tools against Iran indicates that patience is waning.
Simultaneously, Iran’s statements suggesting it may reassess its technical capabilities and political intentions have raised concerns within the international community.
The US might intensify pressure by tightening the enforcement of secondary sanctions on the Iranian economy.
As an initial measure, Trump imposed sanctions on a key international network involved in the sale of Iranian oil, delivering a significant blow to Iran’s oil exports.
Expanding sanctions to target major purchasers of Iranian oil, particularly China, could exacerbate Iran’s economic vulnerabilities.
In other words, the US and Europe may capitalise on this window of opportunity by intensifying pressure on Iran while simultaneously presenting clear diplomatic solutions.
In Iran, contrary to Khamenei’s rhetoric, there are indications that a large section of the leadership and population are generally supportive of negotiations with the US.
Recently, the Center for Islamic World Studies, aligned with Supreme Leader Khamenei, conducted a survey on Iran-US negotiations as part of its advisory role in foreign policy.
The study surveyed 119 academics, senior executives, and current and former officials. The results revealed that 86.5 percent of respondents supported direct negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration, while just 5.8 percent opposed the proposal. A further 7.5 percent of respondents indicated that negotiations would be conditional.
Against the backdrop of Trump’s belligerence against Iran, the risk of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities has gone up manifold.
How Tehran decides to navigate the choppy waters of uncertainty will determine the future of US-Iran relations. And, perhaps, of the volatile region too.
The recent remarks by US President Donald Trump suggesting the displacement of Gaza’s residents to Egypt and Jordan as a “practical solution” for Gaza’s reconstruction carries significant risks. This proposal not only overlooks the fundamental complexities of the issue, from the acceptance of displacement by Gaza’s residents to the logistical feasibility of relocating populations and securing the consent of all involved parties, but also reveals that forced displacement appears to be Trump’s primary solution, one that the region may have to contend with for years to come.
It is essential to remember that we are observing Trump in the early phases of his political return. He is eager to present himself as a strong and decisive leader capable of imposing solutions, even if they appear coercive. However, as with many theoretical ideas that seem simple at first glance, the real challenge lies in their practical implementation.
We are living through an unprecedented era. The events following October 7 have fundamentally altered the region. Gaza is witnessing destruction on a scale it has never seen before. Amid this devastation, Israel appears to be betting on worsening the humanitarian crisis, hoping to make life in Gaza unbearable for its residents. This coincides with difficulties in finding realistic reconstruction solutions or even implementing humanitarian relief efforts that adequately respond to the scale of the disaster.
Israel’s strategic vision is focused on achieving demographic displacement in Gaza and redrawing its geographic landscape. These goals might seem attainable if the crisis continues, and the humanitarian catastrophe deepens. What is alarming, however, is that proposing Jordan as an option in this context may implicitly lay the groundwork for considering it a destination for displaced Palestinians from the West Bank as well, should this theory of forced displacement extend beyond Gaza.
Indeed, Israel is actively pursuing this scenario by seeking to reshape the geography of the West Bank through dismantling densely populated areas, such as the refugee camps in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. This objective aligns with the vision of the Trump administration, which supports Israel’s ambitions under the framework of “Judea and Samaria.” Neither Egypt nor Jordan has had sufficient opportunity to directly engage with the US administration to present alternatives or explain the security, economic, and political risks associated with these proposals.
Jordan’s strategic response should focus on warning against these scenarios while presenting viable alternatives. Highlighting the potential shocks these steps could inflict on a key ally like the United States is crucial. Additionally, Jordan has several cards to play, particularly in the economic domain. These include regional energy projects, development initiatives, and the reconstruction of Syria. Such endeavours could offer the US tangible benefits across multiple fronts, forming the foundation for alternative approaches.
In short, navigating Trump’s looming flood of proposals requires a nuanced understanding of American perspectives and avoiding direct confrontation whenever possible. At the same time, Jordan must strengthen its position with robust Arab support. Elevating strategic relations with Saudi Arabia is particularly crucial, given its dominant role in the current and upcoming phases and its centrality to Trump’s economic and political ambitions, including regional peace efforts.
Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Washington may signal a new escalation in the region. The Gaza conflict remains unresolved, and tensions in the West Bank and Lebanon persist. If the conflict extends further to Iran, a broader escalation could stretch from Iraq to Iran, potentially resulting in the imposition of forced displacement as a grim humanitarian reality, especially if violence escalates once again in Gaza and intensifies in the West Bank.
Dr Amer Al Sabaileh is a professor and a columnist at the Jordan Times
Dr Khairi Janbek
CrossFireArabia
