Analyses Archives - Page 5 of 31

Genocide: What is it With The Germans?

CrossFireArabia
October 8, 2025

Since the beginning of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, German media have been accused of pro-Israeli bias. A new investigation shows that one of Germany’s largest outlets, public broadcaster ZDF, systematically silences criticisms on Israel.

ZDF is as close as Germany gets to state TV. It is funded through a mandatory broadcasting fee, enforceable by court, and legally obliged to foster free opinion-forming, reflect social diversity, and remain objective and impartial. The gap between that mandate and reality is stark. Surveys show 73% of Germans believe Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, while only 13% see Israel’s actions as appropriate. Even ZDF’s own polling found 61% think the government should pressure Israel more strongly. These are the opinions of the majority, the “reasonable realities” ZDF is supposed to reflect — yet its coverage does not reflect them.

Instead, ZDF censors them. Internal sources confirmed that its social media accounts automatically hid comments containing “genocide,” “Volkermord,” “war of exhaustion,” and even “Palestine.” When confronted, ZDF admitted the filters existed, claiming they ensured “netiquette” and protected against “criminal-law concerns.” But repeated test runs showed comments with these terms never appeared, while posts denying or belittling Gaza’s suffering were unaffected. That selective standard shows the problem clearly: potential “criminality” was invoked only when Israel was criticized. Blanket blocking of terms central to describing Israel’s actions suppresses legitimate perspectives and breaches ZDF’s mandate of pluralism.

Criminalizing the debate

The absence extends beyond comment sections. “Not only in the comments but also in ZDF heute’s reporting the term genocide is barely visible,” says journalist Fabian Goldmann. “That’s despite major human rights groups, UN experts, and leading legal scholars repeatedly calling it the most precise term for Israel’s actions.”

Palestinian Ambassador Laith Arafeh calls such blocking “regrettable,” stressing that it suppresses vital debate on horrors the Palestinian population faces. He points out that the International Court of Justice found plausible grounds to investigate Israel for genocide. Political scientist Jules El-Khatib adds that calling the term a netiquette violation is “frankly absurd,” since genocide is a legal definition, not an insult. Goldmann argues ZDF’s rationale fits a wider pattern: instead of naming Israeli war crimes, those who do so are criminalized.

Pressure on staff

Censorship also targets employees. One staff member reports being pressured to delete a private post quoting UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese’s genocide accusation. ZDF did not respond to questions about the case. The contrast with presenter Andrea Kiewel is striking: she faced no repercussions after wearing on-air a necklace showing a map of “Greater Israel,” symbolically erasing Palestine. Kiewel continues to host Fernsehgarten, one of ZDF’s most prominent shows, broadcasting from her residence in Israel, which she openly describes as “my home.” The asymmetry speaks volumes: criticism of Israel is suppressed, while overt nationalist symbolism in its favor is tolerated.

Another employee alleges ZDF’s editorial independence was compromised by calls from Israel’s ambassador Ron Prosor, who demanded sharper pro-Israel coverage. According to this account, ZDF altered the texts afterwards. Again, the broadcaster offered no explanation. Reporters Without Borders has likewise warned of repeated Israeli embassy pressure on German newsrooms through emails, letters, and calls.

Distortion as practice

Despite these concerns, ZDF spokesperson Thomas Hagedorn insists the broadcaster reports “comprehensively, independently and from many perspectives.” But the record shows otherwise.

A telling example is the BILD scandal of November 2024. Germany’s biggest tabloid published what it claimed was a Hamas “war document,” saying it proved ceasefires would only benefit Hamas. Netanyahu cited the article to justify rejecting a ceasefire. The New York Times later revealed the documents were fabricated at Netanyahu’s behest. Yet ZDF repeated the claim that Hamas was waging “psychological warfare” without verifying the source. No correction or apology followed, even after the forgery was exposed. In effect, ZDF had laundered Netanyahu’s talking points into German public discourse.

Broader content analysis reinforces the pattern. By December 2024, Gaza’s death toll was more than 24 times Israel’s, yet ZDF referred to Israelis as “victims” 33% more often. An Itidal review of 500 ZDF pieces (October 2023–December 2024) found the word “barbaric” overwhelmingly applied to attacks on Israel (90.7% of cases) and never to attacks on Gaza. Even in Ukraine coverage, the term appeared in just 4.6% of cases. This vocabulary echoed government messaging: Netanyahu called the Oct. 7 Hamas attack “barbaric,” a framing ZDF and other outlets quickly adopted.

Political entanglement

ZDF’s structure amplifies the concern. A study by the Otto Brenner Foundation found 62% of its Television Council members belong to political parties, despite a Constitutional Court ruling limiting party representation to one-third.

Public broadcasters already average an excessive 41%, ZDF surpasses even that, making it the German broadcaster closest to “state media.”

This entanglement shapes coverage. ZDF has labeled the slogan “Freedom for Palestine” antisemitic. Right-wing commentator Ninve Ermagan used ZDF to stigmatize protests against Gaza’s genocide as a “radicalized pro-Palestine scene.” Government positions criticized by experts as repressive are given prominence, while dissenting voices struggle to appear. In effect, ZDF often functions as a keyword provider for Israeli hardline circles or as an extension of government messaging.

El-Khatib observes: “In Germany, free speech is too often constricted when Israel is the subject. The idea of banning ‘Free Palestine’ was abandoned as absurd, yet suppression persists in other forms. The term ‘genocide’ is still treated as a combat word, even as human rights groups, legal scholars, and most of the German public consider it accurate.”

Restoring trust

A public broadcaster should broaden democratic language, not narrow it. Restoring trust requires dismantling word filters, disclosing external pressures, protecting staff from censorship, and correcting the record when disinformation has been amplified. Anything less is not a moderation glitch. It is a failure of duty.

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu’s editorial policy.

Analyses

Gaza: Changing The Middle East Face

CrossFireArabia
October 8, 2025

By Mohammad Abu Rumman

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation marked a turning point in the modern political history of the Middle East. Its repercussions have gone far beyond the Palestinian and regional arenas, extending to the international system and reshaping the foreign policies of global powers toward the region.

The timing of the operation was particularly significant: it came at a transitional moment in the regional order, in the absence of consensus among international and regional actors on the rules of the game. While a fragile balance of deterrence existed between the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—led by Iran (alongside the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad)—and Israel, the latter was in the midst of a new phase of regional integration through the Abraham Accords.

Several Arab capitals had already normalized relations, and others were on their way, creating an unprecedented political landscape. This shift coincided with the declining influence of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and the rising centrality of the Gulf states. Many analysts began describing this new configuration as a “New Middle East”: wealthy, economically driven, and detached from historical conflicts—unlike the “Old Middle East,” where entrenched crises defined politics.

Turkey, meanwhile, had entered its own phase of recalibration. Once a champion of the Arab Spring and regional Islamist movements, Ankara sought reconciliation with Arab states, even attempting to restore ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime (though rebuffed by Damascus), while focusing more narrowly on national security and northern Syria.

On the Palestinian front, Israel had grown complacent toward Gaza, convinced Hamas had no incentive to disrupt the status quo. Tensions, however, were mounting in the West Bank, with small armed groups emerging in places like Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jenin. Within Israeli and Western policy circles, talk was spreading about the prospect of a “mini-state in Gaza” as a substitute for a Palestinian state.

At the international level, President Joe Biden’s administration lacked enthusiasm for either the Abraham Accords or Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” yet it effectively followed the same trajectory: pursuing “regional peace” by integrating Israel into a new economic order and reducing the Palestinian question to daily livelihood concerns—employment, services, and economic relief in Gaza and the West Bank—rather than a political resolution.

The Al-Aqsa Flood and the subsequent two-year genocidal war in Gaza shattered these calculations and fundamentally restructured strategic assumptions. Whether the outcome will ultimately benefit or harm the Palestinian cause remains too complex to assess in simple terms, but what is clear is that the pre-October 7 regional order no longer exists.

From a Palestinian perspective, the conflict has restored international attention to the cause, leading to a renewed recognition of its centrality. In the Gulf, the previously dominant security paradigm—which cast Iran as the chief threat while framing Israel as a potential partner—collapsed entirely. A new consensus has emerged: Gulf security is inseparable from the Palestinian issue, and the notion of Israel as a “strategic friend” has been critically reassessed.

Skeptics may argue that these shifts have not altered the balance of power on the ground, and they are partially correct. Yet the strategic narrative has changed. Before October 7, the trajectory was toward the erasure of the Palestinian cause (closing UNRWA, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, normalization, and de facto annexation of the West Bank). Today, there is growing recognition—regionally and internationally—that Israeli policies themselves are the root of instability, not Iran or other regional actors. As Emirati political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla put it on X (September 25): “When weighing who poses a greater threat to Gulf security and regional stability—Iran or Israel—the evidence points clearly to Israel. Israel’s brutal behavior has made it more dangerous than an exhausted Iran. The Gulf needs a new defensive and geopolitical strategy for the Middle East beyond Iran.”

Israel, however, now perceives a surplus of power and is pressing for a new political and security order that extends beyond the occupied territories. With the partial unraveling of the Iranian alliance and the breakdown of the “Syrian corridor” that once linked Tehran to the Mediterranean, Israel has set its sights on even more ambitious goals, including the proposed “David Corridor” and establishing buffer zones around its borders in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

In response, a tentative regional coalition has begun to take shape, bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar, with notable support from Turkey and Pakistan. The latter signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia following Israel’s strike on Qatar and has since become more engaged in regional diplomacy. While fragile and constrained, this alignment presents a rare historic opportunity to rebuild a regional balance of power and establish a new deterrence framework.

Another striking development is the shift in Europe’s stance toward Israel. For the first time, Israel has lost significant ground in Western public opinion and media narratives, particularly among younger generations and in universities. This has pushed Israel closer to isolation—a position from which former U.S. President Donald Trump had tried to rescue it through his proposed Gaza peace plan, which was largely about securing U.S. and Israeli interests, without offering real guarantees for Palestinian statehood or ending the occupation.

In conclusion, it is still too early to judge the full strategic consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood and the war in Gaza. Scenarios remain open, and outcomes uncertain. Yet one thing is indisputable: the region today is no longer what it was before October 7.

Abu Rumman is an Academic Advisor of the Politics and Society Institute and Professor of Political Science in The University of Jordan and published this article in The Jordan Times.

Analyses

Can Trump Impose His Plan on Gaza?

CrossFireArabia
September 29, 2025

By Dr Amer Al Sabaileh

Leaks continue to emerge from Washington about the vision of the US administration and President Trump for the next phase in Gaza. From the so-called “Riviera” plan floated months ago, the discussion has now shifted to a proposal for a new governing structure: an “International Transitional Authority” that would oversee Gaza for no less than five years. If granted a UN mandate, this body would become the supreme political and legal authority in the Strip.

This is not the first time such ideas have surfaced. Throughout the past year, many debates revolved around possible frameworks for Gaza, including new local councils or administrative bodies—always with a firm insistence on excluding the Palestinian Authority’s return. But the latest leak appears more realistic than turning Gaza into a real estate project. It now points to a future shaped by new Palestinian technocrats, operating under international oversight, with figures close to Arab decision-making circles such as former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair being floated as possible players. The plan also shows more detail and coherence than previous notions, echoing elements from earlier UN initiatives, especially the principle of rejecting forced displacement or mass expulsion of Palestinians—something Netanyahu has openly opposed.

It is only natural that such ideas are presented not just as trial balloons but as potential answers to an intractable dilemma. The notion of internationalizing Gaza was laid out earlier, following the failure to stop the war and the inability to craft a viable local compromise. Any solution today is being imported from outside, yet still built on immovable foundations: stripping Gaza of weapons and removing Hamas from the Strip. This means we remain far from implementation. Demanding the release of all hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, and its full withdrawal reduces the problem to its simplest form, while in reality, the crisis is still at its peak, not at the stage of post-war arrangements.

The Arab role, increasingly visible in recent months, could prove decisive in shaping any solution. Gulf states, in particular, have stepped up their influence over the Trump administration’s regional outlook. This was evident in their opposition to annexation plans for the West Bank, which Trump raised in talks with Arab leaders. Israel, however, has already taken steps on the ground and shows no sign of reversing them. US pressure, therefore, is focused less on halting annexation altogether and more on blocking its formal declaration. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar even clarified that the debate is not about annexing Palestinian-owned land, but about applying Israeli law to settlements in Area C, signalling a plan to consolidate control without directly clashing with Trump.

Against this backdrop, Netanyahu used his speech at the UN to stress that the war is far from over. While showcasing Israel’s achievements against Iran and its allies, he reaffirmed his concept of the “seven fronts war,” insisting the threat is ongoing and escalation remains possible. This message was clearly aimed at Trump, but Netanyahu also sought to tap into Trump’s interest in a peace legacy, hinting at possible peace with Syria and Lebanon. Still, he tied this to guarantees for minority rights—particularly for the Druze—framing concessions within security needs while keeping escalation elsewhere on the table.

All of this suggests that the region, from now until the coming anniversary of October 7, will remain open to potential flare-ups. Israel’s government, under pressure to deliver even symbolic victories, will continue to play both cards of potential peace and the threat of ongoing confrontation as the second anniversary of the October 7 attack approaches.

The author is a columnist for the Jordan Times

Analyses

Yemeni Drone Lands on Eilat Hotel, Injures 22

CrossFireArabia
September 25, 2025

In a dramatic move of events, a Houthi drone landed in the courtyard of an Israeli hotel in Eilat, Wednesday afternoon, to the surprise of a sleepy, touristic city with sharp bangs and explosions.

The drone sending blast waves and injuring 22 people three of which were critical as reported by the Israeli media, is creating an atmosphere of alarm and fear. This latest hit is seen as a first for incoming drones to Israel.

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The blast, a rarity in itself, because most of these drones and ballistic missiles that travel more than 2000 kilometers from Yemen to Israel, are shot down in mid-air. Up till recently these drones were seen as a bit of nuisance for the Israeli army.

But not this one. The latest strike is seen as a wake up call to Tel Aviv particularly as it is the third to come in two weeks with the Houthis managing to target the Ramon Airport twice – and damaging its departure lounge. The airport has become Israel’s next major international airport next to Eilat and regularly brings in European tourists.

Also, the latest strike is an upkeep of a Houthi promise that these projectiles will not stop as long as the Israeli war on Gaza continues – now coming up to the end of its second year and killed over 65,000 people – and it has been good on its word as recognized by the Israeli media.

The fact that the drone landed outside a touristic hotel and injured over 22 people shows that Houthis are a formidable force and no amount of action will stop them. This is while the latest targeting is seen as a major escalation and source of concern, because now, civilians are being involved with casualties rammed up.

Since 7 October 2023, the Israeli military, through airborne planes bombed Yemen cities a total of 16 times but to no avail. This is in spite of the fact that Israeli planes bombed ports, oil facilities, electrical grids with the last bombing killing the Houthi prime minister and the government in late August 2025.

But the Houthis have not relented nor they plan to. From last July onwards they targeted Israel, including Ben Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Eilat almost every other day. As well. Since 19 October 2023 when the targetting started in support of the people of Gaza, the Houthis fired hundreds of drones, missiles and ballistic missiles towards Israel and which the latter have been unable to stop them.

In a bid to downplay the extent of the fallout, the Israeli government kept saying the incoming projectiles were/are negligible. However, such an assessment ignored the fact it created chaos in the Ben Gurion Airport and disrupted air traffic control while diverting planes from Tel Aviv to other destinations.

This is not to say anything about the fact the sirens boomed in every town and settlement from Tel Aviv, south to occupied Jerusalem sending millions of Israelis to underground shelters and creating many disruptions to the daily lives of people.

The latest direct targeting on an Eilat hotel may be seen as an embarrassment to the Israeli defences, including its billion-dollar Iron Dome and other military paraphernalia for they misfired and were unable to shoot-down the “uneffective drone” from the air.

Military experts say the reason why they were not able to track the drone and shoot it down was related to the fact that the Yemen projectile flew at a low altitude and thus was able to reach its target. The Iron Dome and similar defences are designed to deal with incoming high altitude ballistic missiles. In this case, two very expensive – millions of dollars – counter-missiles were fired at the incoming drone but missed, thus causing the extensive damages and injuries on the ground not to say anything to the pride of Israeli military superiority.

Analyses

Israel’s Mideast Message

CrossFireArabia
September 11, 2025

By Dr Maisa Al Masri

“This is a message to the entire Middle East,” Israeli Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana said in response to the Israeli airstrike that targeted Hamas leaders in the heart of the Qatari capital, Doha.

However, this statement is not merely a comment on the military operation strike into a declared strategic message, telling the entire region, and primarily the Gulf, that Israel, in partnership with Washington, has become the master of the decision-making process in the region.

Ohana’s statement is an explicit and direct threat that leaves no room for interpretation, reflecting the new deterrence doctrine adopted by Tel Aviv: No red lines, no geographical immunities, and no Western allies outside the confines of Israeli dictates. Simply put, anyone who disagrees with us becomes a legitimate target, even if they are in the heart of a friendly capital that hosts the largest American military base.

This makes for a dangerous conclusion: Israel no longer views the Gulf states as partners in stability, but rather as “open arenas for fiery messages.” Washington is blessing the silence, participating in complicity, and mocking the Arabs.

Naked dominance

And don’t forget the Israeli crime in the heart of the Gulf marks the beginning of a new era of naked dominance. It’s not a traditional security operation, but a pivotal turning point in the rules of regional engagement, in which Qatar has been embarrassed both on the Arab level and internationally.

Israel has now publicly placed itself in a circle (no longer concealing its intentions) – through bombing and military strikes – that it no longer sees a distinction between political geography and the theater of operations. More dangerously, the heart of the Gulf today has become openly subject to Tel Aviv’s fire. And who can challenge it?

The strike wasn’t an intelligence leak or a silent targeting, but a direct airstrike in an area teeming with embassies, schools, and residential buildings, in a country that is a major ally of Washington and a pillar of American security in the Middle East.

Thus the message has become clear to everyone: No one is above attack… no state, no sovereignty, no partnership.

The US administration, led by Donald Trump, evaded with a series of conflicting statements about its prior knowledge of the operation. But whether it knew and blessed it, knew and remained silent, knew too late, or did not know at all, the outcome is the same: The American cover was removed, Gulf confidence eroded, and billions perished. The statements of the US embassy in Doha did not go beyond expressions of caution to American citizens, while White House statements swayed between “regret over the location” to “understanding the goal of eliminating terrorism.”

I believe the opposite message was conveyed to the Gulf capitals: Your security is not a priority, and your sovereignty does not equate to a clear position from Washington. The question that now arises however is: Why Qatar? Why now? Why was the strike carried out in Qatar and not in Turkey, or Iran for example? This is despite the fact that the Hamas leaders that were targeted had just returned from Istanbul, suggesting Tel Aviv chose the location not arbitrarily but with deep political awareness. Tel Aviv did not pull the trigger in Istanbul, even though the targeted leaders passed through it only hours earlier.

Turkey, with all its military, political, and international complexity, is not a testing ground for Israeli madness. There are red lines that even Tel Aviv dares not cross… and Turkey is one of them. The potential Turkish military response, the internal Turkish explosion during a highly sensitive election season, and the delicate balance of power within NATO rendered Turkish territory “operationally closed” even to the most violent wings of Israeli decision-making. But when the targeted figures left Istanbul for Doha, everything changed.

Qatar, like other threatened Arab states, in the Israeli security and intelligence mindset, is merely an intermediate gray area, neither neutral nor classified as an “enemy,” potentially a shocking target at a low cost. This is something all Arab decision-makers should be aware of.

From Tel Aviv’s perspective, Qatar is balancing contradictory roles, managing mediation, funding aid, and hosting parties that anger Israel without possessing a genuine deterrent umbrella. There are no international calculations that could prevent a surgical strike carried out within hours. Merely hosting an American base does not make Doha “immune,” but may even further tempt Tel Aviv, proving that decision-making in the region is no longer solely in Washington’s hands but in Tel Aviv as well.

In short, Israel needed a platform to send the biggest message since the Gaza war… so it chose the weakest link, amid the silence of its strongest ally.

Here, we can pause a moment at the Knesset member’s statement that the operation was “a message to the Middle East.” This is not a slip of the tongue, but a strategic doctrine upon which future decisions are based. Israel is telling all countries in the region that whoever harbors Hamas, or even engages in dialogue with it, will be next.

If the Arab states fail to take a firm political stand, the Doha precedent will be repeated elsewhere. It may not be Hamas’s mediation that stands accuse but rather the concepts of neutrality, balance, and even dialogue with parties Tel Aviv disapproves of and which then could become sufficient justification for a strike. It’s a policy of punishment.

This scene is posing existential questions for Arab capitals. If Qatar, Washington’s most important ally, is being bombed over the heads of its own people, after Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza… should we wait for Iraq’s turn? Riyadh? Abu Dhabi? Kuwait? And others? Does the American umbrella truly protect us, or is it used only when our interests intersect with Israel’s?

And what is the point of hosting American bases if they do not prevent airspace violations? Or provide protection?

What happened in Doha is pushing the region to crossroads: Either continuing its position of dependency and timid mediation, or repositioning strategically and developing independent air defenses, which is logistically difficult, or seeking alternative alliances (Ankara, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran?), and establishing red lines that Tel Aviv will not cross.

Qatar now faces difficult choices: Will it withdraw from the Hamas mediation? Will it demand real security guarantees? Will it go further, toward symbolic deterrence or unconventional partnerships? Or will it pay the price of protection once again?

Beware: A war of wills is beginning now. The Israeli airstrike in Doha was not just a blow to Hamas, but also a slap in the face to the sovereignty of the Gulf and the region, an undermining of the prestige of international law and its signed, ratified, and binding agreements, and an insult to the concept of the alleged strategic partnership with America.

This is the beginning of a new era, one in which Israel and Washington declare that the security of the region is no longer an Arab decision. The question now is: Will the Arabs as a whole wake up before “Ohana’s message” reaches other capitals? Perhaps.

The author is a political writer based in Amman Jordan and contributed this article to the Al Rai Alyoum Arabic website